Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, Verse 12

1. The Questions This Verse Raises

The five questions distinguish the prescribed shares from the disputes about their application and the warning against harming the heirs.

Q1. What shares do spouses receive, and what does ⁧وَلَدٌ⁩, "a child", include?

The verse assigns four fractions to the spouses, with each share hinging on one word, ⁧وَلَدٌ⁩ (walad), "a child". The husband takes half of what his wife leaves if she has no child and a quarter if she has one; the wife takes a quarter if her husband has no child and an eighth if he has one. None of the four is in question. The central issue to resolve is the exact scope of the word, who the child is whose presence halves a spouse's share, and with it what makes a woman a wife for the purpose of the verse, whether several wives multiply their share or divide it, and why the husband's portion is twice the wife's.

Here, a qualifying child means a son or daughter eligible to inherit, or a descendant through sons who has the same effect on the spouse's share. A child from any marriage counts. Under the ruling explained below, a descendant through a daughter does not reduce the share.

The verse explicitly dictates the fractions. The verse speaks to the husbands and gives the four fractions itself: to you belongs half of what your wives leave if they have no child and a quarter if they have one, and to them a quarter of what you leave if you have no child and an eighth if you have one. An early commentary specifies both the timing and the condition: half of the estate if they leave no child—male or female—on the day of death, and an eighth for the wives regardless of whether the surviving children are one or many (al-Ṭabarī).^[43] These four shares are established by explicit text and unanimous agreement, requiring no secondary derivation. The remaining wealth passes to the other heirs; Abū al-Suʿūd also mentions the public treasury when no other heir exists.^[44] The question is therefore which children reduce the spouse’s share.

Any child, of either sex and by any marriage. The word includes a son and a daughter alike, and one child as much as many, because ⁧وَلَدٌ⁩ means one who is born and the verse before this one has just spoken of the children as "the male" and "the female" (Ibn ʿUthaymīn).^[45] It includes a child of the wife by an earlier husband as much as a child by this one, because the verse conditions the half on "if they have no child" and not on "if you have none": the child is hers, whoever its father was (al-Ālūsī). This interpretation was already established among the Successors, who understood the clause to mean any child by the husband she leaves behind or by another (Saʿīd b. Jubayr). The same is true of the husband, whose child by any wife reduces the widow to the eighth.^[46] The child must also be one who inherits, since the child whose presence reduces the spouse's portion must be an eligible heir, and one barred from the inheritance does not lower a spouse's share (al-Jaṣṣāṣ).^[47]

The son's child in the son's place, and not the daughter's. The son's child stands in the son's place however far down, and the daughter's child does not. The reason stems from both the language and the law. The word applies to any inheriting child, whether a direct descendant or through the male line however far down, male or female, one or many, by any marriage, since the term covers them all comprehensively (Abū al-Suʿūd). And the son's child inherits in the son's place, so that a husband whose wife leaves a son's son does not take the half, because the sons' children are as the children of the loins (Ibn ʿUthaymīn); and the scholars agree on this too.^[48] A daughter’s child does not reduce the spouse’s share under the ruling adopted here (al-Saʿdī).^[49] A different position is attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās ⁧رضي الله عنهما⁩: a grandchild does not reduce the spouse’s share. It is recorded by al-Ālūsī and Rashīd Riḍā, while Riḍā identifies the inclusion of descendants through sons as the majority position followed in practice.^[50]

What makes a woman a wife. A valid marriage contract establishes inheritance rights even before consummation. The verse says “your wives”, and the valid contract is what makes her a wife (al-Ālūsī, Ibn ʿUthaymīn).^[51]

Divorce requires a further distinction. If the divorce is revocable and the husband dies during the wife’s waiting period, she still inherits because the marriage remains in force. An irrevocable divorce normally ends mutual inheritance. But where a husband uses such a divorce during a life-threatening illness to deprive his wife of inheritance, her right may remain. Under the ruling explained by Ibn ʿUthaymīn, she inherits if he dies of that illness, even after her waiting period has ended, provided she has not remarried or done something incompatible with the marriage, such as apostasy. The suspicion of deliberate deprivation matters: if the separation was at her own request, this exception does not apply.

The conditions differ among the cited authorities. The Ḥanafī treatment in Maʿārif al-Qurʾān limits the right to a death within her waiting period. The Mudawwana preserves a broader Mālikī treatment: she inherits when he divorces her in the qualifying illness and dies of it, even in the case discussed there in which she has remarried.^[52]

Several wives share one share. When a man leaves multiple wives—whether two, three, or four—they equally divide the quarter or the eighth; the share itself does not multiply. The verse allocates a single portion to the wives collectively, making no legal distinction between one wife and several, unlike its explicit differentiation between one daughter and two, or one sister and two (al-Qurṭubī).^[53] A second reason relates to the husband's discretion: the number of wives is within his direct control. If their share multiplied with their number, a husband could intentionally deplete the estate to harm the other heirs, whereas the number of daughters and sisters is beyond his choice (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[54] A third rationale is that the law's normative baseline is a single wife, and exceptional cases do not generate independent rulings (Rashīd Riḍā).^[55] The commentators record this shared distribution as the explicit ruling of the verse, noting that it is entirely undisputed.^[56]

Why the husband takes twice what the wife takes, and why the spouses come here. The husband's double share extends the rule from the previous verse, 'for the male the like of the portion of two females', directly to the spouses (al-Nasafī).^[57] The rationale of the rule is the man's heavier financial responsibility. Since marriage creates bonds of affection and support akin to blood relations, the law treats spousal inheritance like kinship inheritance, but doubles the husband's portion to offset his mandatory duties of financial maintenance and protection (Ibn Rajab).^[58] The comparison is with a man and woman who share both the same line and the same degree of relationship, not with any male and female heir. Even there, the two-to-one pattern has exceptions: maternal siblings and male or female emancipators can receive equal shares (al-Ālūsī).^[59] Ibn Kamāl notes that parents also belong among these cases of equality, pointing out their omission from the shorter list.^[60]

The spouses are placed between the children and the kalāla because the Qurʾān orders heirs by their proximity to the deceased. Those joined to him without an intermediary by birth come first, those joined to him by marriage next, and those joined to him through another, which is the kalāla, last. Thus, the marital bond is deliberately positioned after parents and children but before extended kinship (al-Rāzī, with Abū Ḥayyān and al-Biqāʿī after him).^[61] Before Islam the spouses inherited nothing from each other, so the verse therefore gives a marital right denied during the Jāhiliyya (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[62]

The position of the maternal siblings makes a further point. Among the siblings, those related through the mother are addressed here before the full and paternal siblings discussed at the end of the sūrah. Giving attention to the weaker maternal connection challenges the injustice of excluding women from inheritance (al-Biqāʿī).^[63]

The bequest clause is repeated because each part concerns a different person’s estate: parents and children in 4:11, then the wife, the husband and the person who leaves kalālah heirs in 4:12 (al-Nasafī).^[64] Its first occurrence here, after the husband’s share of his wife’s estate, has a particular significance. ⁧مِنْ بَعْدِ وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصِينَ بِهَا أَوْ دَيْنٍ⁩, “after any bequest they make or debt”, recognizes her own right to make a bequest and incur debt. Her husband inherits only after those claims have been met; marriage does not erase her separate financial rights (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[65]

Conclusion: The husband takes half if his wife leaves no child, and a quarter if she does; the wife takes a quarter if her husband leaves no child, and an eighth if he does, which multiple wives share equally. The child whose presence reduces these shares is a son or daughter eligible to inherit, or a descendant through sons in their place, from any marriage. Descendants through daughters do not reduce the spouse’s share under this ruling.

And Allah knows best.

Q2. What does ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ mean, and whom does it describe?

1. What kalālah means here

The maternal brother and sister receive the shares stated here only in a kalālah inheritance. Before calculating those shares, therefore, we need to know which relatives the deceased has left. The principal disagreement is whether the absence of a child is enough, or whether the father must also have died.

Parents and grandparents are a person's ascendants; children and grandchildren are descendants. Brothers, sisters, uncles, nephews and cousins belong to other branches of the family. They are called collateral relatives, or ⁧الحَوَاشِي⁩: neither person descends from the other, although they share an ancestor. A brother, for example, is related through a shared parent, not because one brother is descended from the other. Ibn ʿUthaymīn illustrates kalālah inheritance with a person whose heirs are brothers, paternal uncles, brothers' sons or paternal uncles' sons.^[66]

Those examples explain the wider term. This verse concerns one particular group: brothers and sisters who share the deceased's mother but not the father. The kalālah provision at the end of the sūrah concerns full or paternal siblings instead. Their shares are different (Mālik).^[67]

For the maternal siblings here, a surviving son or daughter, descendants through sons, a father or a paternal grandfather prevents their inheritance. A surviving mother does not. They may inherit alongside the very mother through whom they are related. Ibn Kathīr expressly makes this distinction. Ibn ʿUthaymīn likewise explains that the excluded ascendants are male: female ascendants do not prevent maternal siblings from inheriting.^[68]

This alternative produces material legal consequences and cannot be treated as a mere difference in expression. A separate dispute concerns what the noun describes: the deceased, the heirs or their relationship. That question is considered after the evidence for the inheritance condition.

2. The evidence for the principal definitions

The argument from the two inheritance verses begins with ⁧إِنِ امْرُؤٌ هَلَكَ لَيْسَ لَهُ وَلَدٌ وَلَهُ أُخْتٌ⁩, “If a man dies, having no child, and he has a sister” (4:176). Only the child is expressly excluded. Al-Rāzī records this as the argument for the child-only definition.^[71]

The answer depends on the rest of the inheritance provisions. The same verse gives the sister a half and, in the reverse case, makes the brother his sister's heir. A surviving father would prevent those siblings from inheriting. Thus the family circumstances presupposed by the ruling exclude the father as well as the child (al-Rāzī). In 4:11, the parents' inheritance is described even when siblings are present: the siblings reduce the mother's share, but are not themselves given a share alongside the father. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses that provision to explain why the father's absence is required even though 4:176 expressly mentions only the child's.^[72]

The order of the legislation gives a further reason. Children and parents have already received their provisions; kalālah introduces a different family situation. Ibn ʿĀshūr gives this contrast as his reason for preferring the majority definition.^[73]

Jābir's circumstances provide a concrete example: he had neither child nor father, his father having died at Uḥud. Abū Ḥayyān cites his case, and Muḥammad b. Naṣr al-Marwazī uses it in explaining kalālah. It illustrates the definition in an actual inheritance question; Jābir's circumstances are not an exhaustive definition of the word.^[74]

The evidence can be compared as follows:

The disagreement over the grandfather extends beyond this verse. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ discusses whether full or paternal siblings may inherit with him and argues that he should be treated like the father. The narrower point relevant here is that maternal siblings do not inherit alongside the paternal grandfather; his wider conclusion about other siblings belongs to that further legal dispute.^[76]

3. The role of language and poetry

Kinship around the direct family line. The wreath explanation relates kalālah to ⁧الإِكْلِيل⁩, a wreath or crown surrounding the head. Parents and children form the direct line; other relatives are connected around it. This is the explanation Ibn Kathīr and al-Shawkānī use, and the image behind Ibn ʿUthaymīn's examples above. Al-Rāzī illustrates direct descent with an unnamed poet's line:

The connected joints picture one generation descending from another. Brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts are related through that family line but are not ancestors or descendants of one another (al-Rāzī).^[77]

There is also a proposed linguistic explanation for excluding the child alone. A child comes from the deceased and may be described as part of him; his father does not come from him. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ suggests that this may explain the narrower interpretation, although he himself argues for excluding both father and child.^[78]

Weariness and more distant kinship. Another derivation begins with ⁧الكَلَال⁩, weariness. The ordinary meaning appears in al-Aʿshā's description of driving his camel onward:

Here kalālah means exhaustion (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[79] The application to kinship compares an indirect connection with the closer bond of parent and child. Muftī Muḥammad Shafīʿ develops this explanation from al-Ālūsī: kalālah names the relationship outside the father–son bond, described as weaker by comparison.^[80] Al-Shanqīṭī records this derivation alongside the wreath explanation; he also records a derivation from ⁧الكَلّ⁩, “the back”: kalālah is what the deceased leaves behind him.^[81] Another family image describes father and child as a person's two ends: when neither survives, those two ends of the direct line are gone (Ibn Qutayba, Thaʿlab).^[82]

Descent from fathers rather than other relatives. Al-Farazdaq praises an inheritance of honour:

The honour comes through fathers rather than brothers and uncles. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains the contrast in those terms, and al-Rāzī uses it as evidence that the father is not included in kalālah.^[83]

An unnamed poet makes a similar distinction through the protection relatives give:

Al-Zajjāj cites the contrast as linguistic evidence that the father is not a kalālah relative.^[84]

Was the term used before Islam? Al-Jaṣṣāṣ says it was and cites ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufayl:

The poet claims leadership through his own merit rather than inherited standing. He is speaking about honour, not the distribution of an estate. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains the kalālah here through the ancestor connecting the wider family. Ibn ʿĀshūr, however, suspects that the specialized inheritance usage is Qurʾānic: he says he has not seen that usage in Arabic before the verse's revelation.^[85]

Al-Shanqīṭī quotes a versified explanation:

He identifies this as Abū Bakr's and most Companions' definition and explicitly endorses it. The lines summarize that legal definition.^[86]

4. The Companion accounts and ʿUmar's reported final position

ʿUmar ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ repeatedly asked about kalālah, and the Prophet ﷺ directed him to the verse at the end of the sūrah.^[87] The answer therefore required considering the inheritance provisions together, not simply translating a familiar Arabic word (al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Ibn al-ʿArabī).^[88]

Abū Bakr's definition and the narration supporting it. Abū Bakr ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ is reported to have said:

Al-Shaʿbī relates this explanation and adds that ʿUmar was reluctant to disagree with Abū Bakr. The chain is interrupted: al-Shaʿbī did not hear either Companion. Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn nevertheless says that the next narration strengthens this account. In that narration, Ṭāwūs says he heard Ibn ʿAbbās describe his last meeting with ʿUmar. The definition stated there is again “one who has neither child nor father.” This is the particular supporting narration Yāsīn means in his edition of Ibn Kathīr.^[89]

The same definition is reported from Ibn ʿAbbās through ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa, a route Yāsīn grades ḥasan.^[90] A report also attributes it to the Prophet ﷺ, but Ibn Rajab judges the version connected through Abū Hurayrah weak.^[91]

Why the final conversation needs explanation. The account through Ṭāwūs and Ibn ʿAbbās has different endings in the sources:

The second wording omits the father. Al-Bayhaqī prefers the other accounts from ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās, which support excluding both child and father. His reasons are that they accord better with the Qurʾān and Sunnah, and that several reports support them against this isolated account. Thus his judgment favours the fuller definition; he does not treat the two endings as equally reliable.^[94]

ʿUmar's withdrawal. A separate account states the change directly. Al-Shaʿbī reports that ʿUmar had defined kalālah as leaving no child, but after he was stabbed said:

The account of withdrawal is the one followed here. It is recorded by Ibn al-Mundhir; al-Qurṭubī, Abū Ḥayyān and Ibn ʿĀshūr also report withdrawal from the child-only definition. Al-Shawkānī quotes Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr to that effect.^[95] Accounts of continued hesitation exist too, and al-Jaṣṣāṣ concludes that ʿUmar did not settle the question.^[96]

The legal conclusion. Kalālah excludes both child and father. Ibn Kathīr identifies this as the position of the seven jurists of Madīnah, the four imams and the general body of earlier and later scholars:

Al-Shanqīṭī states his preference explicitly:

When describing the deceased more specifically, he writes ⁧الميت الذي لم يخلف والدا ولا ولدا⁩, “the deceased who has left neither father nor child.” The permission for maternal siblings to inherit alongside the mother is explicit in Ibn Kathīr and Ibn ʿUthaymīn, as explained above.

After quoting the versified definition given above, al-Shanqīṭī adds:

For the maternal siblings of this verse, the qualifying family circumstances were explained at the start: the mother does not prevent their inheritance, whereas a father or paternal grandfather does. A separate report from Abū Bakr also identifies these siblings as maternal siblings.^[98]

5. Whom does the noun describe?

The legal definition tells us which family circumstances allow the maternal siblings to inherit. The next question concerns the sentence itself: does ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ describe the deceased, the relatives inheriting from him, their relationship, or the inheritance?

The word is used in more than one way. Muftī Muḥammad Shafīʿ describes both the deceased who leaves “no son or father” and the heir who is “neither the son nor the father” of the deceased. He relates these uses to an understood ⁧ذُو⁩, “a person with”: someone connected by the more distant relationship. He also records a later use for the property inherited in such a case.^[99]

The deceased: whose circumstances determine the shares? The person whose estate is divided must have left neither child nor father. Whether a maternal sibling has a child or father of his own does not determine whether he inherits this estate. That is why al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Rāzī prefer to understand the deceased here. Al-Shawkānī likewise explains kalālah as the deceased who leaves neither child nor father.^[100]

The heirs: Jābir's use of the word. Jābir says, ⁧فَإِنَّمَا يَرِثُنِي كَلَالَةٌ⁩, “Only kalālah relatives will inherit me.” Here the word describes the people who inherit. Al-Ṭabarī makes this report the basis of his preference for the heirs. Al-Shawkānī quotes that preference as al-Ṭabarī's.^[101] Early explanations also use the word for heirs other than child and father.^[102] Other, less usual definitions restrict kalālah to the absence of a father alone or to distant cousins.^[103]

A relationship can be described from either person's side. “Kinship” names the connection, while “my kin” names the people connected to me. In explaining kalālah, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Rāzī distinguish the relationship itself from the deceased or heirs described by it.^[104] Explanations naming the deceased and explanations naming the heirs are both transmitted from Saʿīd b. Jubayr.^[105]

Does it mean every heir? Al-Rāghib rejects that broader explanation. Its supporters appeal to a verse about a man accumulating wealth that others will inherit. Abū Ḥayyān quotes:

The warning is especially pointed if the miser's wealth passes to relatives other than his own children. On al-Rāghib's explanation, therefore, the poem does not require kalālah to mean every heir. Abū Ḥayyān attributes the broader definition to him, but al-Rāghib's own discussion rejects it.^[107]

The grammatical preferences. Al-Shanqīṭī prefers al-Zajjāj's explanation:

He calls this ⁧وهو الأظهر⁩, “the more apparent interpretation.” The sentence describes the deceased's circumstances: he has relatives outside the direct parent–child line. Muftī Muḥammad Shafīʿ also explains an understood “person with,” although his discussion allows the expression to describe either the deceased or the heir.^[108]

Ibn ʿUthaymīn instead explains ⁧يُورَثُ إِرْثَ كَلَالَةٍ⁩, “he is inherited from through a kalālah inheritance.” In grammatical terms, ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ specifies the kind of inheritance. This is not an explanation of the word as the property left behind.^[109]

The estate interpretation and its objection. Ibn al-ʿArabī rejects the explanation “the estate” as lacking linguistic or rational support. Ibn ʿAṭiyya adds that the derivation from encircling describes relatives, not wealth. Al-Qurṭubī answers with a grammatical construction in which an understood noun of inheritance is qualified by kalālah; al-Shanqīṭī records the estate usage as uncommon.^[110] The active forms ⁧يُورِثُ⁩ and ⁧يُوَرِّثُ⁩, “leaves an inheritance,” allow further grammatical explanations alongside passive ⁧يُورَثُ⁩, “is inherited from.” The particular analyses and their source differences belong to the Iʿrāb discussion.^[111]

The scholars' preferences. Al-Rāzī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ prefer the deceased; al-Ṭabarī prefers the heirs. Of the two grammatical explanations developed here, al-Shanqīṭī explicitly prefers “a person with kalālah kinship,” whereas Ibn ʿUthaymīn explains “a kalālah inheritance.”

6. Conclusion

Kalālah inheritance here excludes child and father: Abū Bakr’s definition, explicitly preferred by al-Rāzī and al-Shanqīṭī. Al-Shanqīṭī also attributes it to most of the Companions, and Ibn Kathīr presents it as the position of the four imams. For the maternal siblings, the rule also excludes descendants through sons and a paternal grandfather; it does not exclude their inheritance alongside the mother.^[112]

ʿUmar most likely withdrew from the child-only definition and returned to Abū Bakr's position, as reported by the scholars identified above. The noun's several uses and the grammatical constructions explaining it have been distinguished above, with the scholars' respective preferences.

And Allah knows best.

Q3. Who are the brother and sister of this verse, and how do they share?

A maternal brother or sister shares the deceased's mother but has a different father. These are the siblings meant here. A full sibling shares both parents; a paternal sibling shares only the father. Their inheritance is treated at the end of the sūrah, in 4:176.

The ordinary rule is straightforward: one maternal sibling receives a sixth; two or more share a third equally. The more demanding question arises when those shares, together with the husband's and mother's, use up the whole estate. May full brothers then join the maternal siblings in their third?

1. The ordinary shares

These are the prescribed shares after debts and valid bequests have been dealt with. They apply when no father, paternal grandfather, child or descendant through successive sons excludes the maternal siblings. A surviving mother does not exclude them (Ibn Kathīr).^[113]

The phrase ⁧أَكْثَرَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ⁩, “more than that,” means more than the single brother or sister just mentioned. The change from a sixth to a third therefore begins with two, not three. Adding further siblings does not enlarge their collective share; it divides the same third among more people (al-Shawkānī, al-Ṭabarī, al-Ālūsī).^[114]

The deceased may be a man or a woman. Although ⁧وَلَهُ⁩, “and he has,” uses a masculine singular pronoun, it refers to either of the two people just named. The rule is the same for the estate of each (al-Shawkānī).^[115]

2. Why these are the siblings through the mother

The two inheritance passages give different shares. In 4:176, a sister receives a half, two sisters receive two thirds, and a brother can inherit the whole estate when there is no competing entitlement. Here the single sibling receives only a sixth, and the group has a third. The two passages therefore concern different classes of siblings: full or paternal siblings at the sūrah's end, and maternal siblings here (al-Zajjāj; Ibn ʿAṭiyya).^[116]

The smaller allocation also fits the maternal relationship. A sixth and a third are the mother's possible prescribed portions in different family circumstances. The commentators explain that her children inherit through that relationship and receive portions corresponding to hers (al-Zuḥaylī, Rashīd Riḍā).^[117] Ibn ʿĀshūr adds a further reason: if these were the full or paternal siblings, why would their collective share be limited to a third while two thirds remained for others less closely related?^[118]

The early explanation makes that relationship explicit. Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ is reported to have recited:

Ubayy b. Kaʿb ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ is also reported with ⁧مِنَ الْأُمِّ⁩, “through the mother.”^[120] These additional words are not part of the ten canonical readings. Khālid al-Ghāmidī describes Saʿd's form as shādhdh, not recited as Qurʾān, and an explanation from Saʿd; Ibn Juzayy likewise treats the words as an explanation of the meaning.^[121]

Two questions arise about these additional words. First, can a reliably transmitted noncanonical reading establish a legal ruling? One argument treats it like a solitary report, khabar al-āḥād, because it is not a matter of personal opinion; this is al-Karkhī’s comparison. A further argument distinguishes its status as Qurʾān from its value as a report: if the words were transmitted from the Prophet ﷺ, failure to establish them as Qurʾān does not by itself remove their evidential value as a report. Al-Qāsimī gives this second argument for the position transmitted by al-Buwayṭī from al-Shāfiʿī and followed by most of his school. Maẓharī attributes acceptance, conditional on a sound chain, to Abū Ḥanīfa, but reports a different position from al-Shāfiʿī. Al-Ālūsī records both acceptance and rejection.^[122]

Second, were the words recited as Qurʾān at all? It was a Companion’s explanation which listeners mistook for part of the recitation.^[123]

The identification of maternal siblings does not depend on resolving that question. Ibn ʿUthaymīn explicitly considers the meaning clear even without the reported reading, because 4:176 already gives the rules for the other siblings.^[124] Al-Qurṭubī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ report scholarly agreement that the siblings here are maternal.^[125]

3. Why brothers and sisters receive equal portions

The verse says ⁧فَهُمْ شُرَكَاءُ فِي الثُّلُثِ⁩, “they are partners in the third.” An unqualified partnership gives its members equal portions; nothing here grants the brother twice the sister's share. That contrasts with the explicit two-to-one rule for sons and daughters, and for full or paternal brothers and sisters (Ibn ʿUthaymīn, Ibn Juzayy, Ibn al-ʿArabī; also reported by al-Shawkānī).^[126]

The relationship is also the same for each sibling: all inherit through their mother. Being male does not make one of them more closely related through her than another (al-Bayḍāwī, al-Biqāʿī, Abū al-Suʿūd, al-Ālūsī, Ibn Kamāl).^[127] Their prescribed portions correspond to the mother's sixth or third, and each participates equally in that maternal connection (Rashīd Riḍā, al-Nasafī).^[128]

A further explanation concerns the old tribal setting. Maternal siblings were related through the womb, rather than through the deceased's paternal clan. Their men did not have the additional role in clan defence that distinguished male members of that clan. Their inheritance is therefore explained as a gift of kinship shared equally by men and women (Ibn Rajab).^[129]

The equality is stated by the jurists and is also attributed to ʿUmar ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ in an account transmitted by al-Zuhrī. Yāsīn notes that al-Zuhrī did not hear from ʿUmar.^[130] Al-Qurṭubī reports agreement on the equal shares.^[131]

Their mother may inherit with them. Normally, a relative who inherits through another person is excluded while that person survives. Yet here the mother takes her own share and the maternal siblings take theirs. Maẓharī explains that the agreed rule takes precedence over that general analogy; he also points out that the mother does not inherit the whole estate.^[132]

The commentators differ over how this relates to the word kalālah. Al-Bayḍāwī treats the mother's presence as an agreed exception to the word's implication. Ibn Kamāl says no exception is needed: the lineage excluded by the word in his explanation is the paternal line. Both therefore allow the mother and maternal siblings to inherit together.^[133]

4. When the fixed shares leave nothing for full brothers

Consider a woman who leaves a husband, her mother, two maternal siblings and one or more full brothers. There is no child or father.

A full brother ordinarily takes what remains after prescribed shares. Such heirs are called ⁧عَصَبَة⁩ (ʿaṣabah), or residuary heirs. In this case nothing remains. Yet he shares the same mother as the maternal siblings. Should that maternal relationship allow him to join their third?

This is the mushtaraka, the shared case. It does not arise in this form when the deceased is a man: the wife's quarter, rather than a husband's half, leaves a remainder (Ibn Kathīr, al-Qurṭubī, Ibn ʿAṭiyya).^[134]

These are the school positions recorded by Maẓharī; the principal division is also given by al-Jaṣṣāṣ and Ibn Kathīr.^[135]

The reason for sharing. The full brothers' paternal relationship makes them residuary heirs. But they also have a maternal relationship. On this view, having the additional paternal connection should not prevent them from inheriting through the mother they share with the others.

The reported appeal to ʿUmar ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ puts that argument vividly:

The reference to a donkey gives the case its other name, ḥimāriyya. ʿUmar then included them in the third, according to the account recorded by Ibn Kathīr. Ibn Kathīr states that sharing is authentically reported from both ʿUmar and ʿUthmān ⁧رضي الله عنهما⁩.^[136]

The legal argument is more than an appeal to sympathy. The third is assigned to the mother's children. Full brothers can enter that category through their mother even though they would receive nothing in their capacity as residuary heirs. Ibn al-ʿArabī defends this distinction: the share is first assigned to the maternal siblings, and the full siblings then join them in it.^[137]

The reason for keeping the shares separate. The other position begins with the order of distribution. The maternal siblings have a fixed share; the full brothers have an entitlement to the remainder. Their closer overall relationship does not turn that residual entitlement into another fixed share (al-Zajjāj).^[138]

Ibn ʿAbbās ⁧رضي الله عنهما⁩ relates that the Prophet ﷺ said:

For this position, the sequence is decisive. First pay the husband's half, the mother's sixth and the maternal siblings' third. The full brothers receive only what is left, and here that is nothing. Al-Saʿdī expressly prefers this conclusion. Al-Shawkānī also defends it from the verse and this hadith; al-Jazāʾirī reaches the same result.^[140]

An account from ʿAlī ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ expresses the maternal siblings' entitlement directly: even if they numbered a hundred, their share would not exceed a third; he would not reduce that third by admitting the full siblings into it.^[141]

Does the shared mother require a shared portion? Compare a slightly different estate: a husband, a mother, only one maternal brother, and full brothers and sisters. The husband receives a half, the mother a sixth, and the maternal brother a sixth. The full siblings divide the remaining sixth under their own rule, a male receiving twice a female's portion. An individual full sibling may therefore receive less than the maternal brother, despite sharing his mother and having the additional paternal relationship.

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses this accepted allocation to answer the appeal to a shared mother. The two groups already inherit in different legal capacities: one by a prescribed share, the other from the remainder. Shared parentage does not itself make their allocations identical.^[142]

Ibn Kathīr records both positions, including more than one account from certain Companions. The later schools preserve the same two approaches.^[143]

5. Conclusion

The brother and sister in this verse are maternal siblings. One receives a sixth; two or more share a third equally, with no male preference. Their inheritance is excluded by a father, paternal grandfather, child or descendant through successive sons, but not by the mother.

In the shared case, al-Saʿdī and al-Shawkānī prefer keeping the third for the maternal siblings alone, because the full brothers are entitled only to a remainder. Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī allow the full brothers to share, and Ibn al-ʿArabī explains their entitlement through the common mother.

And Allah knows best.

Q4. What harm does the verse forbid, and is a harmful bequest legally effective?

A person may leave the inheritance fractions unchanged on paper yet deprive the heirs by inventing a debt or giving away what should remain for them. The restriction ⁧غَيْرَ مُضَارٍّ⁩, “without causing harm,” closes that route: bequests and debts must not be used to defeat the division Allah has prescribed (al-Ṭabarī, al-Zajjāj).^[144]

There are three separate questions: what conduct is forbidden, how harmful intent can be established, and whether a forbidden bequest must be cancelled. The last question becomes difficult when a bequest stays within the permitted third but is made specifically to hurt the heirs.

1. What counts as harm?

The prohibition protects the heirs against deliberate changes to Allah’s division: excluding an heir, reducing a share or increasing one person’s entitlement at the others’ expense. To arrange that outcome is to oppose the wisdom of the prescribed division (Ibn Kathīr).^[145]

The means can differ. A person may acknowledge a fictitious debt, claim falsely that someone else owns the property, or say that a debt owed to him has already been repaid. Property can also be diverted through a deliberately underpriced sale or an overpriced purchase. Even a bequest of no more than a third can be harmful when its purpose is to deprive a needy heir rather than to do good (al-Rāzī, Ibn ʿAṭiyya).^[146]

These examples explain why the restriction covers both bequests and debts. A false debt would otherwise take money out of the estate before the shares were calculated. Saʿīd b. Jubayr accordingly explains the clause as forbidding acknowledgment of a liability that does not exist and a bequest exceeding the third to hurt the heirs.^[147] The debt is joined to the bequest in the sentence, so the qualification applies to both (Abū al-Suʿūd).^[148]

Transfers made during the final illness can serve the same purpose. An acknowledgment that the purchase price has been received, or a gift or charitable transfer beyond the permitted amount, may conceal an attempt to divert the estate. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ discusses these acts under the restrictions on deathbed dispositions; this is not a prohibition of every gift made during illness.^[149] Once fraud is established, a fictitious debt is not paid and an invalid disposition cannot replace the prescribed distribution (al-Hilāl, al-Jazāʾirī).^[150]

Although “without causing harm” appears after the maternal-siblings provision, it also qualifies the earlier bequest clauses. They concern the same duty and cannot reasonably permit harm to one class of heirs while forbidding it to another. Its particular placement gives added protection where the heirs are not the deceased’s children or parents: affection for one’s immediate family often restrains conduct that resentment toward more distant relatives might encourage (Ibn ʿĀshūr, Rashīd Riḍā; also Maẓharī).^[151]

2. The permitted third is a limit, not a target

The permission to make a bequest does not give a person unrestricted power over the estate. When Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ asked how much he could give, the Prophet ﷺ said:

The Sunnah establishes the limit; the verse’s instruction to distribute inheritance after a bequest does not remove it. Nor may a person simply add a bequest to an heir’s prescribed share. Al-Shāfiʿī explains these restrictions through the Sunnah and the scholars’ agreement. The fuller discussion belongs under 4:11.^[153]

The heirs’ consent matters because the restriction protects their rights. According to the majority, they may permit the excess above a third; the Ẓāhirīs do not accept that permission as validating the excess. The scholars also differ over a person who has no heir: one view allows a bequest of the whole estate, while another retains the third as the limit.^[154]

Within the limit, the heirs’ circumstances still matter. A large charitable bequest is not automatically the best final use of one’s wealth. Where the estate is small and the heirs are needy, leaving it to them may be better; where there is ample wealth, a smaller fraction may provide for others without impoverishing the family. This explains the preference for a fifth or a quarter in the Companion reports, rather than routinely using the full third (Ibn Qudāma, al-Rāzī).^[155]

Maẓharī makes the practical distinction explicit: instructions left at death can be obligatory, recommended, permitted, disliked or forbidden. An instruction to pay an outstanding debt is not a voluntary gift from the third: the debt is payable from the whole estate before the inheritance is divided. For voluntary bequests, the purpose and the family’s circumstances matter.^[156]

When a dying person says, “I owe this heir money.” This statement is an acknowledgment of debt. The question is whether it can establish the heir’s claim against the estate, not whether an independently established debt ceases to be payable. The debt may be real, yet the statement may also disguise an extra bequest. That risk explains why Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik, Aḥmad and al-Shāfiʿī’s earlier position reject the acknowledgment. Al-Shāfiʿī’s later position accepts it; al-Bukhārī also chooses acceptance, arguing that suspicion must not prevent a genuine trust from being returned to its owner. Ibn Kathīr distinguishes this dispute about a truthful acknowledgment from an invented debt, whose use to favour one heir is forbidden by agreement.^[157]

The Mālikī discussion also considers a close friend whose relationship makes collusion plausible. Its concern is that affection can make a friend as likely as a relative to receive a disguised gift (Ibn al-ʿArabī, al-Qurṭubī).^[158]

3. Why the warning is so severe

Ibn ʿAbbās ⁧رضي الله عنهما⁩ said:

Yāsīn judges the athar ṣaḥīḥ as a mawqūf narration from Ibn ʿAbbās, but does not authenticate it as marfūʿ. The marfūʿ isnād includes ʿUmar b. al-Mughīra, whom Yāsīn describes as ḍaʿīf jiddan. Al-Shawkānī says that the transmitters of al-Nasāʾī’s mawqūf isnād are those of the Ṣaḥīḥ.

In one account, Ibn ʿAbbās follows the warning by reciting 4:13–14. Those verses promise reward for observing Allah’s limits and threaten punishment for crossing them. The connection is direct: manipulating a bequest can undo the very shares just commanded. Deliberately disobeying at the approach of death also shows a grave refusal to submit when the need to prepare for meeting Allah is most urgent (al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Rāzī).^[160]

A hadith narrated by Abū Hurayra ⁧رضي الله عنه⁩ describes a lifetime of obedience ending in a harmful bequest:

Al-Tirmidhī grades this hadith ḥasan gharīb; Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ judges its isnād ḍaʿīf because of Shahr b. Ḥawshab. Other narrations threatening punishment for harmful bequests and deprivation of inheritance appear in books of tafsir with weak asanīd or without an isnād.^[162]

4. Does proved harmful intent cancel a bequest within the third?

The disputed case is a bequest that stays within the third but is intended to hurt the heirs. Does that purpose prevent it from taking effect?

The argument for refusing it. The verse does more than allow a bequest and then advise kindness: it expressly qualifies the disposition as one made “without causing harm.” On this understanding, a proved attempt to hurt the heirs fails a condition of execution. Ibn ʿUthaymīn illustrates the point with a man whose heirs are maternal siblings. If he bequeaths a third specifically to leave them less, and that purpose is established, the bequest is ineffective.^[165]

The general legal principle supports the same result in Ibn ʿĀshūr’s argument: a prohibition entails the invalidity of the prohibited act. He nevertheless requires a clear indication of intent, since an unexpressed motive is ordinarily known only to the testator and Allah.^[166] Al-Shawkānī is explicit: a disposition made solely to harm the heirs is rejected, whether it is a third or less.^[167]

There is also Qurʾānic authority for correcting a wrongful bequest. The permission in 2:182 to reconcile matters where a testator has committed partiality or sin supports returning a harmful bequest even within the third, once the harm is known by admission or a clear indication. Ibn ʿAṭiyya uses that verse to support the cancelling position recorded within Mālik’s school.^[168]

The objection: sin and legal effect are not always the same. Permission to dispose of a third establishes a right over that amount. The Mālikī position reported by al-Qurṭubī does not count the act as harm so long as it remains within that third.^[169]

Proving harmful intent is a separate difficulty. A bequest or acknowledgment of debt intended to harm “does not deserve to be carried out”: al-Ālūsī agrees with this inference of ʿIṣām al-Milla, but says that the intention is difficult to establish unless the person admits it.

He then argues that an act may remain legally effective despite a sinful motive. A person who frees a slave or creates an endowment merely to impress others acts wrongly, but the freeing of the slave or creation of the endowment still takes effect. Why, then, must an ill-intentioned bequest be cancelled? Al-Ālūsī requires a specific proof for treating the bequest differently. He also cites the saying reported from Muʿādh that Allah allowed a third of people’s wealth as an opportunity for charity. At this point he calls execution within the third the apparent conclusion, despite the forbidden intent.^[170]

The disagreement therefore concerns the force of this particular restriction. Ibn ʿUthaymīn treats “without causing harm” as a condition of an enforceable bequest. Al-Ālūsī’s later argument distinguishes the sinful intention from the continued validity of the disposition. Their arguments produce different legal results even when both acknowledge the wrongfulness of the purpose.^[171]

Why Mālik’s school appears on both sides. Ibn ʿAṭiyya and al-Qurṭubī report execution within the third as the school’s well-known position, while also recording cancellation. Ibn ʿĀshūr challenges the account of the school’s position: he endorses Ibn ʿArafa’s objection that the Mudawwana expressly requires cancellation where harmful intent is proved. He also reports the opposing ruling from Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam and from Ibn Nājī’s commentary, where it is described as the position followed in fatwā. Thus the ikhtilaf is present within the Mālikī material itself; it cannot be reduced to “Mālik says” on either side.^[172]

Ibn Rajab, transmitting Ibn ʿAṭiyya, likewise records a cancelling position from Mālik and reports that it is said to follow the reasoning of Aḥmad’s school. That is a reported school inference, not a direct quotation from Aḥmad.^[173]

5. What establishes the harmful intention?

The distinction between an unlawful amount and a hidden motive matters in practice. A bequest above the permitted limit can be identified from its amount. A bequest below the limit also leaves the heirs less than they would otherwise receive, but that result alone does not show why the person made it. If the purpose is unknown, Ibn Taymiyya says that the bequest is carried out.

An admission such as “I made this bequest to harm them” establishes the purpose directly. Ibn ʿĀshūr also requires cancellation where a clear indication of harmful intent appears. His requirement is more than the heirs’ displeasure at receiving less: the indication must establish the intention, not merely the reduction in their inheritance.^[174]

Ibn Taymiyya separates unintended injustice from deliberate wrongdoing, and then distinguishes what the person carrying out the will can know from what the recipient knows privately. His cases make the cancelling position more precise.^[175]

The recipient who knows the harmful purpose may not take the gift, even when those carrying out the will do not possess that knowledge.

Conclusion

The interpretation followed here by the author is that a bequest made to harm the heirs is not carried out once its harmful purpose is established. This follows Ibn ʿUthaymīn’s explanation of “without causing harm” as a condition of execution, together with Ibn ʿĀshūr’s and al-Shawkānī’s explicit rulings. It does not authorize cancelling an otherwise lawful bequest on suspicion.

Al-Ālūsī’s later statement treats the intention as forbidden but the bequest effective. The Mālikī execution reports instead reason that the act within the third is not counted as harm.

And Allah knows best.

Q5. Why does the verse end with “a charge from Allah” and the names “Knowing, Forbearing”?

The shares have been prescribed, and the testator has been forbidden to harm the heirs. The verse then closes:

The closing words explain why the division must be obeyed and why its violation must not be taken lightly. A person's wishes cannot override Allah’s command; a hidden intention cannot escape His knowledge; and a delay in punishment does not make wrongdoing safe.

1. A binding command, not an optional gift

The word waṣiyya often refers to the directions a person leaves at death. Here, however, it is Allah who gives the charge. The testator is being commanded, not invited to decide which relatives deserve the prescribed shares. In this context, ⁧يُوصِيكُمُ⁩ means that He makes a duty binding upon you, and His waṣiyya is a confirmed covenant (al-Harawī, as quoted by al-Samīn; Ibn ʿUthaymīn).^[176]

The structure of the passage reinforces that meaning. The inheritance directions began in 4:11 with ⁧يُوصِيكُمُ اللَّهُ⁩, “Allah charges you.” After the shares and restrictions have been set out, ⁧وَصِيَّةً مِنَ اللَّهِ⁩ recalls that opening command. The noun ⁧وَصِيَّةً⁩ is a maṣdar, a noun naming the action of the verb: the sense is “Allah charges you with these directions, a charge from Him.” On this construction, the closing phrase confirms the whole division in the two verses (al-Ṭabarī; Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[177]

A different grammatical connection places the phrase with the nearer statement that each maternal sibling receives a sixth (al-Farrāʾ). That concerns the expression to which the noun is attached; it does not make the other prescribed shares optional. Another construction connects it with “without causing harm”: the testator must not violate Allah’s charge by exceeding the permitted third or impoverishing the children through an excessive bequest. The harm is suffered by the heirs through the bequest, which explains the figurative expression of harming the charge itself (al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī; explained by Abū Ḥayyān).^[178]

The practical consequence is the same point made by the words “from Allah.” A person’s directions about his property come under a command already given by Allah. A bequest favouring some heirs over others, or intended to harm them, cannot set that command aside (al-Shawkānī).^[179]

This leaves the difference between ⁧فَرِيضَةً⁩, “an obligation,” in 4:11 and ⁧وَصِيَّةً⁩, “a charge,” here. If both bind, why change the word? The stronger emphasis of farḍ accompanies the parents’ and children’s shares, underlining the particular importance of caring for the children. The spouses’ and siblings’ rights remain obligatory too. The distinction is one of emphasis, not permission to observe one group of shares and disregard another (al-Rāzī).

Another explanation gives waṣiyya the stronger emphasis: a charge conveys particular concern and a request for prompt fulfilment. More distant relatives may be neglected precisely because their relationship is less close, so their rights receive this emphatic instruction. Al-Ālūsī records this explanation without naming its author. The two explanations differ over which expression gives greater emphasis, not over whether the shares are binding.^[180]

2. Knowledge of the right shares and of concealed wrong

There are two reasons why Allah’s knowledge matters here. First, the division rests on knowledge of the heirs and their interests. The fractions are not a testator’s personal estimate of who deserves more, nor the result of preference or resentment. The command comes from perfect knowledge (al-Qurṭubī; Sayyid Quṭb).^[181]

Second, those carrying out the division are themselves known to Allah. Correct figures on a will do not guarantee justice: a false acknowledgment of debt or a bequest intended to harm may reduce the heirs’ property while concealing the purpose. The prohibition ⁧غَيْرَ مُضَارٍّ⁩, “without causing harm,” is therefore followed by a reminder that Allah knows who has acted unjustly and who has acted justly (al-Zamakhsharī; al-Rāzī).^[182]

The reminder concerns more than one kind of victim. Harm may be done to heirs or creditors, and women or children may be denied their prescribed rights. An offender's continued enjoyment of wealth does not mean that his conduct has escaped judgment (al-Zuḥaylī; Mufti Muḥammad Shafīʿ).^[183] That apparent delay is what the next name addresses.

3. Time to repent is not permission to continue

If Allah knows the wrong, why is its perpetrator not punished immediately? ⁧حَلِيمٌ⁩ answers that question: Allah does not hasten to punish the person who disobeys Him. Its place after the prohibition of harm is therefore directly relevant to the bequest, not a departure from the inheritance discussion (Ibn ʿUthaymīn).^[184]

The delay gives the sinner time to repent. It does not mean that the prohibition has ceased to matter. Forbearance toward the disobedient is explained as delaying punishment and accepting repentance (al-Zajjāj).^[185] The distinction is between ⁧إِمْهَال⁩, granting time, and ⁧إِهْمَال⁩, neglect: the offender has been given an opportunity to return, not evidence that Allah is unaware of what he has done (the Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth’s Tafsīr al-Wasīṭ; Muḥammad ʿAbduh, as transmitted by Riḍā).^[186]

That opportunity gives the warning its urgency. A long respite can tempt someone to continue, but the absence of immediate punishment offers no protection when punishment comes. Thus the two names warn against harm while inviting repentance (al-Biqāʿī).^[187]

The familiar saying “Beware the anger of the forbearing” illustrates why patience should not be mistaken for weakness. A person may overlook repeated offences before finally responding severely. The comparison has a necessary limit: human forbearance can come to an end, whereas Allah’s does not cease. Each person receives a determined measure of it (ʿAbduh, in the lesson transmitted by Riḍā).^[188]

The same closing words also restrain the testator's resentment. He may be displeased with a relative, but a will is not his opportunity to punish that person by damaging the inheritance. Allah gives the disobedient time to repent; the testator is not permitted to retaliate through a harmful bequest (Rashīd Riḍā).^[189]

4. Must delayed punishment eventually occur?

Not hastening punishment and pardoning a sin are distinguishable: one concerns delay, the other concerns whether punishment is inflicted at all. A definition of ḥalīm can include both. Al-Khaṭṭābī, quoted by al-Khāzin, describes the Forbearing as:

Forbearance understood as the absence of haste. On this explanation, the name prevents an offender from drawing the wrong conclusion from his present safety. Enjoying the benefit of an unjust bequest does not show that the warning was empty. The proper response is repentance, not further wrongdoing. The name itself is explained as not being provoked by disobedience into immediate punishment, with the express qualification:

The distinction concerns the meaning of forbearance, while the delay still leaves time for repentance and return to Allah (ʿAbduh, in the lesson transmitted by Riḍā).^[191]

Forbearance understood to include pardon. The alternative explanation rejects the inference that punishment, although postponed, must eventually occur. Al-Zamakhsharī describes Allah as forbearing toward the wrongdoer and not hastening his punishment. Abū Ḥayyān objects to what he understands that wording to imply: that the offender must ultimately be punished. He identifies that implication with the Muʿtazilī position, rather than with the position of Ahl al-Sunna.

The argument turns on the relation between the two names. “Knowing” warns that no harmful disposition is hidden from Allah. “Forbearing” then indicates that Allah may refrain from punishing the sin, expressing ⁧الصفح عمن شاء⁩, “pardon for whom He wills.” Knowledge of the offence is therefore followed by the prospect of pardon, not by a declaration that punishment is inevitable (Abū Ḥayyān).^[192]

The shared warning against wrongdoing does not erase this difference in the meaning of the name. ʿAbduh emphasizes the time granted before punishment; Abū Ḥayyān also draws attention to pardon. Each explanation must be understood with that qualification.

5. Why “Wise” in 4:11 and “Forbearing” here?

The earlier verse says of parents and children, “You do not know which of them is nearer to you in benefit.” Their inheritance is not left to that uncertain human estimate. The prescribed division follows, and the verse ends with Allah’s knowledge and wisdom. Early explanations connect that wisdom with the ruling itself: ⁧حُكْمُ قِسْمَةٍ⁩, “a ruling of division,” and wisdom in His command (Saʿīd b. Jubayr and Abū al-ʿĀliya, transmitted by Ibn Abī Ḥātim).^[193]

In 4:12, the immediate concern is different. The shares are known, but people may still arrange a debt or bequest to injure those entitled to inherit. Knowledge addresses the concealed wrong; forbearance addresses the absence of immediate punishment. On Abū Ḥayyān’s explanation developed above, the sequence also places the hope of pardon after the warning.

There is a wider connection with the injustice these laws corrected. Denying women and maternal relatives inheritance reflected ignorance of kinship rights; denying children reflected harshness toward the weak. The closing names are appropriate to legislation that overturns both practices (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[194]

Does “Forbearing” also explain the character of the law itself? Allah Himself is not harsh; accordingly, the inheritance rules He prescribes should not be regarded as harsh demands imposed upon the family. Their purpose is to prevent hardship. On this explanation, the name directs attention to the purpose of the legislation, rather than to the offender’s punishment (Mawdūdī).^[195]

Conclusion

The prescribed shares are Allah’s binding charge. His knowledge explains both the authority of the division and the warning that a concealed intention to harm will not escape Him. His forbearance means that punishment is not hastened, leaving time for repentance. These two divine attributes form the theological foundation for the legal mandate (Ibn ʿUthaymīn).^[196]

The inclusion of pardon marks an interpretative split: ʿAbduh does not include it in the meaning of forbearance, whereas Abū Ḥayyān understands the name here to indicate pardon for whom Allah wills.

And Allah knows best.

2. How the Commentators Read This Verse

The Questions above explain the shares and their conditions. The discussions below examine further points: what must be paid before distribution, which obligations count as debts, and why the verse gives particular attention to a spouse’s entitlement.

3. Iʿrāb: Grammatical Analysis

The verse first assigns the spouses’ shares, then the maternal siblings’ shares, and closes with a prohibition of harm and a divine charge. Conditions determine which share applies; repeated bequest-and-debt clauses state what must be dealt with before distribution. The word table follows Dār al-Ṣaḥābah’s Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm. Meaningful alternatives are explained after the tables.^[205]

Word / Grammar / What it does

The numbers follow the Word-by-Word table and distinguish repeated occurrences. A nominal sentence has a mubtadaʾ (مبتدأ, subject) and a khabar (خبر, predicate); a verbal sentence has a fāʿil (فاعل, subject), or a nāʾib al-fāʿil (نائب الفاعل, substitute subject) when the verb is passive. In an iḍāfah (إضافة, annexation), the first noun is the muḍāf and the following noun or pronoun is the muḍāf ilayh (مضاف إليه, muḍāf ilayh).

Clause / Position

These are the principal clause relationships. The baseline is Dār al-Ṣaḥābah; the alternatives listed here affect how the clauses connect, not the numerical shares.

Where the grammar changes the meaning

1. ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩: does the word describe the deceased, his relatives, or the inheritance?

The word ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ is manṣūb (منصوب), but several grammatical functions can have that ending: a ḥāl describing someone’s circumstances, a predicate, an object, or an expression of cause. Here the grammatical alternatives follow five proposed meanings: the deceased, the heirs, the property, the inheritance, and the kinship (al-Samīn; al-Suyūṭī).^[222]

Does كَانَ mean “there exists,” or does it need a predicate (خبر)? The clause begins وَإِنْ كَانَ رَجُلٌ. If كَانَ means “there exists,” it is a complete verb [fiʿl tāmm, فعل تام]: رَجُلٌ is its subject [fāʿil, فاعل], and يُورَثُ describes that man [ṣifah, صفة]. If كَانَ is the incomplete verb [fiʿl nāqiṣ, فعل ناقص] that requires a predicate [khabar, خبر], يُورَثُ can be that predicate. Either construction can then take كَلَالَةً as a circumstantial expression [ḥāl, حال] describing the person inherited from. Both are admitted by the Dār al-Ṣaḥābah Iʿrāb, al-ʿUkbarī and Darwīsh.^[223]

A further possibility makes ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ itself the predicate: “if a man who is inherited from is a kalālah.” If the noun means the heirs rather than the deceased, an understood word is needed: “is a person having collateral heirs” (al-Samīn; al-Shawkānī).^[224] This explains why changing the proposed meaning changes the construction, even though the visible ending remains the same.^[225]

A complete ⁧كَانَ⁩ is established Arabic usage. When كَانَ means “there occurred” or “there existed,” its subject completes the clause; it needs no predicate. Al-Akhfash illustrates this with a line he quotes without naming its poet:^[226]

The relevant words are ⁧إذا كانَ يَوْمٌ⁩: “when a day occurs.” Here يَوْمٌ is the subject of complete كَانَ. That is the construction for which al-Akhfash cites the line. The legal definition of kalālah is established through the separate evidence in Question 2.

Why some constructions require an understood word. If ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ simply means “heirs,” the passive construction needs an explanation of how that noun connects with the deceased. “Zayd is inherited from, brothers” is not a complete construction. An understood “having” provides that connection; an active verb can instead take the heirs as its object (al-ʿUkbarī).^[227] A related explanation understands “possessing collateral kinship,” which al-Shanqīṭī prefers and attributes to al-Zajjāj.^[228]

Which alternatives are disputed? The table includes grammatical possibilities, not constructions accepted by every grammarian. The explanation as tamyīz (تمييز), a noun specifying the intended sense, is questioned by al-Samīn; treating the property as a second object is rejected by Darwīsh.^[229]

There is also a more precise disagreement about incomplete ⁧كَانَ⁩. When ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ itself is the predicate, Ibn Barrī allows it. When the noun is a ḥāl describing the deceased, however, he requires complete ⁧كَانَ⁩. The alternative allows ⁧يُورَثُ⁩ to be the predicate of incomplete ⁧كَانَ⁩, leaving ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ as the ḥāl. This is the construction admitted by al-ʿUkbarī and Dār al-Ṣaḥābah but rejected by Ibn Barrī in his objection to al-Ḥawfī.^[230]

Can the noun describe the inheritance rather than the deceased? Al-Ṭabarī expressly rejects the circumstantial analysis and understands a maṣdar (مصدر), naming an act understood from the sentence. His explanation is that the man's surrounding relatives inherit him: ⁧يُورَثُ مُتَكَلِّلُه النَّسَبُ كَلالةً⁩. The words describing the surrounding relatives are understood from the inheritance verb.^[231] On this explanation, the noun describes the inheritance rather than the deceased.

The active forms discussed under Qirāʾāt also do not force one interpretation. If ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ names the deceased, it can remain a circumstantial expression, with the heir and property understood: “he makes his heir inherit his property while being a kalālah.” If it names the heirs, it can be an object instead. The property and kinship senses produce further constructions (Abū Ḥayyān; al-Samīn).^[232]

What changes in translation? “A man who leaves neither a child nor a father” expresses the adopted explanation of the deceased's circumstances. Making the noun a predicate gives essentially the same identification. Describing the kinship or the inheritance instead moves the emphasis to how the relatives inherit. The word table follows Dār al-Ṣaḥābah’s ḥāl analysis. Question 2 explains the legal scope of kalālah and the scholars’ preferences concerning the noun’s referent.

2. ⁧أَوِ امْرَأَةٌ / وَلَهُ⁩: does “he has” include the woman?

The sentence names a man, then “or a woman,” and continues with the masculine singular pronoun in ⁧وَلَهُ أَخٌ أَوْ أُخْتٌ⁩, “and he has a brother or a sister.” Does that return the rule to the man alone?

The woman shares the condition already stated. The sense is “or a woman inherited from as a kalālah.” Arabic leaves those repeated words unstated because the context makes them understood. Coordination alone does not automatically transfer every restriction in every sentence; here it is the meaning of this sentence that establishes the shared condition (Abū Ḥayyān; al-Samīn).^[233] Another explanation relates the separate mention of the man and woman to the man's honour and primary place in the rulings. On that account, ⁧لَهُ⁩ refers specifically to the man, while the woman's corresponding case is understood. This is Abū al-Suʿūd's explanation; he also records the alternative that the pronoun refers to either of them.^[234]

The masculine pronoun need not exclude her. The word ⁧أَوْ⁩ presents one case or the other. A singular pronoun is therefore appropriate. Its masculine form can follow the man named first, the understood expression “one of the two,” or “the deceased” already indicated by the sentence. These are three grammatical explanations of the same inclusion, not three different rules of inheritance (al-ʿUkbarī).^[235]

Arabic usage also permits a pronoun after two alternatives to refer to either expression or, on the explanation recorded from al-Farrāʾ, to both. Abū Ḥayyān illustrates it with “whoever has a brother or a sister, let him maintain the tie with him,” or “with her.”^[236] Al-Samīn records that grammarians who require the singular explain apparent dual exceptions differently.^[237] The following ⁧فَلِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا⁩ means “each of the two mentioned,” the brother and sister; it is not a command to give each a separate sixth when several siblings share the third (al-Ṭabarī).^[238]

What changes in translation? “And he or she has a brother or a sister” makes the inclusive reference clear in English. “And that person has” conveys it too. The Arabic does not need a second feminine pronoun for the rule to cover a deceased woman. Understanding ⁧وَلَهُ⁩ as “one of the two has” states that result directly (Ibn Kamāl).^[239]

3. ⁧غَيْرَ مُضَارٍّ⁩: whose harmful conduct is excluded?

The words mean “not causing harm.” The grammatical question is how they attach to the preceding bequest-and-debt clause. Whether a harmful bequest remains enforceable is a separate legal question, argued in Question 4.

With an active verb, the person making the bequest is named in the grammar. In ⁧يُوصِي⁩, “he bequeaths,” the verb has a concealed subject. ⁧غَيْرَ مُضَارٍّ⁩ can describe that person's circumstances: “he bequeaths without harming [his heirs]” (al-Ṭabarī, al-Zajjāj, al-Qurṭubī, al-ʿUkbarī).^[240]

With the passive, the grammatical subject is no longer the person making the bequest. In ⁧يُوصَى⁩, “it is bequeathed,” Ṣāfī connects “not causing harm” with the testator understood from the clause. A different analysis relates it to the passive verb's substitute subject (⁧نائب الفاعل⁩), the expression ⁧بِهَا⁩ in al-Durra's account, or to the person's concealed subject when the verb is active. Al-Durra then quotes another explanation from al-Zamakhsharī: the passive indicates that someone is making the bequest, so a corresponding active verb is understood.^[241] On that last construction, “not causing harm” describes the subject of the understood “he bequeaths” (al-Ālūsī).^[242]

A poetic example shows how an expressed passive can point to an understood active verb:

Al-Ālūsī quotes the line without naming its poet. On the construction for which he cites it, the opening names the person mourned; the following marfūʿ (مرفوع) identifies the mourner through an understood “let him mourn.” The same construction explains how the passive “it is bequeathed” can indicate an understood active verb whose subject is the testator.^[243]

The intervening words create an objection. The phrase ⁧أَوْ دَيْنٍ⁩, “or a debt,” comes between the bequest verb and “not causing harm.” Abū Ḥayyān objects that a phrase attached to the bequest verb cannot be separated from it by this coordination. The passive presents a further difficulty: its omitted agent cannot simply be treated as though it remained an expressed subject. His preferred explanation understands a broader verb: the testator “charges his property” with a bequest or debt without harming his heirs. He also records the explanation through an understood active “he bequeaths.”^[244]

The response is to understand corresponding wording for the debt as well as the bequest. On that analysis, the restriction describes the person responsible for either charge; the debt phrase is no longer unrelated intervening material. Al-Ālūsī expressly gives this answer. Ibn ʿĀdil records both the usual circumstantial construction and the objection.^[245]

The closing “charge from Allah” allows another construction. Usually ⁧وَصِيَّةً مِنَ اللَّهِ⁩ begins an emphatic conclusion: “Allah charges you with this.” Alternatively, ⁧مُضَارٍّ⁩ may govern ⁧وَصِيَّةً⁩: “not harming Allah's charge.” The harm is actually done to the heirs whom Allah has commanded people to protect; describing it as harm to His charge makes the violation more forceful (al-Ālūsī; al-Samīn).^[246] The annexed form reported from al-Ḥasan permits related explanations: harm to the people concerned by the charge, or harm at the time of making the bequest (al-ʿUkbarī).^[247] Al-Ālūsī also records an analysis describing the act itself, “a bequeathing without harm,” but rejects making the phrase a circumstantial description of the bequest or debt.^[248]

What changes in translation? “Without causing harm” keeps the focus on the testator. “A bequeathing without harm” describes his act. “Not violating Allah's charge” expresses the alternative connection with ⁧وَصِيَّةً⁩. The Dār al-Ṣaḥābah baseline identifies ⁧غَيْرَ⁩ as a circumstantial expression; the more detailed accounts explain how the responsible person is understood.^[249] These constructions explain the wording. They do not, on their own, settle whether a prohibited bequest is legally ineffective or valid but sinful.

4. Ṣarf: Roots and Morphology

The verse contains 48 root-bearing occurrences representing 24 roots. Each occurrence is listed below, including repeated words and the six forms of ⁧كَانَ⁩. The numbers correspond to the Word-by-Word table. Particles and pronouns are excluded; the two occurrences of lafẓ al-jalālah are identified in the grammar table without assigning a disputed derivation here.

Forms in their order in the verse

The fraction forms distinguish precise portions: ⁧نِصْف⁩ is on ⁧فِعْل⁩, while ⁧رُبُع، ثُمُن، سُدُس، ثُلُث⁩ are on ⁧فُعُل⁩. Their case endings follow their roles in the sentence, not a change in the amount. The less common middle-vowel forms are discussed under Qirāʾāt (al-Rāghib, al-ʿUkbarī, al-Ṣāfī).^[252]

The bequest verb changes with its subject: ⁧يُوصِينَ⁩ names the wives, ⁧تُوصُونَ⁩ addresses the husbands, and ⁧يُوصَى⁩ leaves the act in the passive. In ⁧تُوصُونَ⁩, the root-final yāʾ is absent before the plural wāw; al-Ṣāfī traces the form from ⁧تُوصِيُونَ⁩. The feminine ending in ⁧يُوصِينَ⁩ is نون النسوة, not the nūn of rafʿ (نون الرفع), retained in an indicative masculine-plural verb.^[253]

How the key words develop the meaning

1. Kalālah: kinship to the side, rather than through parent and child

The word belongs to a family of meanings involving weakness and encirclement. A sword becomes blunt; a traveller grows weary. Applied to kinship, weakness describes a connection less close than that of parent and child. Another explanation begins with relatives surrounding a person from the sides, rather than being that person’s ancestors or descendants. The two derivations offer different explanations of the name while distinguishing direct from collateral kinship (Ibn Fāris, al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāghib).^[254]

The difference appears in an ordinary expression: ⁧لم يرثه كلالة⁩, “he did not inherit it through collateral kinship.” It contrasts a distant or sideways connection with direct inheritance by nearness and entitlement (al-Mubarrad).^[255] Al-Ṭirimmāḥ uses that contrast of a bull’s horn:

The weapon is the horn inherited from the bull’s father; the flanks belong to the attacking dogs. The contrast is between inheriting directly from a father and inheriting through other relatives. The expression can describe the relationship of either the heir or the person inherited from (al-Zamakhsharī; al-Wāḥidī).^[256]

The alternative derivation, encirclement, can be seen before it becomes a term of inheritance. A meadow ringed with flowers is ⁧رَوْضَةٌ مُكَلَّلَةٌ⁩. An unnamed poet describes it:

Here ⁧مُكَلَّلَة⁩ describes what surrounds the meadow. (Al-Qurṭubī.)^[257]

A cloud can be described in the same way when lightning surrounds its edges. Imruʾ al-Qays says:

The verse illustrates the same surrounding shape. Applied to inheritance, the relatives encircle the deceased from the sides: they are neither that person’s offspring nor the parent from whom that person came (al-Qurṭubī; al-Thaʿlabī).^[258]

This explains why one noun can be used for more than one participant in the inheritance. Jābir’s words, “none but kalālah will inherit me,” use it for the heirs. In the interpretation of ⁧يُورَثُ كَلَالَةً⁩ as a circumstance of the deceased, it describes the person inherited from. A maṣdar (مصدر) can name the person characterized by the action or state, just as “creation” can name what is created. An alternative treats ⁧كَلَالَة⁩ as an adjective on ⁧فَعَالَة⁩, comparable in form to ⁧هَجَاجَة⁩, “a fool” (al-Azharī, Ibn Barrī, al-Rāghib; al-Zamakhsharī).^[259]

The lexical uses are broader than a single statutory category. They include remote cousins, collateral relatives generally, and, in the discussion of this verse, maternal siblings. The word’s relation to the particular heirs must therefore be established from the verse and its context, not from the root alone. Question 2 develops that legal distinction and the differing definitions recorded by the lexicographers.^[260]

2. Causing harm: what the form does and does not imply

⁧مُضَارٍّ⁩ describes a person causing harm. Its root contrasts harm with benefit; the related noun can also describe illness, poverty or another bad condition. Here the prohibition concerns injury through a bequest or a claimed debt, as Question 4 explains (Ibn Fāris; al-Rāghib; Lisān al-ʿArab).^[261]

The form does not require that the heirs have first harmed the testator. Although one explanation of ⁧ضِرَار⁩ distinguishes mutual or retaliatory harm from the initial injury, the lexicon also records other distinctions and the view that the two nouns can share a meaning. It expressly applies ⁧غَيْرَ مُضَارٍّ⁩ to prohibited harm in a bequest. “Without causing harm” is therefore the appropriate explanation here; “without retaliating” would introduce a condition the verse does not state (Lisān al-ʿArab).^[262]

3. A bequest and a divine charge

The root ⁧و ص ي⁩ expresses joining and continuity: joining one thing to another, or plants growing continuously across a piece of land. A waṣiyyah is an instruction entrusted to someone to carry out, accompanied by exhortation (Ibn Fāris; al-Samīn).^[263]

That range explains the verse’s change of sense without changing the noun. The first three occurrences of ⁧وَصِيَّةٍ⁩ name a deceased person’s bequest. The final ⁧وَصِيَّةً مِنَ اللَّهِ⁩ names the charge coming from Allah. It is not another discretionary gift added to the estate. A divine charge imposes a duty, as al-Harawī explains in his comment on ⁧يُوصِيكُمُ اللَّهُ⁩ (al-Samīn).^[264]

There is also a distinction between the related verbs ⁧أَوْصَى⁩ and ⁧وَصَّى⁩. Al-Hilāl associates the doubled form particularly with weightier religious or moral instructions, and the fourth form, when unqualified, with material arrangements. He allows the qualified fourth form to cover both. The distinction concerns how the verbs are used; obligation still depends on the instruction being given.^[265]

4. Inheriting is not purchasing

Inheritance transfers a possession without a contract or its equivalent. The verb can take the property as its object, “I inherited property,” or the deceased person, “I inherited from Zayd.” This explains how ⁧رَجُلٌ يُورَثُ⁩ can name a man as the one inherited from even though the estate is what passes to the heirs (al-Rāghib).^[266]

The authorities differ over the verb’s derivation. Al-Azharī derives ⁧يُورَثُ⁩ here from the simple verb ⁧وَرِثَ⁩, not ⁧أَوْرَثَ⁩; Abū Ḥayyān allows the fourth form. Both must be distinguished from the expressly active variants ⁧يُورِثُ⁩ and ⁧يُوَرِّثُ⁩. The grammatical discussion explains how those constructions distribute the roles of deceased, heir and property.^[267]

5. A brother or sister: the word and the specified relationship

The ordinary meaning of “brother” includes someone who shares both parents or just one. The word alone does not restrict the relationship to the mother. Question 3 explains why this verse concerns maternal siblings, through the transmitted explanations and its relationship to 4:176 (al-Samīn).^[268]

In the form ⁧أَخٌ⁩, the last root letter is omitted; the noun takes an ordinary ḍamma here rather than the long-letter endings used in qualifying annexed constructions. In ⁧أُخْتٌ⁩, al-Samīn explains the tāʾ as compensation for the omitted root letter. Neither morphological feature establishes which parent is shared. That is a question of interpretation and evidence.^[269]

5. Balāghah: Rhetorical Analysis

The verse combines precise legal detail with wording that directs attention to the people whose rights may be overlooked. Some of the features below belong to 4:12 itself; others connect it with the inheritance passage that begins at 4:11.

From the principle to the shares: ⁧التَّفْصِيل بَعْدَ الْإِبْهَام⁩ (al-tafṣīl baʿd al-ibhām)

Where it is. ⁧وَلَكُمْ نِصْفُ مَا تَرَكَ أَزْوَاجُكُمْ⁩, “For you is half of what your wives leave,” and the other detailed shares in 4:11–12. They follow 4:7’s general declaration that men and women have an inheritance share.

The plain way. The legislation could begin with the fractions, without first stating the general entitlement.

What it does. Entitlement comes before calculation. Verse 4:7 establishes that both men and women inherit from parents and relatives; these verses identify the particular heirs, conditions and portions. This is the movement from a general statement to its details that Abū Ḥayyān calls ⁧التفصيل⁩ after ⁧الإبهام⁩. Within that explanation, the provisions proceed by classes: children and parents, spouses, then collateral heirs (Abū Ḥayyān; Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[270]

The effect. The fractions answer an already established right. The reader encounters the principle before working through its application.

Protecting an easily neglected right: ⁧الاحْتِرَاس⁩ (al-iḥtirās)

Where it is. ⁧مِنْ بَعْدِ وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصِينَ بِهَا أَوْ دَيْنٍ⁩, “after a bequest they make or a debt,” and the two corresponding clauses later in 4:12.

The plain way. “after payment of debts and execution of bequests,” following the order in which the estate is settled.

What it does. A bequest is named first although debt is paid first. The difference is between emphasis in the sentence and priority in payment. A debt has a creditor who can demand it; a bequest is more easily neglected by heirs who must give up part of what they would otherwise receive. Placing the bequest first draws attention to that vulnerable obligation. Adding “or a debt” then guards against excluding another prior claim: this is the ⁧احتراس⁩ identified by Ibn ʿĀshūr. The word ⁧أَوْ⁩ does not make either charge optional and does not reverse their legal priority (Ibn ʿĀshūr; al-Qurṭubī; al-ʿUkbarī).^[271]

There are other explanations for the emphasis. A bequest is made by the deceased, while a debt remains owed whether or not the deceased mentions it; al-Qurṭubī also records frequency of bequests and the needs of poor beneficiaries as explanations. The reluctance explanation treats a bequest as resembling an inheritance share that the heirs must give to someone else. Ibn Kamāl objects that this does not account for every kind of bequest, giving a bequest for pilgrimage as his example. He instead emphasizes a point that may need clarification: bequests, like debts, must be settled before the inheritance is divided. Their shared priority over inheritance does not make their claims identical when the estate diminishes: a debt does not decrease merely because some property is lost, whereas a bequest is subject to its own limit.^[272]

The effect. The wording gives prominence to a claim that might be neglected, while retaining the creditor’s prior right. It does not make the order of words a payment schedule.

The condition follows each share: ⁧التَّكْرَار وَالإِطْنَاب⁩ (al-takrār wa-l-iṭnāb)

Where it is. ⁧مِنْ بَعْدِ وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصِينَ بِهَا أَوْ دَيْنٍ⁩, “after a bequest they make or a debt,” followed by the corresponding clauses with ⁧تُوصُونَ⁩, “you make,” and ⁧يُوصَى⁩, “is made.” The qualification appears three times in 4:12 and once in 4:11.

The plain way. One closing qualification could be made to apply to all the shares.

What it does. Each distinct inheritance case carries its own reminder that distribution follows the prior charges. The husband inherits from his wife; the wife inherits from her husband. These are separate estates, whereas the children and parents in 4:11 inherit from the same deceased person. That distinction explains why their earlier qualification occurs once, while the spouses’ cases each repeat it (Ibn Juzayy).^[273]

The repetition also prevents the wife’s property from being treated as though she could neither bequeath it nor incur debt. The verb ⁧يُوصِينَ⁩ explicitly names the women as those making bequests. Its plural form prompts al-Biqāʿī’s further observation that the matter should remain present in everyone’s mind. Al-Zuḥaylī identifies the repeated clauses as ⁧إطناب⁩ for emphasis; Ibn ʿĀshūr relates each occurrence to its particular class of shares.^[274]

The effect. The entitlement and the condition are read together. The reader does not have to remember a distant qualification when reaching a new case.

What the words leave understood: ⁧الإِيجَاز بِالْحَذْف⁩ (al-ījāz bi-l-ḥadhf)

Where it is. ⁧مِنْ بَعْدِ وَصِيَّةٍ⁩, “after a bequest.”

The plain way. “After setting aside or executing the bequest.”

What it does. “after a bequest” is not simply a date after the will was made. What is understood is the setting aside or execution of its provision. Al-Maydānī identifies this omission within the spouses’ clauses as ⁧إيجاز بالحذف⁩.^[275]

The effect. The short expression identifies a necessary action without stating it: the bequest must be provided for before the heirs divide the estate.

A related economy in the plural address. A rule for many households can be stated without repeating every individual case. “Your wives” concerns the wives of the men addressed, and “for them the quarter” concerns the wife or wives of the particular deceased husband. Each share is calculated from its own estate (Ibn ʿĀshūr).^[276]

The instruction heard in its noun and verb: ⁧جِنَاس الِاشْتِقَاق⁩ (jinās al-ishtiqāq)

Where it is. The repeated pairings ⁧وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصِينَ⁩, ⁧وَصِيَّةٍ تُوصُونَ⁩ and ⁧وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصَى⁩: a bequest and the act of bequeathing.

The plain way. The noun “bequest” alone could name the charge against the estate.

What it does. Noun and verb repeat one root while distinguishing the instruction from the person’s act of making it. Al-Zuḥaylī names ⁧جناس اشتقاق⁩ in ⁧وَصِيَّةٍ يُوصِي⁩ in his joint discussion of 4:11–12; the pairings here use that same root with the subjects changed. Ibn ʿĀshūr also gives the qualifying verb a specific interpretive function: it identifies a bequest actually made, rather than the earlier prescribed bequest of 2:180.^[277]

The effect. The repeated root connects the bequest with the responsibility for making it. At the close, ⁧وَصِيَّةً مِنَ اللَّهِ⁩ uses the noun for a different instruction: Allah’s charge governing the inheritance.

From direct connection to collateral kinship: ⁧التَّرْتِيب⁩ (al-tartīb)

Where it is. After the children and parents in 4:11, the verse addresses spouses through ⁧وَلَكُمْ⁩, “and for you,” and ⁧وَلَهُنَّ⁩, “and for them,” then names ⁧أَخٌ أَوْ أُخْتٌ⁩, “a brother or a sister,” in the maternal-sibling provision.

The plain way. The legal provisions could list collateral relatives before spouses simply because the former are blood relations.

What it does. The order follows kinds of connection, not merely blood relationship. Parents and children are directly related through birth. Marriage also connects two people directly, though by a different bond. Collateral relatives are connected through another person. Their inheritance may also be excluded entirely by nearer heirs, whereas the first two classes do not fall away in that way. More constant association and affection give a further reason for treating the first two classes before collateral heirs (al-Rāzī).^[278]

Marriage therefore precedes siblinghood here despite not being a blood relationship. The spouses’ shared life and mutual companionship strengthen that direct connection (Abū Ḥayyān).^[279]

Why are the husbands addressed first? The wording distinguishes not only the order but also the manner of address: the husbands are addressed as “you,” while the wives are spoken of as “they.” Al-Rāzī understands this direct address as a mark of the men’s rank, corresponding to their larger spousal share. Al-Qāsimī reproduces that reasoning:

Abū Ḥayyān and al-Biqāʿī likewise relate the priority given to men to their rank. The different possible explanations are therefore about two choices: why spouses precede siblings, and why the husbands are addressed before the wives (al-Rāzī; al-Qāsimī; Abū Ḥayyān; al-Biqāʿī).^[280]

The effect. The order distinguishes kinds of relationship: direct descent, marriage and collateral kinship. Within the spouses’ provision, direct address gives the husbands the prominence described by these commentators.

The ending recalls the beginning: ⁧رَدُّ الْعَجُزِ عَلَى الصَّدْرِ⁩ (radd al-ʿajuz ʿalā al-ṣadr)

Where it is. ⁧وَصِيَّةً مِنَ اللَّهِ⁩, “a charge from Allah,” at the close of 4:12 recalls ⁧يُوصِيكُمُ اللَّهُ⁩, “Allah charges you,” at the opening of 4:11.

The plain way. The provisions could end without returning to the opening expression.

What it does. The same root frames the connected inheritance legislation: first the divine act of charging, then the charge itself. Ibn ʿĀshūr explicitly identifies this as ⁧ردّ العجز على الصدر⁩. The relationship is between the two verses, not between the first and last words of 4:12 alone.^[281]

The effect. The detailed allocations return to their source of authority. Question 5 considers why this close uses “charge,” while 4:11 also calls its provisions an “obligation.”

Knowledge and forbearance at the close: ⁧التَّذْيِيل⁩ (al-tadhyīl)

Where it is. ⁧وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ حَلِيمٌ⁩, “And Allah is All-Knowing, Forbearing.”

The plain way. The verse could end at “a charge from Allah.”

What it does. The closing statement places the detailed rules beneath two divine Names. In Ibn ʿĀshūr’s explanation, knowledge answers the ignorance of earlier inheritance customs and forbearance answers their harshness: women, maternal relatives and children had been denied rights. Al-Zuḥaylī notes the intensified sense of the two Names.^[282]

The effect. The settlement is more than arithmetic. Its justice concerns both what people know and how they treat those whose rights are at stake. The further disagreement about forbearance, delayed punishment and pardon is developed in Question 5.

6. Qirāʾāt: Variant Readings

The principal transmitted difference discussed here is ⁧يُوصَى بِهَا⁩, “a bequest that is made,” and ⁧يُوصِي بِهَا⁩, “a bequest he makes.” The ten-reading assignments below follow Ibn al-Jazarī’s al-Nashr. The second table covers additional forms reported in the tafsīrs, identifying each source’s reader attribution and classification.

The ten readings: ⁧يُوصَى بِهَا / يُوصِي بِهَا⁩

Ibn al-Jazarī states:

The two places are 4:11 and 4:12. Abū Bakr here is Shuʿba b. ʿAyyāsh, the transmitter from ʿĀṣim. At 4:12, therefore, both Shuʿba and Ḥafṣ transmit the passive.

On the active form, the subject is the deceased person already understood from the context. On the passive form, the act of making the bequest is stated without naming its agent. Al-ʿUkbarī explains the two as having one meaning. The active is preferred by some commentators because the deceased has already been mentioned; al-Qurṭubī records that preference from Abū ʿUbayd and Abū Ḥātim, with al-Akhfash’s comparison to the active ⁧يُوصِينَ⁩ and ⁧تُوصُونَ⁩. Both forms remain in Ibn al-Jazarī’s account of the ten readings.^[284]

Ibn ʿAṭiyya reverses Ḥafṣ’s two places relative to al-Nashr, and al-Qurṭubī includes Abū ʿAmr among the fatḥa readers. Two adjacent editorial notes in al-Thaʿlabī’s edition also differ over Ḥafṣ. These are differences between the cited accounts; the ten-reader table follows Ibn al-Jazarī’s assignments.^[285]

Additional transmitted forms

The doubled bequest verb. Ibn ʿAṭiyya writes:

Ibn ʿĀdil expressly records a shādhdh doubled passive. Al-ʿUkbarī explains the doubling as ⁧التكثير⁩, multiplicity. It does not identify a new heir or prescribe a different fraction.^[292]

The active inheritance verbs. Al-Samīn records:

There are two ways to explain how these active forms govern ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩. One makes ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ the object: the person causes collateral heirs to inherit. Another understands two omitted objects, “he makes his heir inherit his property,” and retains ⁧كَلَالَةً⁩ as a circumstance of the deceased. The latter is recorded from Ibn Jinnī by Ibn ʿAṭiyya and developed by al-Samīn. The active form can therefore retain the deceased-person interpretation. Al-Qurṭubī’s narrower account, limiting the active construction to heirs or property, remains a distinct grammatical position.^[293]

The annexed construction. Makkī records al-Ḥasan’s annexation:

He then gives the explanation:

The objection concerns linking the participle directly to the noun “bequest.” Makkī explains the meaning through an understood preposition: harm by a bequest. Other grammarians understand an omitted expression such as “the people of the charge” or “at the time of the bequest,” while al-Samīn discusses harming the divine charge as a figurative expression for harming the heirs. These explanations are set out in “Where the grammar changes the meaning.” The disagreement concerns how the annexation expresses that relationship.^[294]

The maternal relationship made explicit. Al-Thaʿlabī states:

Al-Ghāmidī distinguishes this report from recited Qurʾānic wording. Abū al-Suʿūd likewise records the added maternal qualification, without naming its reader in that passage, and relates the distinction to the full and paternal siblings discussed at the end of the sūrah. Question 3 presents the legal argument and its supporting reports.^[295]

The fraction words. Al-ʿUkbarī writes:

Al-ʿUkbarī discusses these forms under 4:11; the quarter, eighth, sixth and third also occur here. His explanation concerns their vowels, with the fractions unchanged. He names no individual reader or ṭarīq (transmission route).^[296]

And Allah knows best.