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Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, Verse 6

﴿وَٱبۡتَلُواْ ٱلۡيَتَٰمَىٰ حَتَّىٰٓ إِذَا بَلَغُواْ ٱلنِّكَاحَ فَإِنۡ ءَانَسۡتُم مِّنۡهُمۡ رُشۡدٗا فَٱدۡفَعُوٓاْ إِلَيۡهِمۡ أَمۡوَٰلَهُمۡۖ وَلَا تَأۡكُلُوهَآ إِسۡرَافٗا وَبِدَارًا أَن يَكۡبَرُواْۚ وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيّٗا فَلۡيَسۡتَعۡفِفۡۖ وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرٗا فَلۡيَأۡكُلۡ بِٱلۡمَعۡرُوفِۚ فَإِذَا دَفَعۡتُمۡ إِلَيۡهِمۡ أَمۡوَٰلَهُمۡ فَأَشۡهِدُواْ عَلَيۡهِمۡۚ وَكَفَىٰ بِٱللَّهِ حَسِيبٗا ٦﴾
“And test the orphans [in their abilities] until they reach marriageable age. Then if you perceive in them sound judgement, release their property to them. And do not consume it excessively and quickly, [anticipating] that they will grow up. And whoever, [when acting as guardian], is self-sufficient should refrain [from taking a fee]; and whoever is poor - let him take according to what is acceptable. Then when you release their property to them, bring witnesses upon them. And sufficient is Allah as Accountant.” (4:6)

Saheeh International

Choose how you want to read this verse. §

Simple Explanation

1. Summary

Test the orphans in your care until they are capable of marriage, and if you notice that they understand, then hand over their wealth to them. Do not consume their wealth wastefully or in haste, fearing that they will grow up and you will have to hand it all over to them. Whoever is wealthy should refrain from taking anything from it, and whoever is poor may take from it within reason. When you eventually hand over their wealth to them, then have witnesses over them, and Allah is sufficient to take account.

2. Historical Context

There is a report about the occasion of this verse. A man of the Anṣār named Rifāʿa died and left a young son, Thābit. Thābit's uncle took the boy into his care. The uncle came to the Prophet ﷺ and asked two things. What may I lawfully take from my nephew's money? And when do I hand his money over to him?[1]

The report is not fully established, and what stands in its favour is that the uncle asked two questions and this verse answers those two.[2]

One detail about the period matters later. The property in al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s account consisted of date palms and livestock.[3]

3. Word-by-Word Analysis

Arabic Transliteration Root Type Meaning
وَ wa none Conjunction And
ابْتَلُوا ibtalū ب-ل-و Verb (Form VIII, command, plural) test, put to the proof
الْيَتَامَىٰ al-yatāmā ي-ت-م Noun (plural, definite) the orphans
حَتَّىٰ ḥattā none Particle until
إِذَا idhā none Adverb of time holding a condition when
بَلَغُوا balaghū ب-ل-غ Verb (past, plural) they reached
النِّكَاحَ al-nikāḥ ن-ك-ح Noun (definite, accusative) marriage, that is, the age for it
فَ fa none Connecting particle then
إِنْ in none Conditional particle if
آنَسْتُم ānastum أ-ن-س Verb (Form IV, past, 2nd person plural) you made out, you discerned
مِّنْ min none Preposition from, in
هُمْ hum none Pronoun them
رُشْدًا rushdan ر-ش-د Noun (indefinite, accusative) sound judgement, some measure of it
فَ fa none Connecting particle then
ادْفَعُوا idfaʿū د-ف-ع Verb (command, plural) hand over
إِلَيْ ilā none Preposition to
هِمْ him none Pronoun them
أَمْوَالَ amwāl م-و-ل Noun (plural, accusative) property, wealth
هُمْ hum none Pronoun their
وَ wa none Conjunction and
لَا lā none Prohibitive particle do not
تَأْكُلُو taʾkulū أ-ك-ل Verb (present, plural, jussive) eat, consume
هَا hā none Pronoun it
إِسْرَافًا isrāfan س-ر-ف Verbal noun (accusative) going past the limit
وَ wa none Conjunction and
بِدَارًا bidāran ب-د-ر Verbal noun (accusative) rushing, racing
أَن an none Particle that
يَكْبَرُوا yakbarū ك-ب-ر Verb (present, plural) they grow up
وَ wa none Conjunction and
مَن man none Conditional noun whoever
كَانَ kāna ك-و-ن Verb (past, incomplete) is, was
غَنِيًّا ghaniyyan غ-ن-ي Adjective (indefinite, accusative) well off, not in need
فَ fa none Connecting particle then
لْيَسْتَعْفِفْ li-yastaʿfif ع-ف-ف Verb (Form X, command, 3rd person) let him hold back, keep his hand away
وَ wa none Conjunction and
مَن man none Conditional noun whoever
كَانَ kāna ك-و-ن Verb (past, incomplete) is, was
فَقِيرًا faqīran ف-ق-ر Adjective (indefinite, accusative) poor
فَ fa none Connecting particle then
لْيَأْكُلْ li-yaʾkul أ-ك-ل Verb (command, 3rd person) let him eat, let him take
بِ bi none Preposition in, with
الْمَعْرُوفِ al-maʿrūf ع-ر-ف Noun (definite, genitive) what is recognised as fair
فَ fa none Connecting particle so
إِذَا idhā none Adverb of time holding a condition when
دَفَعْتُمْ dafaʿtum د-ف-ع Verb (past, 2nd person plural) you handed over
إِلَيْ ilā none Preposition to
هِمْ him none Pronoun them
أَمْوَالَ amwāl م-و-ل Noun (plural, accusative) property
هُمْ hum none Pronoun their
فَ fa none Connecting particle then
أَشْهِدُوا ashhidū ش-ه-د Verb (Form IV, command, plural) call witnesses
عَلَيْ ʿalā none Preposition over, against
هِمْ him none Pronoun them
وَ wa none Conjunction and
كَفَىٰ kafā ك-ف-ي Verb (past) is enough
بِ bi none Preposition (added for emphasis) (untranslated)
اللَّهِ Allāh none لَفْظُ الجَلَالَةِ lafẓ al-jalāla, the Name of Majesty Allah
حَسِيبًا ḥasīban ح-س-ب Noun (indefinite, accusative) one who reckons and settles accounts

4. Understanding the Verse

وَٱبۡتَلُواْ ٱلۡيَتَٰمَىٰ “Test the orphans.” (4:6)

The verse before this one says do not put property into the hands of someone who cannot manage it. That raises a question. How do you know who can manage it? Bad judgement with money is not something you can see in a person's face. It only shows itself when money is actually being handled. So this verse does not ask you to form an opinion about the child. It tells you to run a test.

The command is addressed to everyone, and the work of it falls on the guardians and executors, since they are the ones holding the money (Ibn ʿAṭiyya).[1]

What the test looks like depends on what the young person actually deals with. A girl is not tested by buying and selling, because that is not her area, but by the running of a household (Ibn ʿUthaymīn).[2] A boy is handed the household spending for a month, or a small sum to trade with, and if he loses it the executor is not held liable (al-Qurṭubī).[3] The principle is the same in both cases. Give them something real and watch what they do with it.

حَتَّىٰٓ إِذَا بَلَغُواْ ٱلنِّكَاحَ “Until they reach the age of marriage.” (4:6)

This means until puberty. Several early reports explain it that way (al-Ṭabarī).[4] Later scholars discussed what to do when puberty has not shown itself by a certain age, and they set different ages. That discussion belongs to the Deeper Study.

فَإِنۡ ءَانَسۡتُم مِّنۡهُمۡ رُشۡدٗا “If you find sound judgement in them.” (4:6)

The word here means sense with money. Can he look after it? Does he know when he is being cheated? Will he throw it away?

The earliest commentary weighs the reports and settles on intelligence together with the sound management of property, and holds that this stands even where the young man is a transgressor in his religion (al-Ṭabarī).[5] The same conclusion follows from the wording itself, since the word is left indefinite and so means a kind of soundness, the kind that has to do with handling property well and not squandering it (al-Shawkānī).[6] Others required religious soundness as well, and their argument is in the Deeper Study.

فَٱدۡفَعُوٓاْ إِلَيۡهِمۡ أَمۡوَٰلَهُمۡۖ “Then hand their property over to them.” (4:6)

Both conditions have to be met. Old enough, and able. Neither one on its own is enough. The property is not handed over before puberty even to a young person known to be sensible, and not after puberty either until soundness has been made out (al-Shawkānī).[7]

وَلَا تَأۡكُلُوهَآ إِسۡرَافٗا وَبِدَارًا أَن يَكۡبَرُواْۚ “Do not eat it up wastefully, or in a hurry before they grow up.” (4:6)

Two different wrongs are named here. The first is spending past the limit. The second is racing the clock: the guardian sees the child getting older, knows the money is about to leave his hands, and hurries to use it while he still can.

The motive behind the second is named in the earliest commentary. While you have not handed it over, you have a share in it. Once you hand it over, you have none (Ibn Zayd, transmitted by al-Ṭabarī).[8]

One thing this phrase does not mean. It does not say that consuming the money moderately is acceptable so long as you do not overdo it. Going past the limit here means going outside what Allah permitted you in the first place (al-Ṭabarī).[9] The same conclusion is reached by a different route, and any argument for a permitted middle amount is ruled out (al-Qurṭubī).[10] There is no permitted middle amount hidden in the wording.

وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيّٗا فَلۡيَسۡتَعۡفِفۡۖ وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرٗا فَلۡيَأۡكُلۡ بِٱلۡمَعۡرُوفِۚ “A guardian who is well off should keep away from it. A guardian who is poor may take from it in a fair way.” (4:6)

This is the verse's own division, and it is simple. If you do not need the money, do not touch it. If you are poor and you are doing real work looking after this child's property, you may take something for it.

The limit is the phrase "in the fair way", meaning what people would recognise as fair. The verse gives no figure. The scholars differed a great deal about what that comes to in practice, and that discussion is in the Deeper Study.

فَإِذَا دَفَعۡتُمۡ إِلَيۡهِمۡ أَمۡوَٰلَهُمۡ فَأَشۡهِدُواْ عَلَيۡهِمۡۚ “When you hand their property over to them, call witnesses.” (4:6)

What is being witnessed is the orphans receiving their property in full from the guardian's hands (al-Ṭabarī).[11] This protects the young person, who can show he received nothing if the guardian is lying. It also protects the guardian, who can show he handed everything over if the young person later claims otherwise.

وَكَفَىٰ بِٱللَّهِ حَسِيبٗا “Allah is enough as a reckoner.” (4:6)

Everything in this verse up to here is arrangements between people, and every one of them can be got round. A guardian can hold a young man back and call it caution. He can take more than his work is worth and call it fair. He can hand the money over with nobody in the room, and if the ward never complains, nothing happens. There is no one above him in the house, and there may be no one above him anywhere he can be made to answer to.

The last four words are addressed to that man. The name given to Allah here, حَسِيب (ḥasīb), is from the root for counting and settling accounts. It is the reckoner of a man's deeds who repays him for them, "and in this is a threat to everyone who denies a right" (Ibn ʿAṭiyya).[12] The words are a severe warning (al-Shawkānī).[13] The threat turns both ways, at guardians and at wards alike, since a young man can deny receiving what he received as easily as a guardian can claim to have paid what he never paid (al-Biqāʿī).[14]

And the words close more than the command about witnesses. The clause gathers up the whole passage: the testing, the handover, the ban on hurried eating, the rich guardian's restraint and the poor one's portion are all inside its reach (Ibn ʿĀshūr).[15]

Witnesses can be absent. The one who keeps the account cannot.

5. Thematic Connections in the Qurʾān

﴿وَءَاتُواْ ٱلۡيَتَٰمَىٰٓ أَمۡوَٰلَهُمۡۖ﴾
“Give the orphans their property” (4:2)

The command comes four verses earlier. This verse says when.

﴿وَلَا تُؤۡتُواْ ٱلسُّفَهَآءَ أَمۡوَٰلَكُمُ ٱلَّتِي جَعَلَ ٱللَّهُ لَكُمۡ قِيَٰمٗا﴾
“Do not give those who cannot manage it the property Allah has made a support for you” (4:5)

This is the verse immediately before. It holds money back from people who would waste it. Our verse explains how you find out who those people are.

﴿إِنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ يَأۡكُلُونَ أَمۡوَٰلَ ٱلۡيَتَٰمَىٰ ظُلۡمًا إِنَّمَا يَأۡكُلُونَ فِي بُطُونِهِمۡ نَارٗاۖ﴾
“Those who consume the property of orphans unjustly are only swallowing fire into their bellies” (4:10)

The warning that follows.

﴿قَد تَّبَيَّنَ ٱلرُّشۡدُ مِنَ ٱلۡغَيِّۚ﴾
“Right conduct has become clear from error” (2:256)

The word our verse uses for sound judgement is the same word used here. It is the opposite of going wrong.

﴿ءَانَسَ مِن جَانِبِ ٱلطُّورِ نَارٗاۖ﴾
“He saw a fire from the side of the mountain” (28:29)

The verb our verse uses for finding sound judgement is the same verb used here. Mūsā عليه السلام caught sight of something at a distance.

6. Gems and Subtleties

Gem 1

A guardian cannot see financial judgement from the outside; the test makes a hidden capacity visible.

The previous verse holds property back from those who cannot manage it. Yet the weakness it names is inward: appearance and confidence do not reveal what someone will do when money is actually in his hands.[1]

That is why this verse does not tell the guardian merely to form an opinion. It tells him to test. A measured responsibility gives the young person room to show whether he can protect, plan and restrain himself before the whole estate is released.

Gem 2

The verse still calls them orphans at the moment their orphanhood is ending.

A child stops being an orphan in the strict sense once he grows up. But this verse is still calling them orphans at the very point where the money is handed over, which is after they have grown up and shown they can manage.

Arabic can keep the earlier name when describing the last act of the earlier condition. After sound judgement has been established, they are still called by the name they bore before it was established.[2]

The wording carries the trust from its beginning to its proper end. Handing over the property is not a new relationship with an adult; it is the final duty owed to the child who was placed in the guardian's care.

Gem 3

The verse gives the poor guardian no figure; an early answer measures the allowance by service and stops it at harm.

A bedouin came to Ibn ʿAbbās. He said he had orphan nephews in his care, and they owned camels, and he owned camels too. What was lawful for him from theirs?

Ibn ʿAbbās did not give him a number. He asked whether the man went after their strays, treated their mange, repaired their watering trough and went ahead of them on watering day. The man answered yes to all four.

Then Ibn ʿAbbās answered: drink, without harming the young and without draining the udder.[3]

The answer joins permission to restraint. His work explains why he may benefit; the animal's welfare marks where that benefit must stop. Other positions on the poor guardian's allowance, including loan, wage and subsistence, are compared in Deeper Study, Question 8.[4]

7. Contemporary Applications

If you are holding money for a child.

This is the ordinary case. A parent or a relative has died, and you are looking after what they left for a child. The verse gives you three duties. Look after the money, do not live off it if you do not need to, and hand it over when the young person is ready.

If you are doing real work on it and you are in need, you may take something. A man once told the Prophet ﷺ that he was poor and had an orphan in his care, and was told: eat from your orphan's property, without extravagance, without haste, and without building yourself a fortune out of it.[1]

If you manage money that is not yours in any other setting.

The early scholars applied this verse well beyond orphans. ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb said he placed himself, with respect to public money, in the position of a guardian over an orphan's property: if he had enough he kept away from it, and if he was in need he took in the fair way.[2]

The same reasoning applies to a trust, an endowment, a company account or public office. Oversight of an endowment is like guardianship over an orphan (Rashīd Riḍā).[3] The guardian's entitlement compares to that of a public official drawing on public funds (al-Zuḥaylī).[4]

When the money is not camels.

The early answers were shaped by the wealth of the time, which was livestock and date palms. You could take the milk without touching the herd.

Modern scholars have had to say what that means where wealth is cash and there is no milk. One answer is the going rate for the work done (al-Zuḥaylī).[5] Another sets out two instruments side by side: a loan the guardian repays, and paid work at the going rate, with the capital left alone (al-Jazāʾirī).[6]

The abuse this verse names.

There is an obvious way to cheat here, and the verse names it: delay. The longer the young person is treated as not ready, the longer the money stays in your hands.

There is a worse form of it. Guardians come between their wards and the means of becoming sound, keeping the young person from ever being ready (Rashīd Riḍā).[7] The verse's own instruction is the cure. Test him. Testing a young person is how he learns.

Looking after the person, not only the money.

Guardianship covers the child himself and not only his account. The property is protected by managing it, and the child is protected by bringing him up well (al-Zuḥaylī).[8]

8. Common Misconceptions

Wrong: "It is all one household. The orphan lives with us, so his money and our money are the same money."

Correct: The verse separates them by name. A guardian who is well off is told to keep his hands off it altogether. A guardian who is poor is allowed a fair amount and no more. A rich guardian holds back by his own means and takes nothing at all from it (Ibn ʿAbbās).[1] The child's property is his, and it is being held, not shared.

Wrong: "The verse ties the handover to marriage, so it takes for granted that these children will be married as soon as they reach puberty."

Correct: The objection rests on a word that is not doing what it appears to be doing. This is the one place in the whole Qurʾān where النِّكَاحَ (al-nikāḥ) does not mean marrying. The verse is the single exception to the Qurʾān's own usage of the word, and here it means الحلم (al-ḥulum), puberty (al-Zarkashī).[2] The same exception is set down in nearly the same words two centuries later (al-Suyūṭī).[3] The verse names the age for marriage as a way of naming the end of childhood without naming it directly, which is why the wording fits a girl and a boy alike (Ibn ʿĀshūr).[4]

So the verse fixes no marrying age, urges no marriage, and has no wedding in view. It names the end of childhood, and says what is owed at that point: the property goes back to its owner, once he can handle it.

The guardian's practical version of the question is answered by the same finding. Nobody is waiting for a wedding, and a ward's property may not be held back until one happens.

Wrong: "He has turned eighteen, so the money is his by right."

Correct: The verse names two conditions, not one. Age is the first. Being able to handle the money is the second, and it is the one the verse spends most of its words on. The property is not handed over after puberty until soundness has been made out (al-Shawkānī).[5] A number on a birth certificate is not what the verse asks about.

Wrong: "He has reached puberty, so I have to hand it over now, even though he will lose it in a month."

Correct: No. This is the same point from the other side. Both conditions are required together, and that is what the wording of the verse states (al-Qurṭubī).[6] If the young person cannot yet manage it, the duty to hold it continues.

Wrong: "I am poor and I am looking after him, so I can take what I need."

Correct: The permission is real, and it has a limit. The verse sets that limit by saying "in the fair way" and gives no figure. The earliest commentary puts a hard edge on it. What a poor guardian takes is a loan and comes back: the guardian never owned the money, and a man who consumes what he does not own owes it, so what the verse allows him is to borrow at need (al-Ṭabarī).[7] Others allowed a wage for work done with nothing repaid, and the Deeper Study sets out ten positions in all. The positions differ over whether the allowance is measured by work, basic subsistence or borrowing at need. None of this gives the guardian leave to help himself without limit.[8]

9. Points for Reflection

  1. The verse does not ask the guardian to be a good judge of character. It tells him to run a test. That takes the decision out of his private opinion, where his own interest could pull at it, and puts it on something that can be observed and shown to others.

  2. The two things the verse requires are of different kinds. Age arrives on its own. Soundness has to be found out. Only one of them costs the guardian any effort, and it is the one the verse spends most of its words on.

  3. The permission given to a poor guardian concerns his care of the orphan and the estate. Need does not give him an unrestricted claim on the money. What he takes must remain within what is fair.

  4. Nothing in the verse puts a figure on what may be taken. It gives a standard instead, and a standard travels between times and places in a way that a figure does not.

  5. The instruction to call witnesses protects the guardian as much as the ward. A man who has done nothing wrong still needs to be able to show it.

Questions for study

  1. Why does the verse require both age and sound judgement, rather than either one on its own?
  2. The verse gives no figure for what a poor guardian may take. What does it give instead, and why might that be more useful than a number?
  3. ʿUmar applied this verse to public money, not to orphans. What in the verse allowed him to do that?
Deeper Study for Specialists

1. The Questions This Verse Raises

The questions below concern three stages of the trust: preparing the young person to manage property, limiting what the guardian may take while holding it, and establishing that the property has finally been returned. Within each stage, the scholars differed over the conditions, the evidence and the practical result.

Question Central disagreement Practical consequence Result
1. Who is addressed? The whole community, the acting guardians, or rich and poor wards Determines who tests, restrains and may take from the estate The command addresses the community, while guardians and executors carry it out; “rich” and “poor” refer to the guardians, not the wards
2. How is a girl tested? Direct competence, marriage, consummation or later experience Determines when her property is released Practical testing of the responsibilities she actually handles controls; marriage or consummation does not replace demonstrated competence
3. What prompted the verse? Whether the reported occasion can establish the context Affects how confidently the story may frame the verse The story may be mentioned as mursal; the ruling does not depend on it
4. What is sound judgement? Financial competence alone or together with religious uprightness May shorten or greatly extend withholding The condition is sufficient competence in preserving and managing property, not complete perfection; requiring religious uprightness as well remains a genuine position
5. What shows adulthood? Sex-appropriate biological signs, fixed ages and disputed physical indicators Determines when the first handover condition arrives The bodily signs are stated separately for boys and girls; default ages apply when no earlier sign appears; twenty-five is a ceiling on withholding property, not a sign of puberty
6. When does testing occur? Before adulthood or only after it Determines what training and testing can lawfully do Training and testing begin before; decisive confirmation and handover follow adulthood
7. May a discerning minor trade? Actual transactions or supervised observation Determines contract validity and liability for debt Genuine fiqh disagreement; the verse requires a real test but does not alone settle contract validity
8. What may a poor guardian take? Loan, wage, subsistence and narrower permissions Determines what leaves the estate and whether it must return The permission and its limits are clear; the evidence inspected does not establish one uncontested measure
9. Was the permission abrogated? Complete repeal, removal of abuse or continued operation Determines whether the poor guardian may take anything The permission remains within بِالْمَعْرُوفِ; later warnings remove wrongful consumption
10. Are witnesses obligatory? Binding imperative or protective guidance Affects sin, proof and later liability Obligation is adopted from the imperative; the other position treats witnesses as protective guidance, while proof rules and the meanings of حَسِيبًا remain separate questions

Q1. Who Is Being Spoken To?

The verse addresses more than one level at once. The whole community receives the command to protect orphaned children, but the person who can test a ward and release the property is the guardian or executor who holds it. A separate minority interpretation takes “the rich” and “the poor” to be the wards themselves rather than their guardians. That last difference changes the legal consequence: on the majority interpretation a poor guardian may take something under the verse's limit; on the minority interpretation he receives nothing.

Interpretation Community addressed Person who acts Referent of rich/poor Legal consequence
General address, particular execution The Muslim community The guardian or executor holding the property The guardians The communal duty is discharged by the person entrusted with the estate
Direct address to guardians Guardians and executors The guardian or executor The guardians A rich guardian refrains; a poor guardian may take in the fair way
Minority interpretation The command still concerns the ward's care The guardian spends on the ward The wards Spending varies with the ward's means; the guardian receives nothing

Position 1. The command reaches the community, while its execution belongs to guardians and executors.

Who held it. Al-Qurṭubī describes the verse as an address to everyone.[1] Muqātil b. Ḥayyān, Saʿīd b. Jubayr, al-Khāzin, al-Shawkānī, al-Wāḥidī and Abū al-Suʿūd identify the people who act as the guardians and executors.[2]

The evidence. These statements answer two different questions. “Who receives Allah's instruction?” may be answered: the community. “Who can carry it out?” must be answered: the person who has the orphan's property in his hands. Ibn ʿAṭiyya states both parts together:

“This is an address to everyone, and the meaning is that the actual undertaking of this matter falls to the executors.”[3]

This distinction also keeps the pronouns coherent. The people told to test the orphans are the people who later hand over their property. When the verse divides the rich and poor, it therefore continues to regulate the guardians who have been carrying that trust.

Position 2. “The rich” and “the poor” are the wards.

Who held it. Rabīʿa and Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd gave this explanation. Ibn Abī Ḥātim preserves it as one of his many positions.[4]

The evidence and consequence. If the ward is rich, the guardian spends on him according to his wealth; if the ward is poor, according to his poverty. In either case, “the guardian gets nothing.” This interpretation therefore removes the clause from the question of what a guardian may take.

The answer. ʿĀʾisha رضي الله عنها explains:

أُنْزِلَتْ فِي وَلِيِّ الْيَتِيمِ أَنْ يُصِيبَ مِنْ مَالِهِ إِذَا كَانَ مُحْتَاجًا بِقَدْرِ مَالِهِ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ
“It was revealed about the orphan's guardian: if he is in need, he may take from the orphan's property in fair measure, according to the size of the property.”[5]

Al-Qurṭubī likewise prefers the guardian interpretation and argues that a young orphan who lacks judgement is not being addressed about managing his own property.[6] Al-Shawkānī rejects the minority interpretation in much harsher language.[7]

The tarjīḥ. The address is general and the duty is specific. The community is commanded to secure the trust, while the guardian or executor performs the testing, restraint and handover. In the rich-and-poor clause, the guardians are the referents. This preserves the sequence of the verse and is supported directly by ʿĀʾisha's رضي الله عنها explanation. And Allah knows best.

Q2. How Is a Girl Tested?

A girl is included among the orphans whom the verse commands guardians to test. The dispute is not whether she must show sound judgement, but how that judgement can be demonstrated and whether marriage, consummation or a further waiting period must intervene before she receives her property.

Position How competence is demonstrated Marriage required? Consummation required? Additional waiting period? Handover result
Direct practical testing By managing the affairs actually entrusted to her No No No fixed period Property is handed over after puberty and demonstrated sound judgement
Marriage as a condition Marriage is treated as the missing experience Yes Not necessarily Some reports add additional, later experience as well Property remains withheld until marriage
Consummation and experience Marriage is consummated, followed by observed management Yes Yes Some Mālikī reports add one or more years Handover waits for the additional conditions

Position 1. Test her through responsibilities she actually handles, and judge the competence itself.

Who held it. Al-Wāḥidī and Abū Ḥayyān describe a direct test without making marriage a condition. Ibn ʿUthaymīn gives the same principle in a later social setting. Al-Qurṭubī also describes the practical test before discussing his school's additional conditions.[8]

The evidence. The test must reveal whether she can preserve property and manage responsibilities. The classical example, more fitting for its time, gives her responsibility for spinning work: cotton, wages, finished yarn and its quality. Ibn ʿUthaymīn expresses the underlying rule: she is tested through the needs of the household rather than through a field of buying and selling in which she has not been trained; once her competence in those responsibilities is known, she has sound judgement.[9]

Al-Wāḥidī gives boys and girls different exercises but the same criterion. A boy nearing puberty handles his maintenance or a small amount in trade; a girl handles household affairs, spinning and cotton.[10] Abū Ḥayyān states the legal consequence in simple words: her sound judgement is what counts, even if she has not married at puberty.[11]

Position 2. Withhold her property until she marries.

Who held it. Al-Shaʿbī states the requirement in its strongest form: the property is not handed over before marriage “even if she has read the Torah, the Gospel and the Psalms.”[12] A report from Mālik also makes marriage the first threshold and then limits the effectiveness of her dealings until she has acquired further experience.[13] The reports from Mālik are not uniform: Ibn Juzayy gives puberty and sound judgement with no marriage condition.[14]

The reasoning. The argument treats marriage as evidence that she has entered the responsibilities through which her judgement can be known. Al-Qurṭubī reports the rationale that a girl was ordinarily kept away from public dealings, while a boy gained experience through meeting people and handling affairs from an earlier age.[15] On that social premise, marriage stands in for experience that a boy was thought to acquire elsewhere.

Position 3. Require consummation and then a period of observed experience.

Al-Qurṭubī reports that Mālikī jurists required both puberty and consummation before the girl's sound judgement was tested:

شرطوا في الجارية دخول الزوج بها مع البلوغ
“They stipulated for the girl that the husband consummate the marriage with her, together with puberty.”[16]

Some reports then added a further period in which she handled affairs. Ibn al-ʿArabī records proposed periods of five, six or seven years in one case, one year in another and no fixed end in a third. His objection is directed at those unsupported periods: “There is no evidence in any of this,” and the matter must return to the verse's condition, “if you discern in them sound judgement.”[17]

The objections. Ibn al-ʿArabī's criticism removes arbitrary fixed periods; it does not by itself remove the marriage condition. Al-Qurṭubī challenges the more basic condition. He prefers al-Shāfiʿī's position because consummation adds nothing to a woman's judgement if she already understands her affairs and does not squander her property.[18] Al-Thaʿlabī argues from the Prophet's ﷺ acceptance of women's charity at the Eid sermon without distinguishing married from unmarried women or permission from its absence.[19]

The tarjīḥ. The controlling criterion is demonstrated competence, not marriage or consummation by themselves. A guardian should test the young woman through real responsibilities appropriate to her circumstances and release her property when puberty and sound judgement are both established. Marriage may provide experience in a particular case, but it cannot replace the competence the verse requires, and consummation does not create that competence. This is also the conclusion al-Qurṭubī reaches when he rules against the additional condition reported from his own school. And Allah knows best.

Q3. Do We Know What Prompted This Verse?

One report connects the verse to a guardian who asked the Prophet ﷺ two questions: what he could lawfully take from an orphan's property and when he should hand that property over. Because the report's transmission stops at Qatāda, it may be treated as contextual support, but it cannot answer this question definitively.

Evidence feature What the sources establish Limitation Permitted use
The two questions The guardian asks what he may take and when he must hand the estate over The account reaches the Prophet ﷺ through an interrupted isnād Explain how the report corresponds to the verse's two principal rulings
The surviving routes The traceable routes end with Qatāda Multiple later reports do not create multiple independent chains Describe the transmission accurately
Ibn Ḥajar's judgment هذا مرسل، رجاله ثقات, “This is mursal; its transmitters are trustworthy” Trustworthy transmitters do not remove the missing link Mention the story with Ibn Ḥajar's qualification
Internal correspondence The two questions closely match the two parts of the verse A close fit does not repair an interrupted chain Treat it as contextual support, not the foundation of the ruling

The report. Rifāʿa died leaving a young son named Thābit.[20] The boy's paternal uncle took charge of him and asked the Prophet ﷺ: “My brother's son is an orphan in my care. What is lawful for me from his property, and when do I hand his property over to him?” The account then connects the question with the revelation of the verse.

How the commentators present it. Al-Ṭabarī transmits Qatāda’s account of the uncle asking what he may take from the orphan’s property. The reported answer permits taking in a fair manner, without protecting his own wealth through the orphan’s property or amassing a surplus from it. His account begins ذُكِر لنا, “it was mentioned to us.”[21] Al-Thaʿlabī and al-Qurṭubī introduce the report with وقيل, “and it is said,” and al-Qurṭubī preserves the two questions in direct speech.[22] Al-Khāzin states the occasion without a chain,[23] Ibn al-Jawzī calls it the cause of revelation and notes that Muqātil related something similar,[24] and al-Wāḥidī attributes it generally to the exegetes while giving no chain of his own.[25] Abū Ḥayyān also presents it anonymously,[26] whereas al-Māwardī preserves the first question and its answer separately under the poor guardian's allowance rather than presenting the full account as a formal occasion of revelation.[27] Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Bayḍāwī, Abū al-Suʿūd and Ibn Juzayy state no occasion for the verse.[28]

Al-Ṭabarī’s chain ends with Qatāda, as does Ibn Manda’s route quoted by Ibn Ḥajar. Kamāl Basyūnī Zaghlūl’s citation also traces the account to Qatāda through al-Suyūṭī’s attribution to ʿAbd b. Ḥumayd and al-Ṭabarī.

The judgment. Ibn Ḥajar states: هذا مرسل، رجاله ثقات, “This is mursal; its transmitters are trustworthy.”[29] Here mursal means that Qatāda, from the generation after the Companions, relates the account without naming the missing link to the Prophet ﷺ.

Conclusion. The account's two questions correspond closely to the verse: what a poor guardian may take and when the ward's property must be returned. Al-Qurṭubī and al-Wāḥidī both preserve that pair.[30] This correspondence makes the report useful for explaining the structure of the verse, but it does not repair the interrupted chain. The story may therefore be mentioned with Ibn Ḥajar's exact qualification; the meaning and rulings of the verse do not depend on it.

Q4. What Counts as Sound Judgement?

The discussion has three parts: whether رُشْدًا concerns financial competence alone or also religious uprightness; whether complete competence or a sufficient measure is required; and what happens when competence remains unproved.

Position Financial competence Religious uprightness Required degree Possible duration of withholding Principal evidence
Financial soundness Required Not an independent condition Sufficient competence, not perfection Until competence is shown, subject to the separate twenty-five-year position The test and handover concern property
Financial and religious soundness Required Required Both must be established Potentially indefinite The wider lexical range of رُشْدًا and public uprightness
Other early explanations Varies Varies Intelligence, settled bearing, worship or a waiting period From one year to as long as incompetence continues Individual early reports

Position 1. The required sound judgement is competence in managing property.

Who held it. This is reported from Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Suddī and al-Thawrī.[31] Abū Ḥanīfa and his two companions make financial soundness decisive even when the ward is corrupt in religion,[32] and Ibn Juzayy defines it as understanding one's interests and managing one's property “even if he is not a man of religion.”[33]

The evidence. The verse orders a test and makes delivery depend on its result. Al-Ṭabarī connects this to the reason for financial guardianship: a person who is of sound mind and manages money well would not be placed under financial guardianship merely because he sins, so his property should not remain withheld for that reason.[34] He challenges anyone who distinguishes the two cases to identify a relevant difference.[35] His appeal to agreement seems to go too far, however. Al-Qurṭubī records two Shāfiʿī positions on a religiously corrupt man who manages wealth well: Ibn Surayj would withhold the property, while Abū Isḥāq al-Marwazī would not; the latter was the more evident position of the school.[36]

The indefinite form رُشْدًا strengthens the financial interpretation in two related ways. It may indicate a sufficient measure rather than perfection: Abū Ḥayyān speaks of a kind or portion of sound judgement,[37] al-Biqāʿī notes that complete soundness is rare,[38] and al-Samīn and Ibn ʿĀdil explain it as أيُّ نوعٍ حصل من الرشد, “whatever kind of sound judgement has been attained.”[39] Abū al-Suʿūd likewise requires sound judgement “on the whole,”[40] while the Intiṣāf note draws the practical consequence that complete perfection need not be awaited.[41]

The same form may instead identify what kind of sound judgement the verse requires, rather than how much of it is enough. Ibn ʿĀshūr calls this تنكير النوعية: here رُشْدًا means sound judgement of the kind relevant to the matter under discussion.[42] Because the verse concerns releasing property, al-Shawkānī identifies that kind as the ability to preserve wealth and use it properly.[43] Al-Nasafī presents both possibilities: a particular financial competence or a sufficient measure of competence.[44] Rashīd Riḍā states the consequence directly: a fault that affects money matters affects handover, while a religious lapse with no financial consequence does not.[45] Al-Nasafī also connects the “sufficient measure” interpretation with Abū Ḥanīfa's separate rule that withholding ends at twenty-five.[46]

Position 2. Sound judgement includes financial competence and religious uprightness.

Who held it. It is reported from al-Ḥasan and Qatāda,[47] whose own words join soundness of mind to soundness in religion; Yāsīn grades that chain ḥasan.[48] Saʿīd b. Jubayr combines sound religion with safekeeping of property.[49] Al-Shāfiʿī adopts the combined requirement, with Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Ḥasan before him.[50]

The evidence. Al-Shāfiʿī makes each half observable: religious soundness means avoiding open sins that destroy a person's public standing; financial soundness means avoiding waste, squandering and serious deception in sales. He therefore defines sound judgement through both admissibility as a witness and competent property management.[51]

Al-Wāḥidī argues from the breadth of the Arabic language. Sound judgement is “hitting upon the good,” and is the opposite of error and corruption; on that basis he prefers the combined definition.[52] His shorter commentary, however, defines it as soundness of mind and safekeeping of property without adding religion.[53]

Further early explanations. Al-Māwardī records four interpretations: intelligence alone from Mujāhid and al-Shaʿbī; intelligence with religious uprightness from al-Suddī; religious uprightness with financial management from Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Ḥasan and al-Shāfiʿī; and soundness with knowledge of how property is preserved from Ibn Jurayj.[54] Ibn al-Jawzī preserves a different grouping. He places Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Suddī, Sufyān and Muqātil under testing intelligence; al-Ḥasan and Qatāda under intelligence and religion; and a third report under intelligence, religion and preservation of property.[55] In a shorter work, Ibn al-Jawzī himself defines رُشْدًا as religious soundness together with preserving property.[56] Their evidence, not the number of names, decides between these explanations.

Other explanations have also reached us. Ibn Jurayj joins soundness to knowledge of what preserves property,[57] while a report from Ibn ʿAbbās adds maturity, intelligence and settled bearing.[58] ʿAbīda al-Salmānī uses establishment of the prayer as the sign.[59]

Waiting periods answer a different question: not what sound judgement is, but when the guardian may be sure of it. Ibn Shubruma adds a year after adulthood,[60] and Ibn Sīrīn speaks of a full turn of the four seasons.[61] Saʿīd b. Jubayr, al-Shaʿbī and al-Ḍaḥḥāk allow withholding for as long as financial competence remains unproved, even into old age.[62]

A qualification concerning Mālik. The reports do not give one uncontested explanation. Al-Thaʿlabī associates Mālik with religion and financial competence, but that attribution is disputed.[63] Ibn ʿAṭiyya reports Ibn al-Qāsim for financial competence alone and another narration from Mālik for intelligence and religion,[64] while Ibn al-Munayyir's Intiṣāf note gives Mālik the financial criterion even when conduct is corrupt.[65]

The tarjīḥ. The interpretation followed here is intelligence together with sufficient competence in managing property. It fits the subject of the test, the reason for financial guardianship and the indefinite form رُشْدًا. Al-Ṭabarī prefers it from the guardianship comparison,[66] while al-Wāḥidī prefers the broader religious condition from the lexical range of the word.[67] Al-Ālūsī preserves the school division: Abū Ḥanīfa confines the condition to financial competence, whereas al-Shāfiʿī includes religious soundness.[68] The opposing position remains substantive, especially in the report that makes establishing prayer a sign of sound judgement, but it is not adopted here. And Allah knows best.

Q5. What Shows That a Young Person Has Grown Up?

The verse makes handover depend first on reaching “the age of marriage” and then on demonstrated sound judgement. The jurists therefore had to identify the signs of adulthood. A separate legal question follows: how long may an adult's property be withheld if financial competence is still missing?

Sign or age Applies to What it establishes Who accepted it Qualification
Menstruation or pregnancy Girls Biological adulthood Recorded as female-specific signs Pregnancy establishes the earlier point retrospectively
Ejaculation of semen Boys Biological adulthood Early authorities and the juristic schools The precise minimum age is a separate detail
Female sexual discharge associated with a wet dream Girls Biological adulthood Juristic sources It is distinct from semen in English
Fifteen years Both, in the cited position A default legal boundary when no earlier sign appears Al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad and others Derived in part from Ibn ʿUmar's military-service report
Seventeen for girls; eighteen or nineteen for boys According to reports from Abū Ḥanīfa Default age of adulthood Ḥanafī reports The boy's figure differs by transmission
Pubic hair Disputed applications Puberty or evidence of puberty Several early jurists; rejected by Abū Ḥanīfa Some restricted it to cases where birth records could not be proved
Twenty-five years An adult whose sound judgement remains unproved End of withholding, not puberty Abū Ḥanīfa His two companions rejected the ceiling

Position 1. Direct biological signs establish adulthood.

For a girl, the sources name menstruation and pregnancy. Menstruation is counted from the legally possible minimum age, while pregnancy establishes adulthood retrospectively from the minimum term of pregnancy.[69] Al-Shawkānī distinguishes these female-specific signs from signs that apply to both sexes.[70]

Early authorities explain reaching marriage age here as puberty.[71] The juristic works then spell out the bodily sign: ejaculation of semen for boys and the corresponding female discharge for girls. The sign is not confined to a dream; it may occur through sleep, intercourse or otherwise.[72] Al-Māwardī says the marriage-age phrase means the wet dream “in the statement of all of them.”[73] Muḥammad b. Qays instead explains the phrase by fifteen years, as preserved by Ibn Abī Ḥātim.[74]

Position 2. A fixed age provides a default boundary.

Fifteen is the position of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad,[75] together with al-Awzāʿī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Ibn Wahb, Aṣbagh, Ibn al-Mājishūn, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and a group of Medinan jurists.[76] Al-Baghawī calls it the position of most scholars,[77] and Aṣbagh connects it with eligibility for a share in the spoils.[78] The principal report is Ibn ʿUmar's: the Prophet ﷺ turned him back at Uḥud when he was fourteen and permitted him at the Trench when he was fifteen.[79] Nāfiʿ later related this to ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, who treated fifteen as the administrative line between childhood and adulthood.[80]

Reports from Abū Ḥanīfa give seventeen for a girl and either nineteen, the better-known report, or eighteen for a boy.[81]

Twenty-five answers a different question. It is not a sign of puberty. It is Abū Ḥanīfa's ceiling on withholding an adult's property when sound judgement remains unproved.[82] Al-Qurṭubī reports the rationale that a person of that age could already be a grandfather, while Ibn al-ʿArabī objects that a fixed legal period needs textual proof.[83] Al-Nasafī connects the rule with the indefinite رُشْدًا, understood as requiring some sound judgement rather than perfection.[84] Abū Ḥanīfa's two companions reject the ceiling, and al-Ṣābūnī sides with the majority against using age as the measure of sound judgement.[85]

Even within Abū Ḥanīfa's position, delayed handover does not make every adult transaction void. Al-Baghawī reports that the adult's dealings take legal effect before twenty-five even while the inherited property remains withheld.[86]

Position 3. Age alone is not decisive. Dāwūd held that the guardian should continue to await the wet dream even if a person reaches forty,[87] while a report from Mālik uses bodily signs such as the deepening of the voice or change at the tip of the nose rather than a fixed age.[88]

The growth of pubic hair produced three further positions. Al-Shāfiʿī is reported as treating it either as puberty itself or as evidence of puberty,[89] and its evidentiary use is also reported from Ibn al-Qāsim, Sālim, Mālik, Aḥmad, Isḥāq and Abū Thawr.[90] A second position restricts it to children whose ages cannot be established through ordinary family records.[91] Abū Ḥanīfa rejects it as either puberty or proof of puberty.[92] Ibn Kathīr accepts it for everyone on the ground that the physical sign is common to human beings,[93] citing ʿAṭiyya al-Quraẓī’s account of the treatment of the captives of Banū Qurayẓa.[94]

Abū Ḥayyān refuses to derive a catalogue of signs here. The verse, he says, does not specify the age or the mechanism of adulthood; those details belong to the books of fiqh.[95]

Conclusion. The verse makes adulthood necessary. The jurists later developed the details concerning direct biological signs, age-based legal defaults and physical indicators. The fifteen-year position has a Prophetic hadith to support it, but the evidence and its legal application were disputed; al-Qurṭubī even notes that Ibn al-ʿArabī argued differently here and in Sūrat al-Anfāl.[96] Most importantly for this verse, twenty-five is not puberty: it is a separate rule about ending the withholding of an adult's property. And Allah knows best.

Q6. Does Testing Occur Before or After Adulthood?

The discussion becomes clearer when the process is divided into stages. Some scholars speak about training and testing before adulthood; others speak about the legally decisive finding of sound judgement and the handover that follow it.

Stage When it occurs What the guardian does What it establishes Legal effect
Training Before adulthood Teaches, supervises and exposes the child to appropriate dealings Familiarity and developing judgement No full release from guardianship
Testing Before adulthood on the majority account; at adulthood in other reports Observes decisions and may entrust a limited task Evidence from conduct Its contractual effect is discussed in Q7
Attainment of adulthood At the legally recognized sign or age Confirms that the first condition has arrived Adulthood only Property is not yet handed over without sound judgement
Confirmation of sound judgement Legally decisive after adulthood Judges the results of training and testing The second condition Removes the reason for withholding
Handover After both conditions Delivers the estate and calls witnesses Completion of the trust Full control of the property passes to the ward

Position 1. Training and testing begin before adulthood.

Who held it. Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shāfiʿī are named for pre-adulthood testing. Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍāwī, al-Nasafī, Abū al-Suʿūd, Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, al-Wāḥidī and al-Biqāʿī likewise place the test before puberty or as maturity approaches. Al-Khāzin transmits Abū Ḥanīfa's pre-adulthood argument and al-Shāfiʿī's narrower account of what that test may authorize.[97]

The evidence. The command begins the testing and makes the age of marriage its limit: وَابْتَلُوا الْيَتَامَى حَتَّى إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ. Al-Ālūsī says this sequence supports pre-adulthood testing. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ then finds two indications in the syntax. The command calls them “orphans,” which still describes them before adulthood, and حَتَّى places the age of marriage as the limit reached after the testing has begun. He therefore says the verse indicates pre-adulthood testing in two ways.[98]

Position 2. The decisive test or finding occurs after adulthood.

Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib expressly places the examination after the wet dream.[99] A report from Ibn ʿAbbās tells the guardian to test at the coming of puberty and then hand over the property when right conduct and management are established; Yāsīn grades its chain ḥasan.[100] Ibn Zayd places the recognized finding after the wet dream,[101] Mālik is reported for the post-adulthood position,[102] and the Intiṣāf note denies that the child's property is put fully into his hands beforehand.[103]

The reconciliation. Abū Ḥayyān allows a small, supervised test while the child is young, then places the legally effective finding after adulthood and after that testing.[104] His grammatical point is that the perception of sound judgement follows the attainment of marriageable age.[105] Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī explains the legal logic. Pre-adulthood activity trains and prepares the child; it cannot itself terminate guardianship. It is توطئة وتمهيد لزمان البلوغ, “a laying of the ground and preparation for the time of adulthood.”[106]

The tarjīḥ. The evidence supports a sequence rather than a single moment. Training and supervised testing begin before adulthood; thereafter adulthood is attained; the guardian makes the legally decisive finding of sound judgement; only then is the property handed over. This preserves what each group of scholars is describing. And Allah knows best.

Q7. May a Discerning Minor Trade?

Pre-adulthood testing creates a practical legal problem. If a discerning child handles property to show what he can do, are his transactions themselves valid, and can a debt bind him? The schools disagree not about the need to test, but about whether a real contract by the child is a lawful means of doing so.

Position or school Guardian's permission Transaction valid? Debt binding? How testing occurs
Ḥanafī Required Yes, for a discerning minor acting within the permission Consequences follow the authorized trading Through actual dealings with entrusted property
Mālikī report from Ibn al-Qāsim Does not validate the act No No debt binds the child Through supervision without legally effective authorization
Shāfiʿī Neither guardian nor judge may make it valid No The child's acknowledgements and transactions lapse Guardian transacts while testing the child's understanding and bargaining

Position 1. A discerning minor's trading is valid with the guardian's permission.

Who held it. Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad, Zufar, al-Ḥasan b. Ziyād and al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ allow a father, an appointed executor or, where appropriate, the grandfather to authorize a child who understands buying and selling.[107] Al-Khāzin states the result directly: the dealings of a discerning minor are valid when the guardian permits them.[108]

The evidence. Al-Nasafī treats the command to test as proof that property may be handed to the child for actual dealings until the outcome reveals his condition.[109] Al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues from the breadth of وَابْتَلُوا: the test includes mind, conduct and real handling of property, and may not be reduced to conversation without evidence.[110]

Position 2. Permission does not make the minor's dealings valid.

Ibn al-Qāsim reports from Mālik that neither a father nor an executor can validate the minor's trading by permission, and that a debt incurred in it does not bind the child.[111] The Mālikī consequence is therefore not simply “no permission”: it expressly protects the child's estate from the resulting debt.

The Shāfiʿī position is stricter. Al-Rabīʿ reports that a minor's acknowledgements and transactions lapse whether the permission came from a father, guardian or judge, and that a judge may not grant such permission.[112] Al-Khāzin summarizes the purchases and sales as invalid.[113]

How testing remains possible. Al-Rāzī explains that the guardian buys and sells in the child's presence, then questions him about the transaction. The child may bargain or begin the process, but the guardian completes the legally effective sale.[114] Al-Bayḍāwī states the contrast neatly: on one approach the child is entrusted with discussion and bargaining; on the Ḥanafī approach he receives property with which to transact.[115]

Conclusion. The verse requires a meaningful test of financial judgement. The jurists and commentators discuss whether a minor's contract must be legally effective for that test to be meaningful. The Ḥanafī argument uses actual dealings as the evidence of competence; the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī positions protect the child from contractual consequences while allowing supervised observation. And Allah knows best.

Q8. What May a Poor Guardian Take?

The verse permits a poor guardian to take “in the fair way,” but gives no amount and does not expressly say whether what is taken must be repaid. The positions differ over the legal character of the allowance, its measure and the part of the estate from which it may come.

Position Legal character Measure Repayment What may be taken Conditions or limits Principal scholars
Loan Temporary use Actual need Yes Property needed at the time Poverty and necessity ʿUmar, one report from Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Ṭabarī and others
Wage Compensation for work Value of the guardian's service No Estate funds Poverty; work actually performed ʿĀʾisha, ʿAṭāʾ and others; preferred by al-Shawkānī
Subsistence allowance Relief of need Food and clothing sufficient for the guardian No What meets basic need Poverty and the fair way Reports from several early authorities
Produce only Limited benefit What the property yields No stated repayment Milk, fruit, wool; not principal capital Do not consume the underlying estate Several early authorities
Strict necessity Necessity concession Only what averts necessity Yes What necessity requires Compared to otherwise forbidden food in dire need Al-Shaʿbī
Use without consumption Beneficial use Limited to use Not applicable Riding animal or servant's service No money consumed Al-Ḍaḥḥāk
Complete prohibition No allowance None Not applicable Nothing Rich and poor alike One report from Mujāhid; al-Jaṣṣāṣ; al-Kiyā
Appointment distinction Limited permission Unspecified Unspecified Available only to one class of guardian Father-appointed executor, not judge-appointed guardian Al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ
Travel Expense allowance Journey needs No saving or accumulation Travel expenses Journey for the orphan's affairs Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad
Historical limitation Context-specific permission Local need Unspecified Benefits typical of livestock and agricultural wealth Desert communities and similar cases Abū al-Zinād

The restrictions laid down in the verse come first. Ibn ʿAbbās explains إِسْرَافًا وَبِدَارًا, “excessively and in haste,” as consuming the orphan's property in a race against his coming of age so as to come between him and his wealth; Yāsīn grades the chain ḥasan.[116] No position discussed below removes that prohibition. Poverty does not turn another person's estate into the guardian's property, and بِالْمَعْرُوفِ keeps any permission within what is fair.

Position 1. The guardian borrows at need and repays.

Who held it. This is reported from ʿUmar and, through one route, from Ibn ʿAbbās, as well as from ʿAbīda al-Salmānī, Saʿīd b. Jubayr, Mujāhid, Abū al-ʿĀliya and al-Awzāʿī.[117] ʿAbīda connects the later command to call witnesses with the settlement of a debt.[118]

The evidence. Al-Ṭabarī begins from ownership. The guardian never owned the property; one who consumes what belongs to another remains liable for it. Need explains why he may borrow, not why ownership would pass to him.[119] Reports attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās present several positions. They describe eating with three fingers, living from one's own wealth, taking a loan, or taking compensation measured by the guardian's service. The loan report therefore establishes one account, not an absolute position attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās.[120] Al-Ṣābūnī prefers the loan position because, in his judgment, it brings the relevant texts together.[121]

Position 2. The guardian takes compensation for his work and does not repay it.

Who held it. This is reported from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ and Qatāda. Al-Qurṭubī presents it as the jurists' position because managing the estate is work, and al-Ḥasan calls the allowance a provision from Allah. Al-Wāḥidī gives the wage position a formal employment rationale: the guardian is treated as a worker appointed by the Law and may receive the going wage for his work, even though the wealthy guardian is instructed to abstain.[122] The allowance is measured by the guardian’s work. Al-Thaʿlabī associates with ʿĀʾisha and other scholars the position that it requires no repayment, even if its value uses up the estate.[123] Al-Ṭabarī transmits that report but later rejects the wage interpretation.[124]

The evidence. Al-Shawkānī takes the condition of poverty itself as evidence that the permission is not a loan; he therefore prefers the position that no repayment is required.[125]

Position 3. The allowance is measured by need rather than work. The guardian may take enough food and clothing for basic subsistence without repayment. Al-Māwardī keeps this distinct from wages: one is measured by the guardian's need, the other by the value of the work. He reports the need-based position from al-Ḥasan, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, Makḥūl and Qatāda, while assigning the wage position to ʿAṭāʾ.[126]

Limited permission. One group limits the guardian to what the property produces, such as milk, fruit and wool, without consuming gold, silver or capital.[127] Al-Shaʿbī permits taking only under necessity comparable to the necessity that allows otherwise forbidden food, and still requires repayment.[128] Al-Ḍaḥḥāk permits use without consumption, such as riding an animal or receiving a servant's service, but no money.[129]

The prohibition position. One report from Mujāhid and the argument of al-Jaṣṣāṣ allow nothing to the guardian, whether as a loan or an outright taking.[130] Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī reaches the same result by construing the rich-and-poor clause as a command to live from one's own property. He refers the disputed wording to the decisive prohibitions on consuming another's wealth and rejects comparison with a judge's salary: a judge may be paid whether rich or poor, whereas no early authority allowed a rich guardian to take from the child.[131]

Restrictions by appointment, travel or historical setting. Al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ distinguishes the executor appointed by the father from a guardian appointed by a judge.[132] Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad permit necessary expenses only while travelling for the orphan's affairs, not while living in the same town.[133] Abū al-Zinād limits the permission historically to desert communities and similar conditions,[134] a context consistent with al-Ḥasan's reference to palms and livestock[135] and Ibn ʿAbbās's answer to a bedouin concerning camels.[136]

Ibn Abī Ḥātim preserves the fullest early arrangement, setting out ten positions.[137] Al-Qāsimī leaves them open because he finds no decisive Qurʾānic or Prophetic text selecting one, while adding that the path of scrupulous restraint is clear.[138]

Conclusion. The loan and wage positions rest on different principles that the evidence does not dissolve. Al-Ṭabarī chooses the loan because ownership never passed to the guardian,[139] and al-Ṣābūnī follows him because he believes it reconciles the texts.[140] Al-Shawkānī chooses compensation without repayment because poverty would otherwise add nothing to the ruling.[141] What is certain is more restrictive than any one of these conclusions: the allowance is a concession, not an entitlement; ʿAṭāʾ says the guardian may take it or leave it,[142] and al-Qurṭubī considers abstention better.[143] Without decisive proof selecting one measure for every case, the ruling depends on the guardian's circumstances and the applicable legal position. And Allah knows best.

Q9. Was the Permission Abrogated?

The question is whether 4:10 or the general prohibition on wrongful consumption of property withdrew the permission in 4:6. The early sources use نَسْخ in more than one practical sense here: some accounts claim complete repeal, while another says only wrongdoing and transgression were removed.

Claim Verse invoked Effect on 4:6 Who reported or held it Main response
Complete repeal 4:29 or 2:188 The poor guardian may take nothing Attributions to Mujāhid or Ibn ʿAbbās; Abū Yūsuf expresses uncertainty The attributions vary by source, and Ibn al-Jawzī rejects the Ibn ʿAbbās report
Complete repeal 4:10 The permission ends because consuming orphan property is threatened Zayd b. Aslam; reports from Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Ḍaḥḥāk The word “wrongfully” can instead distinguish abuse from lawful use
Removal of abuse 4:10 Wrongdoing and transgression are excluded; the bounded permission remains A report from Ibn ʿAbbās through ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī This is restriction or clarification in effect, not elimination of the allowance
Permission remains 4:6 read with 4:10 A poor guardian may still take within بِالْمَعْرُوفِ ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās and numerous early authorities 4:10 condemns wrongful consumption, not every permitted use

Position 1. A later verse completely repealed the permission.

One attribution to Mujāhid invokes the prohibition on consuming property except through consensual trade: the guardian's taking is not a sale.[144] Abū Yūsuf does not adopt the claim but says, “I do not know; perhaps this verse is abrogated.”[145] The source reports are not uniform. Abū Ḥayyān associates Abū Yūsuf's hesitation with 2:188 and gives Mujāhid the 4:10 claim,[146] while Ibn al-Jawzī assigns the 4:29 claim to Ibn ʿAbbās and immediately rejects the report as unsound.[147]

The separate 4:10 claim is reported from Zayd b. Aslam,[148] appears as an unattributed reported position in Ibn Juzayy,[149] and is also transmitted from Ibn ʿAbbās and al-Ḍaḥḥāk.[150] On this interpretation, the threat against consuming orphan property removes the allowance altogether.

Position 2. The later warning removed abuse, not the permission itself.

A report from Ibn ʿAbbās through ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī says that Allah “abrogated the wrongdoing and transgression” through 4:10.[151] Whatever term the report uses, its stated effect is limited: wrongful and excessive use is removed while the fair allowance remains. In later technical terms, that effect is closer to restriction or clarification than to the repeal of the whole ruling.

Position 3. The permission remains in force.

Ibn al-Jawzī presents the standing and repealed positions, then rejects the repeal report with وَلَا يَصِحُّ, “and it is not sound.”[152] He records the continuing ruling from ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Ḥasan, al-Shaʿbī, Abū al-ʿĀliya, Mujāhid, Saʿīd b. Jubayr, al-Nakhaʿī and Qatāda.[153]

The evidence from 4:10. The word ظُلْمًا, “wrongfully,” can work against complete repeal. Ibn ʿAṭiyya explains it as what exceeds the fair way when the executor is poor.[154] Ibn ʿĀdil argues that if every use of the orphan's property were forbidden, “wrongfully” would add nothing to the warning.[155] The same verse used to cancel the allowance is therefore also evidence that the Qurʾān distinguishes an abusive taking from a permitted one.

The tarjīḥ. The permission remains in force within the limits stated in 4:6. Ibn al-Jawzī rejects the complete-repeal report from Ibn ʿAbbās while also preserving from Ibn ʿAbbās and numerous other early authorities the position that the ruling stands.[156] The partial-naskh wording is compatible with this result because it expressly removes wrongdoing and transgression rather than the permission itself. Al-Baghawī and al-Khāzin discuss naskh nearby only in relation to 4:8 and the inheritance verses.[157] And Allah knows best.

Q10. Is Calling Witnesses Obligatory?

The closing command raises three related questions: whether فَأَشْهِدُوا عَلَيْهِمْ is binding; who must prove delivery if the ward later denies receiving the property; and whether حَسِيبًا means one who reckons, one who suffices or a witness.

Position Force of فَأَشْهِدُوا Proof if receipt is denied Treatment of حَسِيبًا Practical consequence Principal scholars
Obligatory Binding command Guardian ordinarily needs proof Reckoner and witness reinforce accountability Failure to witness risks sin and liability Abū Ḥayyān's preference; a group named by al-Qurṭubī; ʿAbduh and Riḍā
Recommended guidance Strong precaution, not an obligation In the Ḥanafī rule, guardian may be believed on oath Allah suffices as ultimate witness Witnesses prevent suspicion and litigation but omission is not automatically sinful Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Baghawī, al-Khāzin, al-Wāḥidī and others
Both senses possible Verse does not decide one force alone Discharge may depend on witnesses when receipt is denied Closing clause can support more than one construction Result varies with acknowledgment, denial and proof Al-Shāfiʿī's preserved analysis

The evidentiary consequence. Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī are reported as not accepting a guardian's unsupported claim that he handed the property over, while Abū Ḥanīfa accepts it.[158] Al-Qurṭubī gives a parallel case: an executor who pays a deceased person's debt without witnesses is liable, whereas one whose witnesses later die is not.[159] This helps explain the practical stakes, but the allocation of proof is not itself a complete argument about the force of the Qurʾānic imperative.

Position 1. The command is obligatory.

Who held it. Abū Ḥayyān says, وَظَاهِرُ الْأَمْرِ أَنَّهُ وَاجِبٌ, “the apparent force of the command is that it is obligatory,” and presents recommendation as another group's position.[160] Ibn ʿAbbās tells the guardian to hand over the property with witnesses “as Allah commanded him.”[161] Al-Qurṭubī names a group for obligation and calls it the apparent sense of the verse,[162] while Ibn Juzayy preserves both recommendation and obligation.[163]

The evidence. An unqualified imperative normally binds, and the rest of the passage treats its commands and prohibitions as legally serious. Witnesses also protect both the ward's property and the guardian who has discharged the trust. The obligation position does not depend solely on a later lawsuit; it begins with the form and purpose of the command.

Position 2. The command is guidance and precaution.

Who held it. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Baghawī, al-Khāzin, Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Wāḥidī and Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā treat the command as protective guidance rather than an obligation. Al-Biqāʿī does not decide whether it is binding; he explains how witnesses cut off harm and deter betrayal.[164]

The evidence. On this view, witnesses protect both sides at the moment of handover. They prevent suspicion and quarrelling, give the guardian evidence if receipt is later denied, and remove the need to rely on an oath alone. Advance knowledge that proof will be required also restrains betrayal. The command therefore secures the trust and prevents litigation without making every unwitnessed handover sinful.

Abū al-Suʿūd connects this position with the Ḥanafī rule: according to his school the executor is believed about delivery on oath, unlike the rule he attributes to Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī.[165] Abū Ḥayyān reports Mālik differently, placing him with Abū Ḥanīfa on acceptance of the guardian's word.

Al-Shāfiʿī preserves both constructions. On one, the command is دَلَالَةً لَا حَتْمًا, guidance rather than a binding requirement, and Allah's sufficiency allows the absence of human witnesses. On the other, witnesses discharge the guardian when the ward denies receipt, while acknowledgment by the ward may discharge him without them. He concludes that the verse bears both senses.[166] Al-Qurṭubī also records groups on both sides.[167]

The closing clause does not speak with only one legal voice. The Ḥanafī argument uses “Allah suffices as حَسِيبًا” to support the guardian's discharge without additional proof,[168] in line with Saʿīd b. Jubayr's explanation that no witness is better than Allah between the parties.[169]

Muḥammad ʿAbduh draws the opposite practical lesson. Human witnesses may defeat a claim in court, but they do not erase a right before Allah if the guardian lies.[170] He then argues that the imperative should be treated like the other binding commands in the passage and that leaving witnesses aside produces the disputes and litigation visible in his own time.[171] Rashīd Riḍā separately states his own legal summary: obligation for the Shāfiʿīs and Mālikīs, recommendation for the Ḥanafīs.[172]

The word حَسِيبًا itself bears several established senses. Al-Zajjāj gives “one who reckons” and “one who suffices.”[173] Al-Suddī explains it as “a witness,” in a report graded ḥasan by Yāsīn.[174] Al-Ṭabarī chooses sufficiency in place of the guardian's human witnesses,[175] whereas Ibn ʿAṭiyya prefers a reckoner who requites deeds and hears in the clause a threat to anyone who denies a right.[176] Al-Shawkānī likewise joins reckoning and witness and calls the close a severe warning.[177] Al-Biqāʿī directs that accountability to guardian and ward alike,[178] while Ibn ʿĀdil regards the warning as present whether حَسِيبًا means reckoner or sufficer.[179]

The tarjīḥ. The imperative's force supports obligation. Abū Ḥayyān states that force directly,[180] al-Qurṭubī calls it the verse's apparent sense,[181] and ʿAbduh and Riḍā each affirm the binding conclusion.[182] The schools still differ over proof, al-Shāfiʿī preserves both constructions,[183] and several major commentators explain the purpose of witnessing without deciding its legal force.[184] The conclusion rests on the imperative and the protection of the trust. The several meanings of حَسِيبًا strengthen the warning but do not alone settle the command's legal force. And Allah knows best.

2. Commentators: Chronological Index

The Questions are the principal home of every developed argument. This table is only a navigation aid; it does not repeat the evidence or conclusions.

Commentator Principal home in this manuscript
al-Ṭabarī (d. 310 AH / 923 CE) Q4; Q8
al-Māwardī (d. 450 AH / 1058–59 CE) Q8
al-Wāḥidī (d. 468 AH / 1075–76 CE) Q4; Q8
Ibn ʿAṭiyya (d. 542 AH / 1147–48 CE) Q1; Q9
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH / 1210 CE) Q7
al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 AH / 1273 CE) Q2; Q5
Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745 AH / 1344–45 CE) Grammar; Q10
al-Shawkānī (d. 1250 AH / 1834 CE) Q8
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323 AH / 1905 CE), recorded by Rashīd Riḍā Q10
Ibn ʿUthaymīn (d. 1421 AH / 2001 CE) Q6; Grammar

3. Iʿrāb: Grammatical Structure

The table below follows the Dār al-Ṣaḥābah إعراب القرآن الكريم, Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, which takes the verse word by word and gives each word its position.[1] The attached pronouns, which it leaves inside the phrases they belong to, are given as Maḥmūd Ṣāfī gives them.[2]

Word Grammar What it does
وَ
wa
عاطفة
ʿāṭifa
A joining particle
Ties this command to the commands before it
ابْتَلُوا
ibtalū
فعل أمر، والواو فاعل
fiʿl amr, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
An imperative verb, the wāw its subject
The order itself: test them
الْيَتَامَى
al-yatāmā
مفعول به منصوب
mafʿūl bihi manṣūb
Object, accusative
Who is tested
حَتَّى
ḥattā
حرف ابتداء وغاية
ḥarf ibtidāʾ wa-ghāya
A particle of inception and of limit
Sets the far end of the testing, and governs nothing after it. The scholarly difference is detailed below.
إِذَا
idhā
ظرف للزمن المستقبل تضمن معنى الشرط
ẓarf li-l-zaman al-mustaqbal taḍammana maʿnā al-sharṭ
An adverb of future time holding the sense of a condition
"When", with an "if" inside it
بَلَغُوا
balaghū
فعل ماض، والواو فاعل
fiʿl māḍin, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
A past-tense verb, the wāw its subject
The first condition: their reaching the age
النِّكَاحَ
al-nikāḥ
مفعول به منصوب
mafʿūl bihi manṣūb
Object, accusative
What is reached. Marriage, meaning the age for it
فَ
fa
رابطة لجواب (إذا)
rābiṭa li-jawāb idhā
The particle that ties the answer to "when"
Marks what follows as the answer to "when they reach"
إِنْ
in
حرف شرط جازم
ḥarf sharṭ jāzim
A conditional particle that puts its verbs in the jussive
Opens a second condition inside the first
آنَسْتُمْ
ānastum
فعل ماض في محل جزم فعل الشرط
fiʿl māḍin fī maḥall jazm fiʿl al-sharṭ
A past-tense verb standing as the verb of the condition
The finding the guardian has to make
مِنْ
min
حرف جرّ
ḥarf jarr
A preposition
"In", "from"
هُمْ
hum
ضمير في محلّ جرّ
ḍamīr fī maḥall jarr
A pronoun in the genitive position
The orphans. The phrase attaches to "you perceive"
رُشْدًا
rushdan
مفعول به منصوب
mafʿūl bihi manṣūb
Object, accusative
What has to be perceived. Its indefiniteness may indicate a sufficient measure of sound judgement or the relevant kind of sound judgement, namely competence with property
فَ
fa
رابطة لجواب (إن)
rābiṭa li-jawāb in
The particle that ties the answer to "if"
Marks what follows as the answer to "if you perceive"
ادْفَعُوا
idfaʿū
فعل أمر، والواو فاعل
fiʿl amr, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
An imperative verb, the wāw its subject
The order to release the property
إِلَيْ
ilā
حرف جرّ
ḥarf jarr
A preposition
"To"
هِمْ
him
ضمير في محلّ جرّ
ḍamīr fī maḥall jarr
A pronoun in the genitive position
The orphans, who receive
أَمْوَالَ
amwāl
مفعول به منصوب
mafʿūl bihi manṣūb
Object, accusative
What is released
هُمْ
hum
ضمير مضاف إليه
ḍamīr muḍāf ilayhi
A possessive pronoun
Whose property it is. Theirs, not the guardian's
وَ
wa
عاطفة
ʿāṭifa
A joining particle
Joins the prohibition to what came before. The scholarly difference is detailed below.
لَا
lā
ناهية جازمة
nāhiya jāzima
A prohibiting particle that puts the verb in the jussive
"Do not"
تَأْكُلُو
taʾkulū
مضارع مجزوم، والواو فاعل
muḍāriʿ majzūm, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
A present-tense verb in the jussive, the wāw its subject
The forbidden act: consuming
هَا
hā
ضمير، مفعول به
ḍamīr, mafʿūl bihi
A pronoun, object of the verb
The property. What may not be consumed
إِسْرَافًا
isrāfan
مفعول لأجله منصوب
mafʿūl li-ajlihi manṣūb
An accusative naming the reason for the act
The first wrong: going past the limit
وَ
wa
عاطفة
ʿāṭifa
A joining particle
Joins the second wrong to the first
بِدَارًا
bidāran
معطوف على ﴿إِسْرافاً﴾ منصوب
maʿṭūf ʿalā isrāfan manṣūb
Joined to "excessively", accusative
The second wrong: racing the clock
أَنْ
an
حرف مصدري ونصب
ḥarf maṣdarī wa-naṣb
A particle that turns what follows into a verbal noun and puts it in the subjunctive
Makes "they grow up" into a noun. The scholarly difference is detailed below.
يَكْبَرُوا
yakbarū
مضارع منصوب بحذف النون، والواو فاعل
muḍāriʿ manṣūb bi-ḥadhf al-nūn, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
A present-tense verb in the subjunctive, the wāw its subject
Their growing up. Not the thing forbidden, but the thing being raced
وَ
wa
استئنافية
istiʾnāfiyya
A particle opening a new sentence
Starts the second half of the verse
مَنْ
man
اسم شرط جازم مبني في محل رفع مبتدأ
ism sharṭ jāzim mabnī fī maḥall rafʿ mubtadaʾ
A conditional noun standing as the subject
"Whoever". Both the condition and the subject of the sentence
كَانَ
kāna
فعل ماض ناقص، واسمه ضمير مستتر
fiʿl māḍin nāqiṣ, wa-smuhu ḍamīr mustatir
An incomplete past-tense verb whose subject is understood
"Is", with "he" understood
غَنِيًّا
ghaniyyan
خبر (كان) منصوب
khabar kāna manṣūb
Predicate of "is", accusative
What he is: well off
فَ
fa
رابطة لجواب الشرط
rābiṭa li-jawāb al-sharṭ
The particle that ties the answer to the condition
Marks the answer to "whoever"
لْ
l-
لام الأمر
lām al-amr
The lām of command
Turns the verb into an order to a third person and puts it in the jussive
يَسْتَعْفِفْ
yastaʿfif
مضارع مجزوم بلام الأمر، والفاعل مستتر
muḍāriʿ majzūm bi-lām al-amr, wa-l-fāʿil mustatir
A present-tense verb in the jussive by the lām of command, its subject understood
What he must do: refrain
وَ
wa
عاطفة
ʿāṭifa
A joining particle
Joins the second case to the first
مَنْ
man
اسم شرط جازم مبني في محل رفع مبتدأ
ism sharṭ jāzim mabnī fī maḥall rafʿ mubtadaʾ
A conditional noun standing as the subject
"Whoever", the second time
كَانَ
kāna
فعل ماض ناقص، واسمه ضمير مستتر
fiʿl māḍin nāqiṣ, wa-smuhu ḍamīr mustatir
An incomplete past-tense verb whose subject is understood
"Is", with "he" understood
فَقِيرًا
faqīran
خبر (كان) منصوب
khabar kāna manṣūb
Predicate of "is", accusative
What he is: poor
فَ
fa
رابطة لجواب الشرط
rābiṭa li-jawāb al-sharṭ
The particle that ties the answer to the condition
Marks the answer to the second "whoever"
لْ
l-
لام الأمر
lām al-amr
The lām of command
Turns the verb into an order to a third person and puts it in the jussive
يَأْكُلْ
yaʾkul
مضارع مجزوم بلام الأمر
muḍāriʿ majzūm bi-lām al-amr
A present-tense verb in the jussive by the lām of command
What he may do: take
بِ
bi
حرف جرّ
ḥarf jarr
A preposition
"In", "according to"
الْمَعْرُوفِ
al-maʿrūf
جار ومجرور متعلق بمحذوف حال من فاعل (يأكل)
jārr wa-majrūr mutaʿalliq bi-maḥdhūf ḥāl min fāʿil yaʾkul
A preposition with its noun, attached to an omitted word describing the state of the one who takes
The limit on the taking. It describes the taker, not a sum
فَ
fa
استئنافية
istiʾnāfiyya
A particle opening a new sentence
Opens the closing instruction
إِذَا
idhā
ظرف للزمن المستقبل تضمن معنى الشرط
ẓarf li-l-zaman al-mustaqbal taḍammana maʿnā al-sharṭ
An adverb of future time holding the sense of a condition
"When", the second time
دَفَعْتُمْ
dafaʿtum
فعل ماض
fiʿl māḍin
A past-tense verb
The release, now supposed done. Its subject is the attached "you" ending
إِلَيْ
ilā
حرف جرّ
ḥarf jarr
A preposition
"To"
هِمْ
him
ضمير في محلّ جرّ
ḍamīr fī maḥall jarr
A pronoun in the genitive position
The orphans, who receive
أَمْوَالَ
amwāl
مفعول به منصوب
mafʿūl bihi manṣūb
Object, accusative
What is released
هُمْ
hum
ضمير مضاف إليه
ḍamīr muḍāf ilayhi
A possessive pronoun
Whose property it is
فَ
fa
رابطة لجواب الشرط
rābiṭa li-jawāb al-sharṭ
The particle that ties the answer to the condition
Marks the answer to "when you release"
أَشْهِدُوا
ashhidū
فعل أمر، والواو فاعل
fiʿl amr, wa-l-wāw fāʿil
An imperative verb, the wāw its subject
The order: bring witnesses
عَلَيْ
ʿalā
حرف جرّ
ḥarf jarr
A preposition
"Upon", "over"
هِمْ
him
ضمير في محلّ جرّ
ḍamīr fī maḥall jarr
A pronoun in the genitive position
The orphans, who are witnessed receiving
وَ
wa
استئنافية
istiʾnāfiyya
A particle opening a new sentence
Opens the closing sentence
كَفَى
kafā
فعل ماض
fiʿl māḍin
A past-tense verb
"Suffices"
بِ
bi
حرف جر، يفيد الأمر
ḥarf jarr yufīd al-amr
A preposition giving the force of a command
Sits on what is otherwise the subject of the verb. The scholarly difference is detailed below.
اللَّهِ
Allāh
لفظ الجلالة مجرور لفظا مرفوع محلاّ فاعل (كفى)
lafẓ al-jalāla majrūr lafẓan marfūʿ maḥallan fāʿil kafā
The Name of Majesty, genitive in form and nominative in position, subject of "suffices"
Who suffices
حَسِيبًا
ḥasīban
تمييز منصوب
tamyīz manṣūb
An accusative saying in what respect
In what respect He suffices: as the one who settles the account

The clauses of the verse, and where each one stands.

Clause Position
وَابْتَلُوا الْيَتَامَى
"And test the orphans"
معطوفة على جملة: ﴿وَآتُوا النِّساءَ﴾ الاستئنافية maʿṭūfa ʿalā jumlat wa-ātū al-nisāʾ al-istiʾnāfiyya. Joined to وَآتُوا النِّسَاءَ, "and give women," in 4:4
بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ
"they reach marriageable age"
في محلّ جر مضاف إليه fī maḥall jarr muḍāf ilayhi. Governed by إِذَا, "when", which takes a whole clause after it
فَإِنْ آنَسْتُم مِّنْهُمْ رُشْدًا
"Then if you perceive in them sound judgement"
جواب (إذا) jawāb idhā. The conditional sentence introduced here, together with its answer, answers "when"
فَادْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ
"then release their property to them"
في محلّ جزم جواب (إن) fī maḥall jazm jawāb in. The answer to "if"
وَلَا تَأْكُلُوهَا إِسْرَافًا وَبِدَارًا أَنْ يَكْبَرُوا
"And do not consume it excessively and in haste before they grow up"
معطوفة على جملة: (ابتلوا) maʿṭūfa ʿalā jumlat ibtalū. Joined to "test them", and not to "release"
وَمَنْ كَانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ
"And whoever is self-sufficient, let him refrain"
استئنافية istiʾnāfiyya. Opens a new sentence and holds no position of its own
كَانَ غَنِيًّا
"is self-sufficient"
في محل رفع خبر المبتدإ (من) fī maḥall rafʿ khabar al-mubtadaʾ man. The predicate of "whoever"
فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ
"let him refrain"
في محل جزم جواب الشرط الجازم fī maḥall jazm jawāb al-sharṭ al-jāzim. The answer to the condition
وَمَنْ كَانَ فَقِيرًا فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ
"and whoever is poor, let him take according to what is acceptable"
مثل إعراب ﴿مَنْ كانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ﴾ ومعطوفة عليها mithl iʿrāb man kāna ghaniyyan fa-l-yastaʿfif wa-maʿṭūfa ʿalayhā. Built exactly as the clause before it, and joined to it
دَفَعْتُمْ إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ
"you release their property to them"
مثل إعراب (إذا بلغوا) mithl iʿrāb idhā balaghū. Governed by the second إِذَا, "when", as بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ is governed by the first
فَأَشْهِدُوا عَلَيْهِمْ
"then bring witnesses upon them"
جواب شرط غير جازم jawāb sharṭ ghayr jāzim. The answer to a condition that does not put its verb in the jussive
وَكَفَى بِاللَّهِ حَسِيبًا
"And sufficient is Allah as Accountant"
استئنافية istiʾnāfiyya. A new sentence, standing on its own

Where the grammar changes the meaning

حَتَّىٰ (ḥattā), the word standing between the testing and the age.

Does حَتَّى (ḥattā), "until," govern what follows it, or introduce a fresh conditional sentence? The distinction is grammatical. A particle may mark a limit without putting the following expression in the genitive. Dār al-Ṣaḥābah therefore describes it here as both a particle of inception and a particle of limit.[3]

Most grammarians analyze it as حرف ابتداء وغاية ḥarf ibtidāʾ wa-ghāya, a particle of inception and of limit, which governs nothing. When ḥattā is a preposition, it governs a genitive expression, as in حَتَّى الْفَجْرِ, "until dawn." In the analysis followed here, it instead introduces the conditional sentence إذا بلغوا النكاح, "when they reach marriageability," and does not govern it. Al-ʿUkbarī settles the matter in a single term: حتى هاهنا غير عاملة, "حتى here governs nothing," entering the sentence only to convey the sense of a limit.[4] Abū Ḥayyān says the same and adds the general rule: when this word comes in front of a conditional sentence it is not a governing word.[5] Al-Nasafī and Abū al-Suʿūd prove it with a line of verse in which it introduces a complete sentence with no genitive in sight: the slain kept spewing their blood into the Tigris حتى ماءُ دِجلةَ أشكلُ, "until the water of the Tigris ran murky."[6] This is the analysis the Dār al-Ṣaḥābah Iʿrāb gives,[7] and Ṣāfī, Ibn ʿUthaymīn and Muḥammad ʿAbduh give it too.[8]

A minority analyzes it as حرف غاية وجرّ ḥarf ghāya wa-jarr, a particle of limit and of the genitive, so that the sentence after it stands in the genitive and إذا ("when") loses its conditional force and becomes a bare adverb of time. Al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī sets out both views, calls the first أشهرهما, "the better known of the two," and attributes the second to al-Zajjāj and Ibn Durustuwayh.[9] Al-Zajjāj's own commentary here explains the words without discussing this grammatical choice.[10] Abū Ḥayyān attributes the genitive analysis to al-Zajjāj and Ibn Durustuwayh, and the nongoverning analysis to the majority.[11] Muḥyī al-Dīn Darwīsh makes the prepositional construction his primary analysis and demotes the majority view to وقيل, "and it is said."[12]

Why this matters. Puberty does not itself satisfy the separate condition of sound judgement. Ibn ʿUthaymīn makes the testing a continuing duty.[13] Muḥammad ʿAbduh spells out the same thing at length. Test them up to the onset of marriageable age, and if you perceive soundness after puberty, release the property; and if not, go on testing until you do perceive it.[14] Both grammatical accounts can still be rendered with "until … when." The choice explains how the conditional sentence is connected to the command; it does not require a different English word for ḥattā, or make the arrival of puberty alone a reason to stop testing.

وَلَا تَأْكُلُوهَا (wa-lā taʾkulūhā), "and do not consume it."

Does this prohibition hang on the command to release the property, or does it stand on its own?

The question is a matter of dates. If the prohibition is a limb of the sentence that begins "release their property to them," then it takes effect at the release. But at the release the money is no longer the guardian's to touch, and a ban that begins the moment its subject matter leaves your hands forbids nothing. If instead the prohibition stands on its own, it covers the whole period of guardianship, which is the only period in which a guardian could consume anything.

Construction What it means
معطوفة على جملة: (ابتلوا)
maʿṭūfa ʿalā jumlat ibtalū
Joined to "test them"
A second standing order to the guardian, running alongside the order to test
عطفًا على فادفعوا
ʿaṭfan ʿalā fa-dfaʿū
Joined to "release their property"
A term of the release, taking effect when the property changes hands
استئنافية
istiʾnāfiyya
A sentence of its own
A prohibition standing free of the condition, over the whole guardianship

The Dār al-Ṣaḥābah Iʿrāb reads the first,[15] and Ṣāfī prints the first in his main text with Abū Ḥayyān's rebuttal of the second in his own footnote.[16] Abū Ḥayyān argues the third and does not soften it. The sentence is independent. It cannot be tied to the answer of the condition, because the condition and its answer both hang on the ward's reaching marriageability, and that clashes with وبدارًا أن يكبروا, racing the ward to adulthood, which by definition happens earlier. Tying the prohibition to the later clause would put an earlier event downstream of a later one, which cannot be.[17]

وبهذا الذي قررناه يتضح خطأ من جعل ولا تأكلوها عطفًا على فادفعوا
"By this that we have established, the error of whoever joined 'and do not consume it' to 'then release' becomes clear."

Ibn ʿĀdil reaches the third by the same route, from the ordering of the two events,[18] and Darwīsh argues it independently.[19] Abū al-Suʿūd holds the two ends together another way. He does not join the clause grammatically, and he refuses to cut it loose: the prohibition is تأكيدٌ للأمر بالدفع وتقريرٌ لها وتمهيدٌ لما بعدَها, "a confirmation of the command to release, a settling of it, and a preparation for what follows."[20]

Why this matters. On the second construction the ban arrives when the money has already gone, and forbids nothing. On the first and the third it covers the years in which a guardian holds another person's property, which is the only stretch of time in which the wrong the verse names could be done. What the guardian is forbidden is the same on all three, and no ruling was ever made to rest on the choice. What changes is the period the prohibition covers; the English can remain "and do not consume it" on each grammatical account.

أَن يَكْبَرُوا (an yakbarū), "that they will grow up."

Is growing up the thing the guardian races, or the thing he fears?

Both analyses agree that growing up is not what is forbidden. They differ over the word that governs it. The Dār al-Ṣaḥābah Iʿrāb makes the phrase مفعول به mafʿūl bihi, an object, governed by the verbal noun بدارًا ("in haste"), and gives the sense as بدارا كبرهم, "racing their coming of age."[21] Al-Ṭabarī states the same,[22] Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib says it in three words,[23] and Ṣāfī prints it in his main text.[24]

Al-Kharrāṭ instead makes it مفعول لأجله mafʿūl li-ajlihi, an accusative of purpose with a governing noun left out, مخافة أن يكبروا, "for fear that they will grow up."[25] Ṣāfī gives this in his own footnote as the alternative to what he printed above it.[26]

Why this matters. On the first analysis the guardian is racing a clock. He sees the money about to leave his hands and hurries to use it while he still can, and that is the motive the earliest commentary names. On the second he acts out of fear of the day itself. The act forbidden is the same and the property is protected either way. What changes is the state of mind the verse ascribes to a man who does it. A translation can bring out the difference as "racing their coming of age" or "for fear that they will grow up."

The بِ (bi) of وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ (wa-kafā bi-Llāh), the last small puzzle of the verse.

Does the closing clause tell the reader something, or tell the reader to do something?

The sentence reads literally "and it suffices by Allah." The verb is كفى ("suffices"). On the added-preposition analysis, لفظ الجلالة (lafẓ al-jalālah), the Name of Majesty, is مجرور لفظًا مرفوع محلًّا (majrūr lafẓan, marfūʿ maḥallan): genitive in its expressed ending, but occupying the nominative position of the subject. Three accounts of the preposition follow.

Construction What it means
حرف جر، يفيد الأمر
ḥarf jarr yufīd al-amr
A preposition giving the force of a command
An instruction to the reader: content yourself with Allah
حرف جرّ زائد
ḥarf jarr zāʾid
An added preposition; لفظ الجلالة (lafẓ al-jalālah) remains the grammatical subject
A statement about Allah, with the Name of Majesty as the subject of the verb
تأكيد
taʾkīd
Emphasis
The same statement, with the Name pressed on the reader

The Dār al-Ṣaḥābah Iʿrāb reads the first and gives the sense as اكتف بالله, "content yourself with Allah."[27] Abū al-Baqāʾ held it before that, following Makkī and al-Zajjāj. Abū Ḥayyān reads the second: كفى is a verb, lafẓ al-jalālah is its subject, and the preposition is added.[28] Ṣāfī reads it the same way,[29] and so does al-Kharrāṭ.[30] Al-Biqāʿī takes the third and the shortest road: the preposition is emphasis, and what it attaches to is the real subject and not a figurative one.[31]

Ibn ʿĀdil rejects the first as self-cancelling. On the command construction the subject would be the people addressed, while on the added-preposition construction the subject is lafẓ al-jalālah, and it cannot be both. He turns the same objection on Ibn ʿAṭiyya, who wanted the particle to be added and to give a meaning at once.[32]

Calling the bāʾ زائد (zāʾid), "added," describes its place in the construction, not an absence of expressive value. Ibn ʿĀshūr expressly gives it the work of emphasis.[33]

Why this matters. On the first analysis the verse closes by telling the guardian what to do, which is what it has been doing from its first word. On the other two it closes by telling him who is watching. The guardian is left with Allah as the one who settles the account on all three, and no ruling turns on the choice. The first can be brought out as "content yourself with Allah as reckoner"; the other two as "Allah is sufficient as reckoner," with emphasis on that sufficiency. What changes is whether the last words of the verse are its final instruction or its final statement.

4. Ṣarf: Roots and Word Formation

The roots below are taken from al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī's عمدة الحفاظ في تفسير أشرف الألفاظ, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ fī Tafsīr Ashraf al-Alfāẓ, which gives each word the sense it bears in the Qurʾān and often states its pattern, and from Ibn Fāris's معجم مقاييس اللغة, Muʿjam Maqāyīs al-Lugha, which states each root's single semantic axis in one sentence. Neither work covers everything, and each entry names the one it rests on.

Root Pattern What the pattern does
ب-ل-و
b-l-w
in ابْتَلُوا ibtalū
افتعل
iftaʿala, Form VIII
Al-Samīn gives Form VIII and the plain Form I as one word, and cites this verse for it, so the added letters do not add a sense here.[1] Ibn Fāris gives the root two axes, wearing a thing out and putting it to the test; the verse uses the second.[2] Al-Samīn adds what a test yields: knowledge of a state that was hidden, and the showing up of the man's quality, good or bad[3]
ب-ل-غ
b-l-gh
in بَلَغُوا balaghū
فَعَلَ
faʿala, Form I, verbal noun بُلُوغ bulūgh
Ibn Fāris makes the axis arrival at a thing, and says in the same breath that coming close to a thing is called بلوغ too, by nearness.[4] Al-Samīn keeps both and divides the Qurʾān's uses between them.[5] The two senses are the whole of the question about when the testing happens
د-ف-ع
d-f-ʿ
in ادْفَعُوا idfaʿū and دَفَعْتُمْ dafaʿtum
فَعَلَ
faʿala, Form I, imperative and perfect
Ibn Fāris makes the axis moving a thing aside.[6] Al-Samīn lets the preposition decide which way it moves, and cites this verse by name for it: with إلى ilā the verb is putting a thing into someone's hands, and with عن ʿan it is keeping something off him.[7] The verse has the first, so the command is delivery and not refusal
م-و-ل
m-w-l
in أَمْوَالَ amwāl
أَفْعَال
afʿāl, the broken plural of مَال māl
Al-Samīn defines the singular as what is owned of the goods of this world and can be put to use, and notes that usage narrows it to coin and to trade goods.[8] Al-Aṣmaʿī and al-Rāghib derived the noun from leaning, since property leans from one man to another; al-Samīn answers that the middle letter is a wāw, on the evidence of the diminutive and of this very plural.[9] Ibn Fāris files the root under the wāw and gives it one word, a man's acquiring property[10]
أ-ك-ل
ʾ-k-l
in تَأْكُلُو taʾkulū and يَأْكُلْ yaʾkul
فَعَلَ
faʿala, Form I, jussive in both places
Ibn Fāris gives the root one sense and it is not eating: it is a thing's being made less.[11] Al-Samīn says what that buys at 4:2, which is the verse this one continues: eating is named in place of every other way of dealing with property because it is the commonest of them, or else it stands for spending the property away.[12] Neither the prohibition here nor the permission is about food
ك-ب-ر
k-b-r
in يَكْبَرُوا yakbarū
فَعِلَ يَفْعَلُ
faʿila yafʿalu, Form I
Ibn Fāris gives the axis as the opposite of smallness.[13] Al-Samīn separates the uses: size, then rank, then priority in time, which is the use that gives كبير kabīr the sense of aged.[14] The verse's verb is the third. The wards grow older, and it is their age and not their standing that the guardian is racing
ك-و-ن
k-w-n
in كَانَ kāna
فَعَلَ
faʿala, Form I, hollow
Ibn Fāris allows the verb to report that a thing has come about in past time or in present time alike.[15] Al-Samīn adds that its past may be long or short, so it does not by itself put the guardian's wealth or poverty in a former time.[16] The condition is read of the man as he is when the question arises
غ-ن-ي
gh-n-y
in غَنِيًّا ghaniyyan
فَعِيل
faʿīl
Ibn Fāris gives the root two axes and the first is sufficiency.[17] Al-Samīn grades sufficiency in three, wants that cannot arise, which belongs to Allah alone, few wants, and many possessions.[18] He then explains who is meant in this verse: the man meant is one who has property enough to do without the orphan's.[19] The word is measured against the ward's money, not against wealth at large
ف-ق-ر
f-q-r
in فَقِيرًا faqīran
فَعِيل بمعنى مفعول
faʿīl bi-maʿnā mafʿūl, an active-looking form with a passive sense
Ibn Fāris and al-Samīn agree that the word comes from the vertebrae of the back, so that the poor man is one whose backbone has been broken.[20] Al-Samīn records the pattern with it. The form names something done to the man rather than something he does, which is why the verse pairs it with a permission and not with a rebuke
ع-ر-ف
ʿ-r-f
in الْمَعْرُوفِ al-maʿrūf
مَفْعُول
mafʿūl, the passive participle
Al-Samīn defines the word as the name of every act whose goodness reason and the Law recognise, and adds that a middle course in giving is called معروف for that reason.[21] On the same page he explains the identical phrase at 2:241 as the course that neither goes past the limit nor stints.[22] The passive form puts the standard outside the guardian. It is what is recognised, not what he rules
ش-ه-د
sh-h-d
in أَشْهِدُوا ashhidū
أَفْعَلَ
afʿala, Form IV, causative
Ibn Fāris gathers three things under the root, being present, knowing, and making known.[23] Al-Samīn defines testimony as a statement issuing from knowledge got by seeing.[24] Form IV makes the guardian the one who brings others to be present. He is not told to testify; he is told to procure witnesses, and the two are different duties
ك-ف-ي
k-f-y
in كَفَىٰ kafā
فَعَى
faʿā, Form I, defective
Ibn Fāris states the axis as an amount admitting of no increase.[25] Al-Samīn defines sufficiency as the stopping of a want and the reaching of what was wanted.[26] On this construction he prefers the analysis in which lafẓ al-jalālah is the grammatical subject and the بِ bi is added, and the grammatical dispute is taken up in the section above.[27]

ن-ك-ح, for النكاح. A reader who reaches "until they reach marriage" without a commentary at his elbow reads the clause as fixing a moment by an event. The orphans marry, and then their property follows. Nothing in the wording tells him otherwise, and a great deal of what is written about this verse assumes he will never think it.

The root does not settle the question, because the root is not about a ceremony. Al-Samīn gives its language sense as interlocking, and his illustration is trees whose branches run into one another; the word is applied to the contract because the contract is the cause of what the root names. He records a third account under which the axis is clinging, as rain is said to نكح the ground, meaning it stayed on it.[28] Ibn Fāris gives the root one axis, and adds in his own next sentence that النكاح may stand for the contract without the act.[29] Neither lexicographer states a pattern for the noun, and none is called for, since what is in question here is not its form.

What settles it is a count. Al-Samīn states a rule of Qurʾānic usage: wherever النكاح occurs in the Book it means the contract, with one exception, 2:230, where the act is required as well.[30] That rule runs along the line between contract and act, and this verse stands on neither side of it, because here the word names no marriage at all. Two authorities of the Qurʾānic sciences say so, and say it as a count. Al-Zarkashī: النِّكَاحُ فِي الْقُرْآنِ التَّزَوُّجُ, marriage in the Qurʾān is marrying, except this verse, فإنه يعني الحلم, where it means puberty.[31] Al-Suyūṭī sets down the same exception in nearly the same words two centuries later.[32]

So the one place in the Qurʾān where this word does not mean marrying is the place where a reader is likeliest to think it does. Naming marriage is a courteous way to refer to the end of childhood. The rhetorical discussion below explains this choice of wording; both authorities identify this verse as the exception.

أ-ن-س, for آنستم. A translator who renders فإن آنستم منهم رشدًا as "if you feel comfortable with them" has changed the verse from a finding into a feeling, and the guardian's task from an examination into a relationship. Everything in the verse before this word describes a test. This word reports its result. So which sense the verb gives is not a shade of meaning; it decides whether the verse asks for evidence or for a mood.

The lexicographers answer it, and they answer it more interestingly than a simple ruling would. Ibn Fāris gives the root one core sense and no second: a single root sense, namely a thing's coming into view, and everything that runs contrary to the way of wildness.

أصلٌ واحد، وهو ظهورُ الشيء، وكلُّ شيءٍ خالَفَ طريقة التوحُّش

He then names this verse itself as his illustration of آنستُ الشيءَ إذا رأيتَه, "I آنستُ the thing, when you have seen it."[33] Even the noun الإنس, humankind as against the jinn, he grounds in visibility: سُمُّوا لظهورهم, they were named for being visible, where the jinn are named for being hidden. Al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī makes the same move and then states the priority outright for our verse: it means that you came to know, and its origin is that you saw, because seeing is the road to knowledge.[34]

أي علمتم. وأصله أبصرتم، لأنه طريق العلم

Al-Zamakhsharī settles the matter from a different direction in Asās al-Balāgha, his dictionary of usage, because he alone arranges his entries around an explicit divider. Everything before the heading ومن المجاز, "and among figurative usages," is literal; everything after it is figurative. The verse's own phrase, وآنستُ منه رُشْدًا, sits before the divider. It sits there in one run with آنستُ نارًا and آنستُ فَزَعًا, and in the same literal section that opens with وأَنِستُ به واستأنستُ به, growing familiar with someone. No derivation is claimed in either direction: familiarity is not made a figure of perceiving, and perceiving is not made a figure of familiarity. On the classification of the man who invented that classification, both are literal and both are one root.[35]

The hawk on that same page fixes the register beyond argument. A hawk يتأنَّس when it clears its view and looks with its head raised and its gaze straining.

والبازي يتأنَّس إذا جلَّى ونظر رافعًا رأسَه طامحًا بطرفه

Whatever the root does in that sentence, it is not settling into comfort. It is scanning.

Which brings the two facts together, and shows exactly what goes wrong in the mistranslation. Al-Rāghib explains this verse: أي أبصرتم أنسًا بهم, "that is, you discerned a congeniality in them."[36] The verb is discerning. The congeniality is the thing discerned. Rendering the phrase "you grew comfortable with them" does not import a foreign sense into the root; it takes the object of the verb and puts it in the verb's place.

Two further supports, both first-hand. The vowel length is doing work, and Ibn al-Aʿrābī sets the pair side by side in Lisān al-ʿArab. The form with a short first vowel and the preposition بـ is to take delight in someone; the form with the long alif is to sense a thing and find it in yourself.

أَنِستُ بفلانٍ أي فرحتُ به وآنستُ فَزَعًا... إذا أحسستَه ووجدتَه في نفسك

The same entry explains the verse's idiom in isolation: آنستُ منه رُشدًا أي علمتُه.[37] Al-Akhfash guards the same distinction for this verse and marks the form as ممدودة, with the long alif, setting آنستُ منه رُشدًا وخيرًا against أنِستُ بالرجل.[38] And al-Farrāʾ records the living idiom that puts the matter past doubt: اذهبْ فاستأنِسْ هل ترى أحدًا, "go and استأنِسْ, do you see anyone?", where الاستئناس في كلام العرب النظر, the word means looking.[39] The same idiom circulates under al-Azharī's name in al-Samīn.[40] Shawkānī records it too.[41]

ر-ش-د, for رُشْدًا. What is at stake here is how much maturity the ward must show, and of what kind. The root itself is spatial before it is moral: Ibn Fāris defines it as استقامةِ الطريق, the straightness of a road, with المراشد meaning the destinations that roads run to.[42] Lisān keeps the same picture and adds the test: a man is راشد إذا أصاب وجه الأمر والطريق, when he hits the right face of a matter and of a road.[43] All four lexicographers define the word by its opposite, الغيّ, going astray, which is the ground of the argument some commentators build from قد تبيّن الرشد من الغيّ (2:256); al-Rāghib cites that verse and ours in one breath.[44]

Whether the two vowellings رُشْد and رَشَد differ in meaning is openly discussed among the lexicographers, and the discussion matters because a noncanonical qirāʾah of this verse has the second form. Ibn Fāris treats them as the same word and lists them as free variants in one phrase.[45] Lisān's own head definition merges all three forms, and al-Azharī is quoted there holding the two verbs to be بمعنًى واحد, one meaning.[46] Against that, al-Samīn reports Abū ʿAmr distinguishing them, the form with ضمة meaning الصلاح, practical soundness, and the form with فتحة meaning الدين, religion. He then applies the distinction to our verse by name, and says that it is for this reason that the readers agreed on the ضمة form here.[47]

ومن ثمَّ أجمعوا على ضمّ ﴿فإن آنستم منهم رشدًا﴾

Al-Rāghib reports a third account, that the two differ in scope rather than in kind, the ضمة form covering this world and the next and the فتحة form the next alone.[48] Note the direction on both of the distinguishing accounts: it is the فتحة form that is the narrower and the more religious. Any argument that the noncanonical form broadens the orphan's required maturity has the distinction backwards.

The lexicographers add one caution. Al-Rāghib insists that between the رشد discerned in an orphan and the رشد given to Ibrāhīm in 21:51 there is بونٌ بعيد, a vast distance.[49] Al-Samīn says the same, and adds that the two agree in wording only.[50] The word gives no fixed quantity of maturity. It takes its measure from what it is attached to.

س-ر-ف, for إسرافًا. The question here is whether the verse forbids the guardian only lavishness, or negligence as well. The root runs in two directions at once. Ibn Fāris builds both into his definition: a single root sense indicating exceeding the limit, and also overlooking a thing.[51]

أصلٌ واحدٌ يدلُّ على تعدِّي الحدّ والإغفالِ أيضًا للشيء

Lisān confirms that the two directions sit on different verb forms. One form, أسرف... أفرط, is to go to excess; the other is to overlook a thing, miss it, be ignorant of it.[52]

وسَرِفَ الشيءَ، بالكسر، سَرَفًا: أغفَلَه وأخطأه وجَهِلَه

Al-Ṭabarī had already made exactly that split. Al-Thaʿlabī preserves Jarīr's witness in full:

أعطوا هنيدة يحدوها ثمانية ... ما في عطاياهم مَنٌّ ولا سرفُ
“They gave Hunayda, driven by eight; in their gifts there is neither reproach nor missing the proper mark.”[53]

Here سرف means error or putting a gift in the wrong place, not lavishness. Ibn ʿAṭiyya cites only the second hemistich, with عطائهم, and explains it: أي لا يخطئون مواضع العطاء, “that is, they do not miss the proper places for giving.” Lisān likewise explains سرف as overlooking or missing the mark.[54] Shimr's image of water is the clearest instance of the second direction. The سرف of water is what runs off without irrigating and without benefit.

سَرَفُ الماء ما ذهب منه في غير سَقْيٍ ولا نفع

That is waste as loss, not waste as extravagance.

How the two directions relate is where the lexicographers part, and there are three accounts. Ibn Fāris makes them one thing, saying of the ignorance sense that it goes back to part of what came before, and that the analogy is one.[55]

وهذا يرجع إلى بعض ما تقدَّم. والقياس واحد

Al-Rāghib derives ignorance from excess: a man overstepped what was not his to overstep, and so was ignorant, من هذا, from that.[56] Shimr goes the other way and treats two of the senses as flat opposites, asking how one of them can be an explanation of the other when it is its contrary.[57]

كيف يكون ذلك تفسيرًا له وهو ضدُّه؟

Three incompatible accounts of one root.

The Lisān records an explanation of this verse under قال بعضهم, "some of them said," without naming its author. It does not limit the prohibition to extravagance: do not build a fortune out of it, and eat subsistence, in proportion to your benefit to them.[58]

إسرافًا أي لا تَأَثَّلُوا منها، وكلوا القوتَ على قدر نفعكم إياهم

And al-Samīn preserves a definition of the verbal noun itself that is pure shortfall. Iyās b. Muʿāwiya held that إسراف is that by which one falls short of Allah's due, and that it is the opposite of measure.[59]

الإسراف: ما قصّر به عن حق الله تعالى، وهو ضد القصد

ب-د-ر, for بدارًا. One caution belongs with this word. Arabic has بدر for the full moon and غلامٌ بدرٌ for a boy filled out with youth, and the context here is precisely a boy coming to fullness. But Ibn Fāris keeps fullness and haste as two separate senses of the root.[60] The etymological echo that the setting seems to invite is not in the word.

ح-س-ب, for حسيبًا. The verse's last word can bear two established senses. They color the arguments over witnessing, depending on whether the close stresses Allah's reckoning or His sufficiency, but neither sense by itself decides whether the command is binding.

Ibn Fāris does not treat the two senses as one word wearing two faces. He gives the root أصولٌ أربعة, four separate root senses. The first is counting, and the second, kept apart from it, is sufficing, as when you say of a thing that it is حِساب, meaning enough.[61]

الكِفاية. تقول شيءٌ حِسابٌ، أي كافٍ

He knows this is unusual and says so in closing: such disparity does sometimes occur among the root senses of an entry.

وقد يتّفق في أصول الأبواب هذا التفاوت

He is not a splitter by habit; inside the same article he unifies counting with supposing on the ground that المعنى واحد. So on his analysis the two senses in حسيبًا are two words that happen to look alike.

Al-Zajjāj states the double sense of the verse's own word directly. It can give the sense of one who calls to account, and it can give the sense of one who suffices.[62]

وكفى بالله حسيبًا: يكون بمعنى محاسبًا، ويكون بمعنى كافيًا

Both senses are independently attested in the ordinary language. Lisān has أحسبني ما أعطاني أي كفاني, what he gave me sufficed me.[63] Ibn Fāris gives sufficiency as a root sense in its own right, and the same line of a woman of Banū Qushayr stands in both books.[64]

This is why the two senses enter the argument over calling witnesses. They illuminate the jurists' reasoning; they do not settle the legal force of the imperative by themselves. One further datum belongs here, because it sets the odds. Among the lexicographers of Qurʾanic vocabulary the weight is on reckoning alone. Al-Rāghib explains our verse as a watcher who calls them to account for it.[65] Al-Samīn explains it as one who calls them to account, because nothing of their deeds is hidden from Him.[66]

رقيبًا يحاسبهم عليه محاسبًا لهم لأنه لا يخفى عليه من أعمالهم شيء

The double interpretation is well attested, but it is not the majority lexical explanation.

ع-ف-ف, for فليستعفف. The word is often heard in English as "let him be chaste," which misplaces it entirely. Ibn Fāris gives the root two senses, the first الكفُّ عن القبيح, holding back from what is base, the second a remnant of milk left in the udder; only the first is in play.[67] Lisān quotes our verse under the root and explains its register. Seeking restraint is the seeking of العَفاف, which is holding back from the forbidden and from asking of people.

الاستعفاف: طلبُ العَفاف، وهو الكفُّ عن الحرام والسؤالِ من الناس

A man is عفّ عن المسألة والحرص, restrained as to asking and grasping; and of a people it is said أعِفَّةُ الفقر, "restrained in poverty," meaning that when they became poor they did not stoop to shameful begging.[68] That is the register of ومن كان غنيًّا فليستعفف set against ومن كان فقيرًا فليأكل بالمعروف. The rich guardian is told not to put out his hand.

Whether the form استعفّ adds effort to the plain verb عفّ is left open in Lisān al-ʿArab itself. It records the form as meaning simply to be restrained, and it also records it as meaning to put oneself to the trouble of restraint.[69] The commentators take the second: Abū Ḥayyān, al-Nasafī and Abū al-Suʿūd all say in nearly the same words that استعفّ is stronger than عفّ because it seeks an increase of restraint.[70]

ي-ت-م, for اليتامى. The core sense is not bereavement but الانفراد, being alone. Lisān states it plainly.[71] Ibn Fāris and al-Aṣmaʿī bear it out from usage: any single thing is يتيم, a single pearl, a lone sand-hill, a single line of verse standing outside a poem.[72] Losing a father is the human instance of solitariness, not the root sense of the word.

Two things in the entry bear directly on this verse. The first is that the name is meant to end where the verse's testing ends: وهو يتيمٌ حتى يبلغَ الحُلُم, he is an orphan until he reaches puberty. Once puberty arrives the name falls away in strict usage, and may afterwards be applied only loosely.

زال عنهما اسم اليُتم حقيقةً، وقد يطلق عليهما مجازًا بعد البلوغ

Ibn Manẓūr makes the loose-and-strict distinction himself, and then uses it to answer the obvious objection to the wording of 4:2: how can they still be called orphans at the very moment their property is handed over? They were called orphans, after maturity had been discerned in them, by the first name that was theirs before it was discerned in them.[73]

وسُمُّوا يتامى بعد أن أُونِسَ منهم الرُّشدُ بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسِه منهم

The name is held over from the prior state. Note also that Ibn Manẓūr, in solving that problem, reads آنستم as the discernment of a state in someone, which is where the first root in this section ended.

The second is a competing account of the root that lands in the same field as س-ر-ف. Al-Mufaḍḍal held that the root sense of orphanhood is heedlessness, أصل اليُتم الغفلةُ, and that the orphan is called an orphan because kindness to him is neglected.

وسمي اليتيمُ يتيمًا لأنه يُتغافَلُ عن بَرِّه

Abū ʿAmr gives اليُتْم الإبطاء, slowness, because kindness is slow in coming to him.[74] Two of this verse's key words give a documented sense of neglect.

5. Balāghah: Rhetorical Analysis

Saying one thing to mean another (الكِنَايَة, al-kināya)

Where it is. حَتَّىٰ إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ, until they reach marriage.

The plain way. The verse could have said until they reach puberty, or fixed a number of years. It says neither.

What it does. Ibn ʿĀshūr reads the phrase بلوغ النكاح, reaching marriage, as standing for the child's departure from childhood, and it works the same way for a boy and for a girl.[1]

وهو كناية عن الخروج من حالة الصبا للذكر والأنثى

Naming marriage rather than puberty does three things that no plain wording does. It marks the physical fact, since a person ready to marry is past childhood. It marks the social fact, that the child is now someone others have to deal with. And it does both without naming the physical fact directly, which is the courtesy the device exists for. A verse legislating over orphans keeps that courtesy.

Ibn ʿĀshūr also gives the reason a fixed number was never going to serve. The age at which a body finishes growing differs from one country to another with heat and cold, and it differs between one person and another inside a single town, in strength and in weakness.[2]

تختلف باختلاف البلاد في الحرارة والبرودة، وباختلاف أمزجة أهل البلد الواحد في القوة والضعف

A single number would not describe bodily maturity equally in every place and person. This wording moves with the person.

The effect. The hearer arrives at the meaning himself. He is not told it; he is shown a thing from which it follows, and he completes it.

Borrowing a word from one field for another (الاسْتِعَارَة, al-istiʿāra)

Where it is. فَإِنْ آنَسْتُم مِّنْهُمْ رُشْدًا, then if you perceive sound judgement in them.

The plain way. The verse could have said فإن عَلِمْتُم منهم رشدًا, if you come to know sound judgement in them. Ibn ʿĀshūr raises that very alternative and asks why it was not taken.[3]

What it does. The verb آنس belongs to the eye: to catch sight of a thing, to make it out. The verse uses it for the guardian's judgement about a young person's competence, and competence is not something anyone sees. Al-Zamakhsharī names the transfer. The word الإيناس, he says, is making a thing out clearly, and it was borrowed here for coming to see something plainly in the mind.[4]

والإيناس: الاستيضاح فاستعير للتبيين

The effect. Ibn ʿĀshūr answers his own question. A borrowed verb of sight names the first moment a thing comes into view, not the settled state of knowing it afterwards. The guardian is therefore under orders at the first clear sign, and the money is to go across دون تراخٍ ولا مطل, with no dragging of feet and no putting the young person off.[5]

Ibn al-Qayyim takes the borrowing back as far as the word for a human being. The two nouns الإنس and الإنسان, mankind and a man, are themselves derived from the same root as the verb here, which he explains as seeing and sensing, and he sets this verse beside Mūsā's sighting of the fire at 28:29, where the same verb is used of a thing actually seen.[6]

والإنس والإنسان: مشتق من الإيناس، وهو الرؤية والإحساس

Putting the two verses side by side sets the guardian's finding in the same class as a fire made out in the dark. It is something met with, not something felt.

Putting a word ahead of its usual place (التَّقْدِيم, al-taqdīm)

Where it is. مِّنْهُمْ, "in them," stands before رُشْدًا, "sound judgement"; and إِلَيْهِمْ, "to them," stands before أَمْوَالَهُمْ, "their property."

The plain way. Arabic normally lets the object follow its verb and the modifier follow its noun. In ordinary order, sound judgement would come before “in them,” and their property before “to them.” Twice in one sentence the verse reverses that order.

What it does. Abū al-Suʿūd gives the move a double function: the word brought forward receives emphasis, and postponing what follows creates anticipation.[7]

للاهتمام بالمقدَّم والتشويق إلى المؤخر

What is brought forward in both places is the young people: the sound judgement is sought in them, and the property is handed to them.

The effect. The order keeps the wards prominent in both clauses and creates anticipation for the two delayed terms, sound judgement and their property.

The indefinite that names a kind (تَنْكِير النَّوْعِيَّة, tankīr al-nawʿiyya)

Where it is. رُشْدًا, sound judgement, with no article on it.

The plain way. It could have used the definite form, “the sound judgement,” naming the quality as a bounded whole. Instead, it leaves the noun indefinite.

What it does. Ibn ʿĀshūr calls the bare noun an indefinite of kind, تنكير النوعية: it marks out which sort of soundness is meant rather than how much of it is being asked for.[8] Al-Ṣābūnī, quoting al-Kashshāf, sets out both interpretations the bare noun allows.[9]

الفائدة في تنكير الرشد التنبيه على أن المعتبر هو الرشد في التصرف والتجارة، أو على أن المعتبر هو حصول طرفٍ من الرشد، وظهور أثر من آثاره حتى لا ينتظر به تمام الرشد

The effect. On the first analysis the missing article fences off a domain: what the guardian is looking for is competence in handling and trading, and not competence at large. On the second it lowers a threshold: some portion of soundness is enough, and the guardian may not hold the property back waiting for the whole of it. One missing article holds both interpretations open, and the jurists took the verse in both directions.

Drawing a scene (التَّمْثِيل, al-tamthīl)

Where it is. وَبِدَارًا أَن يَكْبَرُوا, and in haste against their growing up.

The plain way. The verse could have said that the guardian must not eat the property quickly, before the ward comes of age, using a plain word for speed. It chose بِدَار, the form Arabic keeps for two parties doing a thing to each other, which turns a motive into a race with two runners in it.

What it does. Haste is not a manner of eating. It is a reason for eating now rather than later, and what it identifies is the guardian's incentive. Ibn Zayd states that incentive as the guardian's own arithmetic: while you have not handed the property over you have a share in it, and once you have handed it over you have none.[10] Ibn ʿAbbās puts the same calculation in the guardian's mouth: أبادر كِبَره لئلا يرشد ويأخذ ماله, "I race his growing up, so that he may not come to competence and take his property."[11]

The chosen form turns that arithmetic into a picture. Al-ʿUkbarī reads it as two men running, فكأنهما يستبقان, as though the two of them were racing.[12] Abū Ḥayyān names the runners, the orphan running toward adulthood and the guardian running to take his property.[13] Ibn ʿĀshūr gives the device its name, and says plainly that no real mutual action is being reported. The form is there to draw the guardians' posture.[14]

المفاعلة هنا قصد منها تمثيل هيئة الأولياء

Riḍā extends the picture from a single act to an incentive, and names an abuse the classical books do not: guardians who يحولون بينهم وبين أسباب الرشد, who stand between their wards and the things that would make them competent, so as to keep control.[15] The guardian can therefore betray the trust not only by spending the money, but by obstructing the young person's path to independence. The verse requires him to test for competence and then call witnesses when the property is handed over.[16]

The effect. Ibn ʿĀshūr warns against taking the pair إسرافًا وبدارًا, lavishly and in haste, as narrowing the ban to those two cases. The work of the two words is to make the eating look as ugly as it is.[17]

فليس القصد تقييد النهي عن الأكل بذلك، بل المقصود تشويه حالة الأكل

Setting a word against its opposite (الطِّبَاق, al-ṭibāq)

Where it is. وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيًّا against وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرًا, whoever is rich against whoever is poor.

The plain way. The verse could have stated only the case of the poor guardian. Instead, it names both the rich and the poor guardian and gives each a command.

What it does. Al-Ṣābūnī lists the pairing of rich with poor, غنيًا with فقيرًا, among the figures of this verse.[18]

The effect. The explicit contrast places restraint beside need: wealth removes the excuse to take, while poverty does not remove the limit of what is fair.

Two sides answering member for member (المُقَابَلَة, al-muqābala)

Where it is. وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرًا فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ, whoever is rich, let him keep his hands off; and whoever is poor, let him eat in the fair way.

The plain way. The two rulings could have come in unmatched sentences. Instead, the verse gives them a parallel frame, while the poor guardian's side adds the important qualification بِالْمَعْرُوفِ, “in the fair way.”

The first side The second side answering it
وَمَن كَانَ غَنِيًّا, whoever is rich وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيرًا, whoever is poor
فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ, let him keep his hands off فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ, let him eat in the fair way

What it does. Al-Ṣābūnī names the figure here.[19] The two conditions and their responses are placed in parallel, but the match is not mechanically identical: بِالْمَعْرُوفِ adds an express limit to the poor guardian's permission.

The verb given to the rich guardian is chosen for its shape. Arabic could have said فليعفّ, let him be restrained. It says فليستعفف, which is the form used for seeking or asking for a thing. Abū al-Suʿūd reads it that way.[20]

واستعفَّ أبلغُ من عفّ كأنه يطلب زيادةَ العفة

The rich guardian is not told only to keep away from the money. He is told to go after the keeping away.

The effect. Al-Ṣābūnī calls it المقابلة اللطيفة, a fine matching.[21] The balanced frame makes the moral contrast easy to retain, while the added phrase “in the fair way” prevents the poor guardian's side from becoming an unrestricted mirror of the rich guardian's restraint.

Two words from one root, differing in form (الجِنَاس المُغَايِر, al-jinās al-mughāyir)

Where it is. فَادْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ, hand over their property to them, and then a few words later فَإِذَا دَفَعْتُمْ إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ, and when you have handed over their property to them.

The plain way. The second mention could have used a different verb for delivery instead of repeating the same root.

What it does. Al-Ṣābūnī names the pairing of the command with the completed act, فادفعوا with دفعتم.[22] The two are one root in two forms, once as a command and once as a completed act.

The effect. The sound of the first comes back in the second while the sense has moved on, and that is what pins the witnessing to the very act just commanded. It is not some later stage of the guardianship. It is the handover itself, now done.

Saying it at more length than the sense requires (الإِطْنَاب, al-iṭnāb)

Where it is. فَإِذَا دَفَعْتُمْ إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ, the whole handover phrase said a second time.

The plain way. A pronoun could have referred back: “when you have done that, call witnesses over them.” Instead, the full handover phrase is repeated.

What it does. Al-Ṣābūnī names the lengthening here.[23] The handover first appears as a command and then returns as the completed act on which another command depends.

Abū al-Suʿūd adds a point about the verb itself. 4:2 had already given the same order in different words, وآتوا اليتامى أموالهم, give the orphans their property. Here it is فادفعوا, hand it across. The change of word, he says, is notice that the two are not doing the same work.[24]

إيذانٌ بتفاوتهما بحسب المعنى

The effect. The command states what the guardian owes; the completed act fixes the moment at which the witnesses are called. Spelling the handover out a second time makes the two unmistakably one event. The change from "give" to "hand over" also brings the act into view: the first states the duty; the second describes letting go of something you are holding.

The closing seal (التَّذْيِيل, al-tadhyīl), and the emphasis inside it (التَّوْكِيد, al-tawkīd)

Where it is. وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ حَسِيبًا, and Allah suffices as a reckoner.

The plain way. The verse could have stopped at the command to call witnesses, فَأَشْهِدُوا عَلَيْهِمْ, and said nothing more. It could also have used the ordinary construction without the added بـ before lafẓ al-jalālah.

What it does. Ibn ʿĀshūr reads the clause as a sentence set at the end to gather up everything said before it.[25]

وجاء بقوله وكفى بالله حسيبا تذييلا لهذه الأحكام كلها

The letter بـ is attached to لفظ الجلالة (lafẓ al-jalālah), the Name of Majesty. Ibn ʿĀshūr explains its force: والباء زائدة للتوكيد, it is an added letter, there to strengthen what is said.[26] Al-ʿUkbarī says what the added letter does to the mood of the sentence. It came in to give the sentence the force of an order, the underlying shape being اكتف بالله, let Allah be enough for you.[27]

The effect. The testing, the handover, the ban on hurried eating, the rich guardian's restraint and the poor one's portion are all inside its reach, and not the calling of witnesses only. On al-ʿUkbarī's analysis, the statement that Allah is sufficient also instructs the guardian to be satisfied with that.

The noun that says in what respect (التَّمْيِيز, al-tamyīz)

Where it is. حَسِيبًا, the last word of the verse.

The plain way. The sense could have been stated as a plain nominal predicate. Instead, حَسِيبًا appears in the accusative and specifies the respect in which Allah is sufficient.

What it does. Al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī reports two ways of taking the word, prefers this one, and gives a test anyone can apply. The preposition مِنْ, "in respect of," could be put in front of the word without spoiling the sense, and that is the mark of a specifier.[28]

أصحُّهما: أنه تمييزٌ يَدُلُّ على ذلك صلاحيةُ دخولِ «مِنْ» عليه، وهي علامةُ التمييز

The effect. Naming it a specifier is not a small point. A specifier answers the question "sufficient in what respect?", and that is the very question the commentators go on to answer in two different ways: Allah sufficient in place of the witnesses, or Allah sufficient as the one who will call the guardian to account.

The shape of the whole verse

By the time this verse arrives, the reader has been given two instructions that do not fit together. 4:2 commands guardians to hand orphans their property, without qualification. 4:5 forbids handing property to the foolish. A guardian holding an orphan's estate has been told to give it and told not to give it, and has been given no way to tell which case he is in.

Al-Biqāʿī's account of the sequence turns on one observation about the defect named in 4:5. Folly is باطنٌ لا يُعرف إلا بالتصرف، ولا سيما في المال, an inward thing not knowable except through conduct, above all conduct with money. Because the disqualifying condition cannot be seen, Allah بدأ سبحانه بتعليم ما يتوصلون به إلى معرفته, began by teaching the means of coming to know it.[29] That is why the verse opens with a command to test rather than a command to look. An inspection would presuppose a visible defect. A test is what an invisible one requires.

Abū al-Suʿūd states the same architecture in a single sentence, without the psychology: 4:6 is شروعٌ في تعيين وقتِ تسليمِ أموالِ اليتامى إليهم وبيانِ شرطِه, the setting of the time of delivery and the statement of its condition, coming after the absolute command to deliver and after the prohibition of delivery when the owners are foolish.[30] Two clauses of one law, then the procedure that tells you which applies.

6. Qirāʾāt: The Readings

No verse-specific difference among the ten canonical readings is reported for 4:6. In al-Nashr, Ibn al-Jazarī moves from the difference at 4:5 to the one at 4:9 without entering a variant for this verse, and elsewhere cites 4:6 as a case of agreement on one canonical vocalization.[1]

Canonical reader آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا Verse-specific difference reported for 4:6
Nāfiʿ آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Ibn Kathīr آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Abū ʿAmr آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Ibn ʿĀmir آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
ʿĀṣim آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Ḥamza آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
al-Kisāʾī آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Abū Jaʿfar آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Yaʿqūb آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None
Khalaf al-ʿĀshir آنَسْتُم رُشْدًا None

The juristic disagreements in this commentary therefore concern interpretation of the canonical wording, not competing canonical qirāʾāt. The qirāʾāt sources report the following noncanonical forms:

Noncanonical form Carriers as the sources state them Status in the cited sources Stated limit
رَشَدًا Ibn Masʿūd, al-Sulamī and ʿĪsā al-Thaqafī in al-Shawkānī; Abū Ḥayyān and Ibn ʿAṭiyya add Abū al-Simāl; al-Thaʿlabī names only al-Sulamī and ʿĪsā; al-Qurṭubī’s printed wording coordinates al-Sulamī, ʿĪsā, al-Thaqafī and Ibn Masʿūd as four names شَاذّ The differing rosters remain separate; they are not harmonized [2]
أَحَسْتُم Ibn Masʿūd شَاذّ A contracted form of أَحْسَسْتُم; the cited grammarians differ over whether the contraction is exceptional or regular in the dialect of Sulaym [3]
حَسْتُم Ibn Masʿūd; this still shorter form is reported here only by Ibn ʿAṭiyya شَاذّ It is recorded as Ibn ʿAṭiyya gives it, without using him as the carrier [4]
رُشُدًا No carrier named at 4:6 شَاذّ The same form is canonical at 18:66 for Ibn ʿĀmir, but that does not change its status at this verse [5]

Meaning and limit. Ibn ʿAṭiyya says وَالْمَعْنَى وَاحِدٌ, “the meaning is one,” for رُشْدًا and رَشَدًا; al-Thaʿlabī and al-Qurṭubī call them two dialectal forms. Al-Qurṭubī likewise places آنَسْتُ, أَحْسَسْتُ and وَجَدْتُ in one semantic field. Abū ʿAmr's narrower lexical distinction is preserved in the sources, but at 4:6 the canonical form is agreed. None of these reported variants establishes a different ruling for this verse.[6]

Notes

Historical Context

  1. al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, p. 147, no. 294, ed. Kamāl Basyūnī Zaghlūl, records the account without an isnād; Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 1/358. Zaghlūl cites al-Suyūṭī’s al-Durr al-Manthūr, 2/122, which attributes it to ʿAbd b. Ḥumayd and al-Ṭabarī from Qatāda. ↩

  2. Ibn Manda’s report through ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Saʿīd from Qatāda is quoted by Ibn Ḥajar, al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah, 1/504, entry 884, Thābit b. Rifāʿa al-Anṣārī. Ibn Ḥajar judges it: هذا مرسل، رجاله ثقات, “This is mursal; its transmitters are trustworthy.” Al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, p. 147, no. 294, ed. Kamāl Basyūnī Zaghlūl, records the two questions: what the uncle may take and when he must hand over the property. ↩

  3. Ibn al-Mundhir, Tafsīr, 2/573, no. 1391, ed. Saʿd b. Muḥammad al-Saʿd (Dār al-Maʾāthir, first printing, 1423/2002), from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī through Mūsā, Shujāʿ, Hushaym and ʿAwf: إنما كانت أموالهم إذ ذاك، النخل والماشية، فرخص لهم إذا كان أحدهم محتاجا أن يصيب من الثمار، ويأكل من الرسل, “Their property at that time consisted of date palms and livestock, so a guardian in need was permitted to take some fruit and consume some milk.” Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/421–422, ed. al-Turkī, records the athar through Yaʿqūb, Hushaym and ʿAwf. ↩

Understanding the Verse

  1. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10: هذه مخاطبة للجميع، والمعنى: يخلص التلبس بهذا الأمر للأوصياء "This is an address to everyone. The meaning is: the discharge of this matter belongs purely to the executors." ↩

  2. Ibn ʿUthaymīn, Tafsir: al-Nisa, 1/42: المرأة لا تختبر بالبيع والشراء؛ لأنها ليست من أهله، لكن تختبر بحاجات البيت "A woman is not tested by buying and selling, because she is not one of its people; but she is tested by the needs of the house." ↩

  3. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/34. He describes giving a boy the household spending for a month or a small sum to trade with while the guardian observes him; فإن أتلفه فلا ضمان على الوصي, ‘if he destroys it, the executor is not liable.’ For a girl, he describes supervising cotton, the spinners' wages, the finished yarn and its quality. ↩

  4. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/404, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. He records الحُلُم, “puberty,” from Mujāhid through Muḥammad b. ʿAmr, Abū ʿĀṣim, ʿĪsā and Ibn Abī Najīḥ; from al-Suddī through Muḥammad, Aḥmad b. al-Mufaḍḍal and Asbāṭ; from Ibn ʿAbbās through ʿAlī b. Dāwūd, ʿAbd Allāh b. Ṣāliḥ, Muʿāwiya b. Ṣāliḥ and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa; and from Ibn Zayd through Yūnus and Ibn Wahb. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/865, no.4800, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419), records Mujāhid’s explanation through Ḥajjāj b. Ḥamza, Shabāba, Warqāʾ and Ibn Abī Najīḥ. ↩

  5. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/407: وأولى الأقوال عندي بمعنى الرشد في هذا الموضع: العقل وإصلاح المال … وإن كان فاجرًا في دينه "The most fitting of the views to me on the meaning of rushd in this place is: sound sense and the good management of wealth … even if he is corrupt in his religion." Ibn Jurayj explains it as صلاحًا وعلمًا بما يصلحه, "soundness, and knowledge of what keeps it sound." ↩

  6. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. والمراد بالرشد نوعه، وهو المتعلق بحسن التصرف في أمواله وعدم التبذير بها, “The sound judgement meant is the kind concerning proper management of property without squandering it.” ↩

  7. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. ↩

  8. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/410, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, from ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. Aslam through Yūnus and Ibn Wahb: لأنك إن لم تدفعه إليه لك فيه نصيب، وإذا دفعته إليه فليس لك فيه نصيب, “If you do not hand it over, you have a share in it; when you hand it over, you have no share in it.” ↩

  9. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/408: بغير ما أباحه الله لكم "other than what Allah has made lawful for you"; and 6/408: وأصل الإسراف: تجاوز الحد المباح إلى ما لم يُبَح "The root sense of isrāf is going past the permitted limit to what has not been permitted." ↩

  10. Al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, quoted by al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/43: تَوَهَّمَ مُتَوَهِّمُونَ مِنَ السَّلَفِ بِحُكْمِ الْآيَةِ أَنَّ لِلْوَصِيِّ أَنْ يَأْكُلَ مِنْ مَالِ الصَّبِيِّ قَدْرًا لَا يَنْتَهِي إِلَى حَدِّ السَّرَفِ، وَذَلِكَ خِلَافُ مَا أَمَرَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى بِهِ ‘Some of the early authorities imagined from the ruling of the verse that the executor may take from the child's property an amount that does not reach extravagance, but that contradicts what Allah commanded.’ ↩

  11. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/429: فأشهدوا على الأيتام باستيفائهم ذلك منكم، ودفعكموه إليهم "So call witnesses against the orphans that they have received that from you in full, and that you have handed it over to them.". فليدفعه إليه بالشهود كما أمره الله "So let him hand it over to him with witnesses, as Allah commanded him.". وكفى بالله كافيًا من الشهود الذين يشهدهم والي اليتيم "And Allah is sufficient in place of the witnesses whom the orphan’s guardian calls to witness." ↩

  12. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/12: والأظهر حسيبًا معناه: حاسبًا أعمالكم ومجازيًا بها، ففي هذا وعيد لكل جاحد حق "The more apparent view is that ḥasīb means: reckoning your deeds and requiting you for them. So in this is a threat to everyone who denies a right." ↩

  13. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. ↩

  14. Al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/199: حسيبًا أي محاسبًا بليغًا في الحساب، فهو أبلغ تحذيرًا لهم وللأيتام من الخيانة والتعدي ومدّ العين إلى حق الغير, “‘Ḥasīban’: one who calls to account, thorough in reckoning. This is a stronger warning to them and to the orphans against betrayal, transgression and coveting another’s right.” ↩

  15. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/247: وجاء بقوله وكفى بالله حسيبا تذييلا لهذه الأحكام كلها, “His words ‘Allah suffices as a reckoner’ conclude all these rulings.” ↩

Gems and Subtleties

  1. al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/197: السفه باطن لا يعرف إلا بالتصرف "Foolishness is inward; it is known only through dealings." ↩

  2. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 12/645: وسموا يتامى بعد أن أونس منهم الرشد بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسه منهم, “After sound judgement had been perceived in them, they were still called orphans by the name they bore before it was perceived.” ↩

  3. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/420–421, ed. al-Turkī, from Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما through al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad. One isnād runs through al-Ḥasan b. Yaḥyā, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Maʿmar and al-Zuhrī; the other through al-Ḥasan b. Yaḥyā, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Thawrī and Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd. In the latter, Ibn ʿAbbās allows the guardian to drink if he searches for stray camels, treats their mange, repairs their drinking trough and tends them: فاشرب غير مضر بنسل، ولا ناهك في الحلب, “Then drink, without harming the young or milking excessively.” Khālid b. ʿAlī al-Ghāmidī judges the isnād through Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd ṣaḥīḥ and the athar ṣaḥīḥ through corroboration; he identifies Zamʿa b. Ṣāliḥ as weak in al-Thaʿlabī’s other isnād (al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/85–87, nos. 1015–1016, ed. al-Ghāmidī, Dār al-Tafsīr, first printing, 1436/2015). Mālik, al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, 2/934, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, also transmits it through Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd from al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, who describes the man's question to Ibn ʿAbbās; ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, 1/435, transmits it through al-Thawrī, Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd and al-Qāsim. ↩

  4. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/427. ↩

Contemporary Applications

  1. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, 3/115, no. 2872, ed. Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, from ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ through ʿAmr b. Shuʿayb, his father and his grandfather: كُلْ مِنْ مَالِ يَتِيمِكَ غَيْرَ مُسْرِفٍ، وَلَا مُبَادِرٍ، وَلَا مُتَأَثِّلٍ, “Eat from your orphan’s wealth without extravagance, haste or accumulating wealth.” Aḥmad, Musnad, 6/451–452, no. 7022, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, records Ḥusayn’s uncertainty between “without protecting your own wealth” and “redeeming your own wealth with his”; Shākir grades this chain ṣaḥīḥ. Al-Albānī, Ṣaḥīḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Ghiras printing, 8/225, no. 2556, grades it ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ. In his detailed discussion he calls Abū Dāwūd’s chain ḥasan, mentioning the disagreement over ʿAmr b. Shuʿayb’s transmission from his father and grandfather, and grades the hadith ṣaḥīḥ with a supporting mursal report from al-Ḥasan al-ʿUranī. Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/9, cites Ibn Ḥajar’s judgment, إسناده قوي, “its chain is strong,” in Fatḥ al-Bārī, 8/90. ↩

  2. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/412, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, relates this mawqūf account from ʿUmar رضي الله عنه through Abū Kurayb, Wakīʿ, Sufyān and Isrāʾīl, Abū Isḥāq, and Ḥāritha b. Muḍarrib. It also includes his undertaking to repay what he took if he later became prosperous. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42, answers those who cite that repayment clause: فَلَا حُجَّةَ لَهُمْ فِي قَوْلِ عُمَرَ: فَإِذَا أَيْسَرْتُ قَضَيْتُ، أَنْ لَوْ صَحَّ, “They have no proof in ʿUmar’s words, ‘If I become prosperous, I will repay’, even if they are established.” His legal argument is that a reasonable allowance granted by Allah need not be repaid. ↩

  3. Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/321: النظر على الوقف كالوصاية على اليتيم "Overseeing a waqf is like executorship over an orphan.". ʿAbduh, in Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/321. ↩

  4. al-Zuḥaylī, al-Tafsir al-Munir, 4/258. ↩

  5. al-Zuḥaylī, al-Tafsīr al-Munīr, 4/252, reporting the wage position: والقاعدة الفقهية تقتضي أن تكون هذه الأجرة مقدرة بأجر المثل، سواء أكفت الولي أم لا ‘The legal principle requires that this wage be assessed at the going rate for comparable work, whether or not it is enough for the guardian.’ ↩

  6. al-Jazāʾirī, Aysar al-Tafasir, 1/438. ↩

  7. Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/316: يحولون بينهم وبين أسباب الرشد "They come between them and the means of sound judgment." ↩

  8. al-Zuḥaylī, al-Tafsir al-Munir, 4/259: فالمال يحفظه بضبطه، والبدن يحفظه بأدبه "Wealth he preserves by managing it, and the body he preserves by disciplining it." ↩

Common Misconceptions

  1. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/868, no. 4820, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419), from Ibn ʿAbbās through Aḥmad b. Sinān, Abū Aḥmad al-Zubayrī, Sufyān, who reports from Ibn Abī Laylā and al-Aʿmash, both from al-Ḥakam, from Miqsam: فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ بِغِنَاهُ, “Let him refrain because of his wealth.” Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/411, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, records the same report through Muḥammad b. Bashshār, Abū Aḥmad and the same subsequent transmitters. ↩

  2. al-Zarkashī, al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, 1/109, in النوع الرابع: في جمع الوجوه والنظائر "the fourth kind: on gathering the senses and the parallels": النِّكَاحُ فِي الْقُرْآنِ التَّزَوُّجُ إِلَّا قَوْلَهُ جَلَّ ثَنَاؤُهُ: ﴿حَتَّى إِذَا بَلَغُوا النكاح﴾ فإنه يعني الحلم "Nikāḥ in the Qurʾān is marrying, except His words, exalted be His praise, ⟨until they reach al-nikāḥ⟩, for it means puberty." ↩

  3. al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, 2/159, in النوع التاسع والثلاثون: في معرفة الوجوه والنظائر "the thirty-ninth kind: on knowing the senses and the parallels": وَكُلُّ " نِكَاحٍ " فِيهِ تَزَوُّجٌ إِلَّا: ﴿حَتَّى إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ﴾ فَهُوَ الْحُلُمُ "And every nikāḥ in it is marrying, except ⟨until they reach al-nikāḥ⟩, where it is puberty." ↩

  4. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/238: وهو كناية عن الخروج من حالة الصبا للذكر والأنثى "And it is an indirect expression (kināya) for leaving the state of childhood, for the male and the female." ↩

  5. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. ↩

  6. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/38: دفع المال يكون بشرطين: إيناس الرشد والبلوغ، فإن وجد أحدهما دون الآخر لم يجز تسليم المال, “Handover requires two conditions: perceived sound judgement and puberty. If either exists without the other, handing over the property is not permissible.” ↩

  7. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/426: أكل مال اليتيم عند الضرورة والحاجة إليه على وجه الاستقراض منه "Eating from the orphan's property in a case of necessity and need for it, by way of borrowing from it." ↩

  8. al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-Uyun, 1/454, the second of the four positions he sets out on وَمَن كَانَ فَقِيراً فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ "and whoever is poor, let him take in the fair way": أنه يأكل ما يسد الجوعة، ويلبس ما يواري العورة، ولا قضاء، وهو قول الحسن، وإبراهيم، ومكحول، وقتادة "that he eats what stops the hunger and wears what covers his nakedness, and there is no repayment; and that is the statement of al-Ḥasan, Ibrāhīm, Makḥūl and Qatāda." His fourth position is the wage and he gives it to ʿAṭāʾ alone: أن يأخذ إذا كان محتاجاً أجرةً معلومة على قدر خدمته، وهو قول عطاء "that he takes, when he is in need, a known wage in proportion to his service; and that is ʿAṭāʾ's statement." His first is the loan and his third is the produce of the property. ↩

The Questions This Verse Raises

  1. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/34: وهذه الآية خطاب للجميع في بيان كيفية دفع أموالهم, “This verse addresses everyone, explaining how their property is to be handed over.” ↩

  2. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/865, no. 4799, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, records Muqātil b. Ḥayyān's explanation through Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, Muḥammad b. Muzāḥim and Bukayr b. Maʿrūf: الأولياء والأوصياء, “the guardians and executors.” At 3/871, no. 4837, he records Saʿīd b. Jubayr's يقول للأوصياء, “He addresses the executors,” through Abū Zurʿa, Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukayr, Ibn Lahīʿa and ʿAṭāʾ b. Dīnār. Abū Ḥātim says that ʿAṭāʾ's tafsīr from Saʿīd was taken from a written government register and transmitted mursal (al-Jarḥ wa-l-Taʿdīl, 6/332). Al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/343; al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491; al-Wāḥidī, al-Wajīz, 252; and Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/146, likewise identify guardians or executors as the people carrying out the command. ↩

  3. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10: هذه مخاطبة للجميع، والمعنى: يخلص التلبس بهذا الأمر للأوصياء "This is an address to everyone. The meaning is: the discharge of this matter belongs purely to the executors." ↩

  4. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/867, no. 4818, and 3/871, no. 4835, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419 AH. Both accounts are transmitted through Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā, Ibn Wahb and Nāfiʿ b. Abī Nuʿaym, the Qurʾān reciter, who asked Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd and Rabīʿa. Their answer concerning the rich orphan is: ذَلِكَ فِي الْيَتِيمِ؛ إِنْ كَانَ غَنِيًّا أُنْفِقَ عَلَيْهِ بِقَدْرِ غِنَاهُ، وَلَمْ يَكُنْ لِلْوَلِيِّ مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ, “That concerns the orphan: if he is rich, expenditure on him should accord with his wealth, and the guardian receives nothing from it.” Concerning the poor orphan: ذَلِكَ فِي الْيَتِيمِ إِنْ كَانَ فَقِيرًا أُنْفِقَ عَلَيْهِ بِقَدْرِ فَقْرِهِ، وَلَمْ يَكُنْ لِلْوَلِيِّ مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ, “That concerns the orphan: if he is poor, expenditure on him should accord with his poverty, and the guardian receives nothing from it.” ↩

  5. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 4/2316, no. 11 (3019), Kitāb al-Tafsīr, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, from ʿĀʾisha رضي الله عنها through Hishām b. ʿUrwa and his father; this is the wording quoted here. Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Sultani printing, 6/43, no. 4575, Kitāb Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, chapter on وَمَنْ كَانَ فَقِيرًا فَلْيَأْكُلْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ, records her explanation that the poor guardian takes a reasonable amount for caring for the orphan’s property. ↩

  6. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/41. ↩

  7. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. He says of applying rich and poor to the orphans: وهذا القول في غاية السقوط, “This position is wholly untenable.” ↩

  8. al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/329; Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519; Ibn ʿUthaymīn, Tafsīr al-ʿUthaymīn: al-Nisāʾ, 1/42; al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/34. Al-Qurṭubī describes giving a boy the household spending for a month or a small sum to trade with while the guardian observes him; for a girl, he describes supervising cotton, the spinners' wages, the finished yarn and its quality. ↩

  9. Ibn ʿUthaymīn, Tafsīr al-ʿUthaymīn: al-Nisāʾ, 1/42: المرأة لا تختبر بالبيع والشراء؛ لأنها ليست من أهله، لكن تختبر بحاجات البيت، فإذا عُرف ضبطها لحاجات البيت فهي رشيدة "A woman is not tested by buying and selling, because she is not one of its people; but she is tested by the needs of the house. So if her competence with the needs of the house is known, she has sound judgment." ↩

  10. al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsir al-Basit, 6/329: أن يُردّ إليه الأمر في نفقته عند مراهقة الحلم، ويعطى شيئًا نزرًا يتصرف فيه … وإن كانت جاريةً يرد إليها ما يرد إلى النساء من أمر البيت وتدبير الغزل والقطن "That the handling of his own maintenance be turned over to him as he nears puberty, and that he be given a small amount to manage … and if the child is a girl, there is turned over to her what is turned over to women: the affairs of the house and the management of the spinning and the cotton." ↩

  11. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519: يُعْتَبَرُ رُشْدُهَا، وَإِنْ لَمْ تَتَزَوَّجْ بِالْبُلُوغِ "Her sound judgment is assessed at puberty, even if she has not married.". 3/518: قِيلَ: تُوُفِّيَ رِفَاعَةُ وَتَرَكَ ابْنَهُ ثَابِتًا صَغِيرًا "It is said: Rifāʿa died and left his son Thābit, who was small.". 3/518: فإذا أنس منه الرشد بعد البلوغ والاختبار دفع إليه ماله، وأشهد عليه "So when sound judgment is perceived in him after puberty and testing, his property is handed over to him, and witnesses are called for it." ↩

  12. Ibn al-Mundhir, Tafsīr, 2/569, no. 1379, ed. Saʿd b. Muḥammad al-Saʿd (Dār al-Maʾāthir, first printing, 1423/2002), from al-Shaʿbī through Mūsā, Yaḥyā, Qays, Jābir and ʿĀmir: لا يُدْفَعُ إلى الجاريةِ مالُها حتى تُزَوَّجَ، ولو قرأتِ التوراةَ والإنجيلَ والزَّبورَ, “A girl's property is not handed over to her until she marries, even if she has read the Torah, Gospel and Psalms.” ↩

  13. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/76; Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/569; al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/342; Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubab, 6/189. ↩

  14. Ibn Juzayy, al-Tashīl li-ʿUlūm al-Tanzīl, 1/179: واعتبر مالك البلوغ والرشد، وحينئذ يدفع المال, “Mālik required puberty and sound judgement; the property is then handed over.” ↩

  15. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/38, explains that girls were ordinarily secluded from public dealings, whereas boys gained experience by handling affairs and meeting people; on that premise his school's jurists required marriage. ↩

  16. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/38: شرطوا في الجارية دخول الزوج بها مع البلوغ, “They required consummation of marriage for the girl, together with puberty.” He states that Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shāfiʿī did not require this. ↩

  17. Ibn al-ʿArabī, quoted at al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/39: وَلَيْسَ فِي هَذَا كُلِّهِ دَلِيلٌ "There is no proof in any of this"; وَاجْتَنِبِ التَّحَكُّمَ الَّذِي لَا دَلِيلَ عَلَيْهِ "Avoid arbitrary assertion that has no proof for it." ↩

  18. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/38, prefers al-Shāfiʿī's position: intercourse does not increase the competence of a woman who already understands her affairs and does not squander her property. ↩

  19. Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Sultani printing, 2/19, no. 964, Kitāb al-ʿĪdayn, chapter on the sermon after the Eid prayer, from Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما: the Prophet ﷺ urged the women to give charity, and they gave their jewellery. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2/602, no. 2 (884), Kitāb Ṣalāt al-ʿĪdayn, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, names their rings and earrings. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, Dar al-Tafsir printing, 10/76–77, draws the inference: ولم يفصل بين متزوجة، وغير متزوجة، ولا بين من تصدقت بإذن زوجها أو بغير إذنه, “He did not distinguish between a married woman and an unmarried woman, or between one who gave charity with her husband’s permission and one who gave without it.” ↩

  20. Al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, 147, no. 294, ed. Kamāl Basyūnī Zaghlūl. ↩

  21. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/422, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, through Bishr b. Muʿādh, Yazīd and Saʿīd from Qatāda. Qatāda begins ذُكِرَ لنا, “It was mentioned to us.” The uncle asks what he may take from the orphan’s property; the reported answer is أن تأْكُلَ بالمَعْرُوفِ مِن غيرِ أن تَقِىَ مالَك بمالِه، ولا تَتَّخِذَ مِن مالِه وَفْرًا, “That you eat in a fair manner, without protecting your own wealth through his property or amassing a surplus from his property.” Al-Turkī records textual variants: “ʿUmar b. Thābit b. Rifāʿa” instead of “the uncle of Thābit b. Rifāʿa,” and ابن أختي, “my sister’s son,” instead of ابن أخي, “my brother’s son.” ↩

  22. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/68; al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/34. ↩

  23. Al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/341: نزلت في ثابت بن رفاعة وفي عمه, “It was revealed concerning Thābit b. Rifāʿa and his uncle.” ↩

  24. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/371, describes the death of Rifāʿa and his son's guardianship as the occasion of revelation, adding that Muqātil related a similar account. ↩

  25. al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/328: قال المفسرون: نزلت في ثابت بن رفاعة، وفي عمه, “The exegetes said: it was revealed about Thābit b. Rifāʿa and his uncle.” His Asbāb al-Nuzūl, p. 147, no. 294, ed. Kamāl Basyūnī Zaghlūl, records both questions without an isnād: what the uncle may take, and when he must hand over the property. ↩

  26. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/518 (Dār al-Fikr printing): قيل توفي رفاعة وترك ابنه ثابتًا صغيرًا, “It is said that Rifāʿa died and left his young son Thābit.” ↩

  27. Al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-ʿUyūn, 1/454, through Shuʿba from Qatāda: أن رجلًا قال للنبي ﷺ إن في حجري يتيمًا أفآكل من ماله؟ قال: بالمعروف غير متأثل مالًا ولا واق مالك بماله, “A man said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘An orphan is in my care; may I eat from his property?’ He replied, ‘In a reasonable manner, without building up wealth or protecting your property with his.’” Qatāda reports this directly from the Prophet ﷺ, without naming a Companion. Ibn Ḥajar describes the Qatāda occasion-report as mursal (al-Iṣābah, 1/504, entry 884). ↩

  28. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10–12; al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, 2/60–61; Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145–146; Ibn Juzayy, al-Tashīl li-ʿUlūm al-Tanzīl, 1/179. ↩

  29. Ibn Ḥajar, al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah, 1/504, entry 884. His judgment concerns Ibn Manda’s report through ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Saʿīd from Qatāda. ↩

  30. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/34; al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, 147, no. 294. The guardian asks: فما يحل لي من ماله، ومتى أدفع إليه ماله؟, “What is lawful for me from his property, and when do I hand it over to him?” ↩

  31. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37, attributes صلاحًا في العقل وحفظ المال, “soundness of mind and preservation of property,” to Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Suddī and al-Thawrī. ↩

  32. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/75, ed. Khālid b. ʿAlī al-Ghāmidī, attributes to Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan consideration of financial soundness without requiring religious uprightness. ↩

  33. Ibn Juzayy, al-Tashīl li-ʿUlūm al-Tanzīl, 1/179: الرشد هو المعرفة بمصالحه وتدبير ماله، وإن لم يكن من أهل الدين, “Sound judgement is knowledge of one's interests and management of one's property, even if one is not religiously upright.” ↩

  34. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/407: وأولى الأقوال عندي بمعنى الرشد في هذا الموضع: العقل وإصلاح المال … وإن كان فاجرًا في دينه "The most fitting of the views to me on the meaning of rushd in this place is: sound sense and the good management of wealth … even if he is corrupt in his religion." Ibn Jurayj explains it as صلاحًا وعلمًا بما يصلحه, "soundness, and knowledge of what keeps it sound." ↩

  35. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/407–408. He prefers sound sense and management of property because a person with both is not financially interdicted merely for religious misconduct: وأَوْلَى الأقوالِ عندى بمعنى الرُّشْدِ في هذا الموضعِ: العقلُ وإصلاحُ المالِ ... وإن كان فاجرًا في دينِه. He argues that the reason for imposing financial guardianship and the reason for continuing to withhold property must be treated consistently, and challenges anyone who distinguishes the two cases to identify a relevant difference. He then restates the conclusion: فإذ كان ما وَصَفْنا من الجميعِ إجماعًا، فبَيِّنٌ أن الرُّشْدَ ... هو ما قُلْنَا مِن صحةِ عَقْلِه وإصلاحِه مالَه ‘If what we have described is agreed, it is clear that the sound judgement by which an orphan, after attaining maturity, deserves to receive his property is what we have said: soundness of mind and good management of his property.’ ↩

  36. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37–38. He records two Shāfiʿī positions on a man who manages his property properly but is corrupt in religion: Ibn Surayj would legally restrict his control of the property, while Abū Isḥāq al-Marwazī would not. Al-Qurṭubī describes the latter position as the more evident position of the school. ↩

  37. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519–3/520: وَنَكَّرَ رُشْدًا لِأَنَّ مَعْنَاهُ نَوْعٌ مِنَ الرُّشْدِ، وَطَرَفٌ وَمَخِيلَةٌ مِنْ مَخِيلَتِهِ، وَلَا يُنْتَظَرُ بِهِ تَمَامُ الرُّشْدِ "He made rushdan indefinite because its meaning is a kind of rushd, a portion of it and a trace of its traces, and complete rushd is not waited for in his case." ↩

  38. al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/197. ونكره لأن وجود كمال الرشد في أحد يعز وقوعه "And He made it indefinite because the presence of complete rushd in anyone rarely occurs." ↩

  39. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, al-Durr al-Maṣūn, 3/584: ونكَّر «رُشْداً» دلالةً على التنويعِ، والمعنى: أيُّ نوعٍ حَصَل من الرشدِ "And he made ‘rushdan’ indefinite to indicate variety; the meaning is: whatever kind of rushd has come about"; Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb, 6/188. ↩

  40. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145: والتنوين للدلالة على كفاية رشد في الجملة, “The indefinite ending indicates that a sufficient measure of sound judgement is enough.” ↩

  41. Ibn al-Munayyir, al-Intiṣāf, printed with al-Zamakhsharī's al-Kashshāf, 1/472: فبادروا بتسليم المال إليهم غير منتظرين بلوغ الغاية فيه, “Hasten to hand the property over to them without waiting for the highest degree of sound judgement.” ↩

  42. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/243, naming the indefinite تنكير النوعية indefiniteness of kind (tankīr al-nawʿiyya). ↩

  43. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. ↩

  44. Al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331–332: المراد رشد مخصوص وهو الرشد في التصرف والتجارة أو يفيد التقليل أي طرفًا من الرشد, “A particular kind of sound judgement is meant, competence in handling affairs and trade, or a sufficient measure of sound judgement.” ↩

  45. Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/318. ↩

  46. Al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331–332, connects the sufficient-measure interpretation with Abū Ḥanīfa's rule requiring handover at twenty-five. ↩

  47. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37, attributes صلاحًا في العقل والدين, “soundness of mind and religion,” to al-Ḥasan, Qatāda and others. ↩

  48. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/405, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, transmits Qatāda’s explanation through Bishr b. Muʿādh, Yazīd and Saʿīd: صَلَاحًا فِي عَقْلِهِ وَدِينِهِ, “Soundness in his mind and religion.” Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/9, grades this chain ḥasan. ↩

  49. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/866, no. 4806. Saʿīd b. Jubayr explains sound judgement as صَلَاحًا فِي دِينِهِمْ وَحِفْظًا لِأَمْوَالِهِمْ, “soundness in their religion and safekeeping of their property.” Ibn Abī Ḥātim transmits it through Abū Zurʿa, Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukayr, Ibn Lahīʿa and ʿAṭāʾ b. Dīnār from Saʿīd. ↩

  50. Al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-ʿUyūn, 1/453, attributes صلاح في الدين وإصلاح في المال, “uprightness in religion and proper management of property,” to Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Ḥasan and al-Shāfiʿī. ↩

  51. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/74, ed. Khālid b. ʿAlī al-Ghāmidī: فالرشد شيئان: جواز الشهادة، وإصلاح المال, “Sound judgement consists of two things: admissibility as a witness and proper management of property.” His preceding explanation attributes to al-Shāfiʿī avoidance of open sins, waste, squandering and serious deception in transactions. ↩

  52. al-Wāḥidī, al-Basit, 6/331 to 6/332: وهذا هو الأولى؛ فإن أهل اللغة قالوا في معنى الرشد: إنه إصابة الخير، والمفسد في دينه لا يكون مصيبًا للخير "This is the more fitting view, for the people of the language said about the meaning of rushd that it is hitting upon what is good, and one who is corrupt in his religion does not hit upon what is good." ↩

  53. al-Wāḥidī, al-Wajiz, 252: صلاحًا للعقل وحفظًا للمال "soundness of intellect and safekeeping of wealth". ↩

  54. Al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-ʿUyūn, 1/453. ↩

  55. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/371: وَبِمَاذَا يُخْتَبَرُونَ؟ فِيهِ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْوَالٍ: أَحَدُهَا: أَنَّهُمْ يُخْتَبَرُونَ فِي عُقُولِهِمْ، قَالَهُ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ وَالسُّدِّيُّ وَسُفْيَانُ وَمُقَاتِلٌ. وَالثَّانِي: يُخْتَبَرُونَ فِي عُقُولِهِمْ وَدِينِهِمْ، قَالَهُ الْحَسَنُ وَقَتَادَةُ. وَعَنْ مُجَاهِدٍ كَالْقَوْلَيْنِ. وَالثَّالِثُ: فِي عُقُولِهِمْ وَدِينِهِمْ وَحِفْظِهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ، ذَكَرَهُ الثَّعْلَبِيُّ “In what are they tested? There are three positions: first, that they are tested in their intelligence, stated by Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Suddī, Sufyān and Muqātil; second, that they are tested in their intelligence and religion, stated by al-Ḥasan and Qatāda, with both positions reported from Mujāhid; and third, in their intelligence, religion and preservation of their property, which al-Thaʿlabī mentions.” ↩

  56. Ibn al-Jawzī, Tadhkirat al-Arīb fī Tafsīr al-Gharīb, 60: وَالرُّشْدُ الصَّلَاحُ فِي الدِّينِ مَعَ حِفْظِ الْمَالِ “Sound judgement is uprightness in religion together with preserving property.” ↩

  57. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/407, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, records Ibn Jurayj's explanation: صلاحًا وعلمًا بما يصلحه, “Soundness and knowledge of what preserves it.” ↩

  58. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/865, no. 4803, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, from Ibn ʿAbbās through his father Abū Ḥātim, ʿAmr b. ʿAwn, Sharīk, Simāk b. Ḥarb and ʿIkrima: إذا أدرك اليتيم بحلم وعقل ووقار دفع إليه ماله, “When the orphan reaches puberty with intelligence and a settled bearing, his property is handed over to him.” ↩

  59. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/866, no. 4807, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, cites Abū Bakr b. Abī Shayba, through ʿUbayd Allāh b. Mūsā, Sufyān, Hishām and Muḥammad b. Sīrīn, from ʿAbīda al-Salmānī: إذا أقام الصلاة, “When he establishes prayer.” He introduces the chain with ذُكر عن, “It was mentioned from.” ↩

  60. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/866, no. 4808, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, through his father Abū Ḥātim, Ibn Nufayl and Hushaym, who quotes Ibn Shubruma: سنة بعد الاحتلام, “A year after puberty.” ↩

  61. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519 (Dār al-Fikr printing), reports from Ibn Sīrīn: حتى تمضي عليه سنة وتداوله الفصول الأربع, “Until a year has passed and the four seasons have come round.” ↩

  62. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37. He reports that Saʿīd b. Jubayr and al-Shaʿbī held that an orphan’s property should be withheld even in old age until sound judgement is established. He further reports that al-Ḍaḥḥāk required evidence of competent property management even if the ward reached one hundred. ↩

  63. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/74–75, ed. Khālid b. ʿAlī al-Ghāmidī, attributes religious and financial competence to Mālik. Al-Ghāmidī quotes Ibn al-ʿArabī's description of Mālik's position as intelligence sufficient to recognize one's interests and preserve one's property, and comments: وهو يخالف ما نسبه إليه الثعلبي، حيث لم يشترط صلاح الدين, “This differs from what al-Thaʿlabī attributed to him, since he did not require uprightness in religion.” ↩

  64. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/11. ↩

  65. Ibn al-Munayyir, al-Intiṣāf, printed with al-Kashshāf, 1/472: هو أن يحرز ماله وينميه، وإن كان فاسقًا في حاله, “It is that he preserves his property and increases it, even if his conduct is sinful.” He attributes this criterion to Mālik. ↩

  66. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/407: وأولى الأقوال عندي بمعنى الرشد في هذا الموضع: العقل وإصلاح المال … وإن كان فاجرًا في دينه "The most fitting of the views to me on the meaning of rushd in this place is: sound sense and the good management of wealth … even if he is corrupt in his religion." Ibn Jurayj explains it as صلاحًا وعلمًا بما يصلحه, "soundness, and knowledge of what keeps it sound." ↩

  67. al-Wāḥidī, al-Basit, 6/331 to 6/332: وهذا هو الأولى؛ فإن أهل اللغة قالوا في معنى الرشد: إنه إصابة الخير، والمفسد في دينه لا يكون مصيبًا للخير "This is the more fitting view, for the people of the language said about the meaning of rushd that it is hitting upon what is good, and one who is corrupt in his religion does not hit upon what is good." ↩

  68. Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, 2/414: والاقتصار على هذا الاهتداء رأي أبي حنيفة، والشافعي يعتبر مع هذا أيضًا الصلاح في الدين, “Restricting it to this competence is Abū Ḥanīfa’s position; al-Shāfiʿī also requires religious uprightness.” ↩

  69. Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/567 to 1/569. ↩

  70. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/490: وهذه العلامات تعم الذكر والأنثى، وتختص الأنثى بالحبل والحيض, “These signs apply to males and females; pregnancy and menstruation are specific to females.” ↩

  71. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/865, no.4800, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419). He also records similar explanations from Abū Mālik, Saʿīd b. Jubayr and al-Suddī. ↩

  72. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/71; Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/567 to 1/568. ↩

  73. al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-Uyun, 1/453. يعني الحلم في قول الجميع "He means the wet dream, by the statement of all of them." ↩

  74. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/865, no. 4801, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, cites Abū Maʿshar from Muḥammad b. Qays: خمس عشرة, “Fifteen.” He introduces it with ذُكر عن أبي معشر, “It was mentioned from Abū Maʿshar.” ↩

  75. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/71; Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/567 to 1/568. ↩

  76. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/35–36, records fifteen from al-Awzāʿī, al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Ibn Wahb, Aṣbagh, Ibn al-Mājishūn, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and a group of Medinan jurists; he adds that Ibn al-ʿArabī chose it. ↩

  77. Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/567 to 1/569. ↩

  78. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/35–36. Aṣbagh b. al-Faraj's stated rationale for fifteen is that it is the age at which a person becomes eligible for a share in the spoils. ↩

  79. Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Sultani printing, 3/177, no. 2664, Kitāb al-Shahādāt, chapter on boys reaching adulthood and their testimony, from Ibn ʿUmar رضي الله عنهما through Nāfiʿ. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 3/1490, no. 91 (1868), Kitāb al-Imāra, chapter on the age of adulthood, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī. ↩

  80. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, no. 91 (1868), ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī. Nāfiʿ relates that ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz called fifteen the dividing line between childhood and adulthood, then instructed his officials to assign an allowance to those aged fifteen and count the younger children among the dependants. Al-Qāsimī, Maḥāsin al-Taʾwīl, 3/29. ↩

  81. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/71; Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/567 to 1/568. ↩

  82. Al-Ṣābūnī, Rawāʾiʿ al-Bayān, 1/441: وذهب أبو حنيفة إلى أن من بلغ خمساً وعشرين سنة سلّم له ماله سواءً كان رشيداً أو غير رشيد, “Abū Ḥanīfa held that whoever reaches twenty-five receives his property, whether or not he has sound judgement.” ↩

  83. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/9, at 4:2: وَقَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ: إِذَا بَلَغَ خَمْسًا وَعِشْرِينَ سَنَةً أُعْطِيَ ماله كُلَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ حَالٍ، لِأَنَّهُ يَصِيرُ جَدًّا "Abū Ḥanīfa said: when he reaches twenty-five years he is given the whole of his property in every case, because he comes to be a grandfather"; and Ibn al-ʿArabī, quoted there: وَهَذَا بَاطِلٌ لَا وَجْهَ لَهُ، لَا سِيَّمَا عَلَى أَصْلِهِ الَّذِي يَرَى الْمُقَدَّرَاتِ لَا تَثْبُتُ قِيَاسًا وَإِنَّمَا تُؤْخَذُ مِنْ جِهَةِ النَّصِّ، وَلَيْسَ فِي هَذِهِ الْمَسْأَلَةِ "This is void and has nothing to stand on, above all on his own principle, which holds that fixed measures are not established by analogy but taken from a text, and there is none in this question." ↩

  84. al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331–1/332: وتنكير الرشد يفيد أن المراد رشد مخصوص وهو الرشد في التصرف والتجارة أو يفيد التقليل أي طرفاً من الرشد حتى لا ينتظر به تمام الرشد وهو دليل لأبى حنيفة في دفع المال عند بلوغ خمس وعشرين سنة "Making rushd indefinite conveys that what is meant is a particular rushd, namely rushd in handling affairs and in trade; or it conveys smallness, that is, a portion of rushd, so that complete rushd is not waited for. And it is a proof for Abū Ḥanīfa for handing over the property upon reaching twenty-five years." ↩

  85. Al-Ṣābūnī, Rawāʾiʿ al-Bayān, 1/441: الصحيح ما ذهب إليه الجمهور، وهو مذهب الصاحبين أبي يوسف ومحمد أيضاً، ولا عبرة بكبر السن, “The correct position is the majority’s, also held by Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad; advanced age is not decisive.” ↩

  86. al-Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/569, reporting Abū Ḥanīfa's position on withholding delivery until twenty-five: غَيْرَ أَنَّ تَصَرُّفَهُ يَكُونُ نَافِذًا قَبْلَهُ, "His transactions are nevertheless effective before that age." ↩

  87. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/72: دَاوُدُ: لَا يَبْلُغُ مَا لَمْ يَحْتَلِمْ، وَلَوْ بَلَغَ أَرْبَعِينَ سَنَةً ‘Dāwūd: he does not reach legal adulthood until he has a wet dream, even if he reaches forty years.’ ↩

  88. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/72: وَقَالَ مَالِكٌ: بُلُوغُهُ بِأَنْ يَغْلُظَ صَوْتُهُ، أَوْ تَنْشَقَّ أَرْنَبَتُهُ ‘Mālik said: his adulthood is marked by his voice becoming deep or the tip of his nose changing.’ ↩

  89. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/72: وَلِلشَّافِعِيِّ فِي الْإِنْبَاتِ قَوْلَانِ: أَحَدُهُمَا: أَنَّهُ بُلُوغٌ، وَالثَّانِي: دَلَالَةُ الْبُلُوغِ ‘Al-Shāfiʿī has two positions on the growth of pubic hair: that it is adulthood itself, and that it is evidence of adulthood.’ ↩

  90. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/36, records its evidentiary use from Ibn al-Qāsim, Sālim, Mālik, one of al-Shāfiʿī's two positions, Aḥmad, Isḥāq and Abū Thawr. He separately records that Abū Ḥanīfa does not treat it as adulthood or evidence of adulthood. ↩

  91. Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/568 to 1/569; al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/342; Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubab, 6/187. ↩

  92. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/72. وقال أبو حنيفة: لا يتعلق بالإنبات حكم، وليس هو ببلوغ، ولا دلالة عليه "Abū Ḥanīfa said: No ruling attaches to the growth of pubic hair. It is not puberty, and it is no indication of it." ↩

  93. Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 2/215. ↩

  94. Al-Tirmidhī, Sunan, 3/240, no. 1584, Abwāb al-Siyar, chapter on submitting to a judgment, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, from ʿAṭiyya al-Quraẓī through ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿUmayr. Al-Tirmidhī grades it ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ and says Aḥmad and Isḥāq treat pubic-hair growth as adulthood when neither a wet dream nor the person’s age is known. ↩

  95. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519 (Dār al-Fikr printing): ولم تتعرض الآية لسن البلوغ ولا بماذا يكون, “The verse does not specify the age of puberty or what establishes it.” He refers these matters to the books of fiqh. ↩

  96. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/36. قلت: هذا قوله هنا، وقال في سورة الأنفال عكسه "I say: This is what he said here, and in Sūrat al-Anfāl he said the opposite of it." ↩

  97. Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, 2/414, says Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shāfiʿī agreed that testing precedes puberty and that the verse's expression of a limit supports them. Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 1/472, places it قبل البلوغ, “before puberty”; al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, 2/60; al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331; Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145. Al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/342, transmits Abū Ḥanīfa's pre-adulthood argument and then al-Shāfiʿī's answer: pre-adulthood testing does not authorize the minor to transact; it examines his intellect and his ability to recognize benefit and harm. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/371, quotes Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā: وهذا الابتلاء قبل البلوغ, “This testing is before puberty”; al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/329: عند مراهقة الحلم, “as he nears puberty”; al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/197: اختبروهم ... في مدة مراهقتهم واجعلوا ذلك دأبكم, “Test them during the period in which they approach maturity, and make that your continuing practice.” ↩

  98. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/356: فدلت الآية من وجهين على أن هذا الابتلاء قبل البلوغ "So the verse indicates in two ways that this testing is before puberty." ↩

  99. Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib, al-Hidaya ila Bulugh al-Nihaya, 2/1226: وذلك بعد الاحتلام "And that is after the onset of puberty." ↩

  100. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/406, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/864–865, nos. 4797, 4802 and 4805, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419 AH. These accounts transmit Ibn ʿAbbās’s explanation through Abū Ṣāliḥ, Muʿāwiya b. Ṣāliḥ and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa. Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/8, brings the explanations together: يَقُولُ اللَّهُ تَبَارَكَ وَتَعَالَى اخْتَبِرُوا الْيَتَامَى عِنْدَ الْحُلْمِ، فَإِنْ عَرَفْتُمْ مِنْهُمُ الرُّشْدَ فِي حَالِهِمْ وَالْإِصْلَاحَ فِي أَمْوَالِهِمْ فَادْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ وَأَشْهِدُوا عَلَيْهِمْ, “Allah, blessed and exalted, says: test the orphans at puberty; if you recognize sound judgement in their conduct and proper management of their property, hand their property over to them and call witnesses.” Yāsīn grades the two collectors’ chains ḥasan. ↩

  101. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/403, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, from Ibn Zayd through Yūnus and Ibn Wahb: إذا عرف أنه قد أونس منه رشد، دفع إليه ماله. قال: وذلك بعد الاحتلام, “When sound judgement is known to have been perceived in him, his property is handed over to him. He said: that is after puberty.” ↩

  102. Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, 2/414: واتفق الإمامان على أن هذا الاختبار قبل البلوغ … وقال الإمام مالك إنه بعد البلوغ, “Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shāfiʿī agreed that this test precedes puberty … Imam Mālik said that it follows puberty.” Ibn al-Munayyir, al-Intiṣāf, in al-Zamakhsharī’s al-Kashshāf, 1/472, records both positions within al-Shāfiʿī’s school. ↩

  103. Ibn al-Munayyir, al-Intiṣāf, printed with al-Kashshāf, 1/472: لا يكون عنده إلا بعد البلوغ ولا يدفع إليه من ماله شيء قبله, “According to Mālik, this takes place only after puberty, and none of his property is handed over to him beforehand.” ↩

  104. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/518 (Dār al-Fikr printing), describes a small sum used under the guardian's supervision, then says: فإذا أنس منه الرشد بعد البلوغ والاختبار دفع إليه ماله وأشهد عليه, “When sound judgement is perceived after puberty and testing, the property is handed over and witnesses are called.” ↩

  105. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519 (Dār al-Fikr printing): وإيناس الرشد مترتب على بلوغ النكاح فيلزم أن يكون بعده, “Perception of sound judgement follows attainment of marriageable age; it must therefore occur afterward.” ↩

  106. al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/327: وليس في العلماء من يقول إنه إذا اختبر الصبي فوجد رشيدا ارتفع عنه الولاية، وأنه يجب دفع ماله اليه، وإطلاق يده في التصرف، وذلك يدل على أن الابتلاء في الصبي ليس يفيد العلم المعتبر برشده "There is no one among the scholars who says that if a boy is tested and found of sound judgement the guardianship is lifted from him, and that his property must be handed to him and his hand freed to deal. That shows that the testing of a boy does not yield the knowledge of his sound judgement that counts." al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/328: بل دل على أن الابتلاء قبل البلوغ في أمر الدين والدنيا، بأن يربيه على الخيرات والطاعات، ويندبه إلى المراشد وتأمل التصرفات والتجارات، حتى يكون نشوّه على الخيرات، فإذا بلغ النكاح نفعه ما تقدم من التدريب، ويحصل به إيناس الرشد "Rather it shows that the testing before growing up is in the matter of religion and of this world, in that he brings him up to good things and to acts of obedience, urges him toward what is sound and toward looking closely at dealings and trades, so that his growth is upon good things; and when he reaches the age of marriage the earlier training benefits him, and by it the perceiving of sound judgement comes about"; إنما هو توطئة وتمهيد لزمان البلوغ الذي يوثق فيه بإيناس الرشد، فهذا تحقيق لمذهب الشافعي "It is only a laying of the ground and a preparing for the time of growing up, in which the perceiving of sound judgement can be relied upon. This is the working out of al-Shāfiʿī's position." ↩

  107. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/356. He says the verse proves جَوَازِ الْإِذْنِ لِلصَّغِيرِ الَّذِي يَعْقِلُ فِي التِّجَارَةِ, ‘the permissibility of authorizing a minor who understands trade,’ and names Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad, Zufar, al-Ḥasan b. Ziyād and al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ. He permits a father, the father's executor or, where appropriate, the grandfather to give that authorization. ↩

  108. Al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/341: تصرفات الصبي العاقل المميز بإذن الولي صحيحة, “The transactions of a rational, discerning child are valid with the guardian's permission,” attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa. ↩

  109. Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331: وفيه دليل على جواز إذن الصبي العاقل في التجارة "In it is a proof for the permissibility of giving a rational boy leave to trade." ↩

  110. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/356: وَمَنْ قَصَرَ الِابْتِلَاءَ عَلَى اخْتِبَارِ عَقْلِهِ بِالْكَلَامِ دُونَ التَّصَرُّفِ فِي التِّجَارَةِ وَحِفْظِ الْمَالِ فَقَدْ خَصَّ عُمُومَ اللَّفْظِ بِغَيْرِ دَلَالَةٍ ‘Whoever restricts the testing to examining his mind through conversation, without actual trading and preserving property, has restricted the general wording without evidence.’ ↩

  111. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/356, from Ibn al-Qāsim from Mālik: the permission of a father or executor does not validate a minor's trading, and if debt results, none of it binds the child. ↩

  112. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/356, from al-Rabīʿ from al-Shāfiʿī: a minor's acknowledgments and transactions lapse whether or not he was authorized by a father, guardian or judge; a judge may not authorize him, and his buying and selling are annulled. ↩

  113. Al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/341, reports al-Shāfiʿī's position that such transactions are invalid. ↩

  114. al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb, 9/497: وذلك إذا باع الولي واشترى بحضور الصبي، ثم يستكشف من الصبي أحوال ذلك البيع والشراء "That is when the guardian sells and buys in the boy's presence, then finds out from the boy the details of that selling and buying." ↩

  115. al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, 2/60: اختبروهم قبل البلوغ بتتبع أحوالهم في صلاح الدين، والتهدي إلى ضبط المال وحسن التصرف، بأن يكل إليه مقدمات العقد. وعن أبي حنيفة رحمه الله تعالى بأن يدفع إليه ما يتصرف فيه "Test them before puberty by following their conditions in soundness of religion and in being guided to the safekeeping of property and good management, by entrusting to him the preliminaries of the contract. And from Abū Ḥanīfa, may Allah have mercy on him: by handing over to him something he may transact with." Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331, in his own wording: واختبروا عقولهم وذوقوا أحوالهم ومعرفتهم بالتصرف قبل البلوغ فالابتلاء عندنا أن يدفع إليه ما يتصرف فيه "And test their minds, taste their condition and their acquaintance with handling property, before puberty; for testing, with us, is that he be handed something he may transact with." Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145, in his own wording: أي واختبروا من ليس منهم بيِّن السَّفَهِ قبل البلوغِ بتتبُّع أحوالِهم في صلاح الدينِ والاهتداءِ إلى ضبط المالِ وحسنِ التصرفِ فيه وجرِّبوهم بما يليق بحالهم فإن كانوا من أهل التجارةِ فبأن تعطوهم من المال ما يتصرفون فيه بيعا وابتياعا "That is: test those of them whose foolishness is not evident, before puberty, by following their conditions in soundness of religion, in being guided to the safekeeping of property and in managing it well, and try them out with what suits their case; so if they are people of trade, then by giving them property to deal in by selling and buying." ↩

  116. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/409, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/867, no. 4813, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419 AH. Both transmit Ibn ʿAbbās’s explanation through Abū Ṣāliḥ, Muʿāwiya b. Ṣāliḥ and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa. Al-Ṭabarī’s wording is يَأْكُلُ مَالَ الْيَتِيمِ يُبَادِرُ أَنْ يَبْلُغَ، فَيَحُولَ بَيْنَهُ وَبَيْنَ مَالِهِ, “He consumes the orphan’s wealth, hurrying before the orphan comes of age and can stop him from taking it.” Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/9, grades both chains ḥasan. ↩

  117. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/41–42, names these authorities for borrowing according to need and repaying when prosperous. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/412–413 and 6/415–416, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, records asanid for the accounts from ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAbīda, Mujāhid, Saʿīd b. Jubayr and Abū al-ʿĀliya. ↩

  118. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/412–413, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, through Yaʿqūb, Ibn ʿUlayya, Salama b. ʿAlqama, Ibn Sīrīn and ʿAbīda al-Salmānī. After ʿAbīda relates borrowing to the command to call witnesses, Ibn Sīrīn adds: فَظَنَنْتُ أَنَّهُ قَالَهَا بِرَأْيِهِ, “I thought he had said this from his own judgement.” ↩

  119. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/426: أكل مال اليتيم عند الضرورة والحاجة إليه على وجه الاستقراض منه "Eating from the orphan's property in a case of necessity and need for it, by way of borrowing from it." ↩

  120. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/413, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/869, no. 4829, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib, Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419 AH. Both transmit the loan explanation from Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما through Abū Ṣāliḥ, Muʿāwiya b. Ṣāliḥ and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalḥa; Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/9, grades both asanid ḥasan. Ibn Abī Ḥātim records the three-finger account at no. 4825, through al-Suddī and ʿIkrima, and the own-property explanation at no. 4828, through al-Ḥakam and Miqsam. Al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr, 2/437, attributes the service-based explanation to Ibn al-Mundhir and al-Ṭabarānī, from Ibn ʿAbbās: بِقَدْرِ قِيَامِهِ عَلَى مَالِهِ وَمَنْفَعَتِهِ لَهُ وَمَا لَمْ يُسْرِفْ أَوْ يُبَذِّرْ, “In proportion to his management of the property and the benefit he gives him, provided he is neither extravagant nor wasteful.” ↩

  121. al-Ṣābūnī, Rawāʾiʿ al-Bayān, 1/443, quoting al-Ṭabarī: وأولى الأقوال في ذلك بالصواب قول من قال ﴿فَلْيَأْكُلْ بالمعروف﴾ المراد أكل مال التيم عند الضرورة والحاجة إليه، على وجه الاستقراض منه "The most fitting of the views in this, and the correct one, is the view of him who said that in 'let him take in the fair way' what is meant is taking from the orphan's property at the point of necessity and need for it, by way of borrowing from it"; then in his own voice: أقول: ولعلَّ هذا القول أرجح، لأنه جمع بين النصوص "I say: perhaps this view is the stronger, because it brings the texts together." ↩

  122. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42, introduces al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's statement هُوَ طُعْمَةٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ لَهُ, ‘it is a provision from Allah for him,’ and says وَعَلَيْهِ الْفُقَهَاءُ, ‘and the jurists hold this.’ Al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/336: وَعَلَى هَذَا الْحُكْمُ الْيَوْمَ، فَالْقَيِّمُ مَمْنُوعٌ مِنَ الْإِسْرَافِ، وَإِنَّمَا لَهُ أَجْرُ مِثْلِ عَمَلِهِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ أَجِيرٌ بِالشَّرْعِ ... وَإِنْ أَخَذَ الْأُجْرَةَ حَلَّتْ لَهُ فِي الْحُكْمِ فِي مُقَابَلَةِ عَمَلِهِ ‘On this the ruling stands: the administrator is barred from extravagance and is entitled only to the going wage for work like his, because he is a worker appointed by the Law ... and if he takes the wage it is lawful to him in return for his work.’ ↩

  123. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/87 (Dār al-Tafsīr, first printing, 1436/2015), describes an allowance proportionate to the guardian’s management, service and work: وإن أتى على جميع المال فلا قضاء عليه، وهذا طعمة من الله له, “Even if it uses up the whole property, he owes no repayment; this is a provision from Allah for him.” He associates this position with ʿĀʾisha رضي الله عنها and other scholars. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/425–426, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, records her athar through al-Qāsim, al-Ḥusayn, Ḥajjāj, Ibn Jurayj, Hishām b. ʿUrwa and ʿUrwa: the needy guardian may eat reasonably in return for managing the property. ↩

  124. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/427: ولا معنى لقول من قال: إنما عنى بالمعروف … أكل والي اليتيم من مال يتيمه لقيامه عليه على وجه الاعتياض على عمله وسعيه له "There is no sense to the words of one who said: what is meant by 'in a fair manner' is only … the orphan's guardian eating from his orphan's property for his taking charge of him, by way of compensation for his work and his effort for him." ↩

  125. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. وهذا بالنظم القرآني ألصق، فإن إباحة الأكل للفقير مشعرة بجواز ذلك له من غير قرض, “This accords more closely with the Qurʾānic wording: permission for the poor guardian to consume indicates that he may do so without a loan.” ↩

  126. Al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-ʿUyūn, 1/454. ↩

  127. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/420–422, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. He introduces the position as permission to consume fruit, milk and other produce, not the capital. He records Abū al-ʿĀliya's من رسل الدابة ومن التمر, “from the animal's milk and the dates,” through Bishr b. Muʿādh, Yazīd b. Zurayʿ and Dāwūd, and through al-Muthannā, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Dāwūd. ↩

  128. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/415, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, from al-Shaʿbī through Ibn Ḥumayd, Ḥakkām, ʿAmr b. Abī Qays and ʿAṭāʾ b. al-Sāʾib: لا يأكله إلا أن يضطر إليه، كما يضطر إلى الميتة، فإن أكل منه شيئًا قضاه, “He does not consume it except under necessity, as with carrion; if he consumes any of it, he repays it.” ↩

  129. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/423, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, cites Ḥusayn al-Faraj, through Abū Muʿādh and ʿUbayd b. Sulaymān, from al-Ḍaḥḥāk. He permits riding the animal and using the servant's service, but not consuming the property. He adds that money borrowed to meet a need must be repaid. Al-Ṭabarī introduces this isnād with حُدِّثت عن, “I was told from.” ↩

  130. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, quoted in Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb fī ʿUlūm al-Kitāb, 6/191: لا يأخذ على سبيل القرض، ولا على سبيل الابتداء، سواء كان غنيًا أو فقيرًا, “He takes neither as a loan nor outright, whether rich or poor.” Al-Qurṭubī gives the argument: وهذا ليس بتجارة, “This is not trade.” ↩

  131. al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 2/329: فقوله: (وَمَنْ كانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ) يرجع إلى أكل مال نفسه دون مال اليتيم فمعناه: ولا تأكلوا أموال اليتيم مع أموالكم، بل اقتصروا على أكل أموالكم "So His words 'And whoever is well off, let him keep away' go back to eating his own property and not the orphan's. The sense is: do not eat the orphans' property along with your own; keep to eating your own"; فقد وجدنا آيات محكمات بمنع أكل مال الغير بغير رضاه، سيما في حق اليتيم، ووجدنا هذه الآية محتملة للمعاني، فحملها على موجب الآيات المحكمات متعين "We have found decisive verses forbidding the eating of another's property without his consent, above all in the case of the orphan, and we have found this verse open to more than one sense; so referring it to what the decisive verses require is the only course." And 2/330: اعلم أن أحدا من السلف لم يجوز للوصي أن يأخذ من مال الصبي مع غنى الوصي، بخلاف القاضي، فذلك فارق بين المسألتين "Know that not one of the early generations allowed the executor to take from a boy's property while the executor is well off, unlike the judge; and that is what separates the two questions." ↩

  132. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42, reports from al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ b. Ḥayy that a father's appointed executor may take in the fair way, but a judge's appointee فَلَا سَبِيلَ لَهُ إِلَى الْمَالِ بِوَجْهٍ, ‘has no access to the property by any route.’ ↩

  133. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/43, attributes to Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad: فيمنع إذا كان مقيمًا معه في المصر, “It is forbidden when he is residing with him in the town.” When travel is needed for the orphan's affairs, he may take his necessary expenses without accumulating property. ↩

  134. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/871, no. 4836, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419), from Abū al-Zinād through Abū Ḥātim, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Uwaysī and Ibn Abī al-Zinād: إنما كان ذلك في أهل البدو وأشباههم, “That was only among desert dwellers and those like them.” ↩

  135. Ibn al-Mundhir, Tafsīr, 2/573, no. 1391, ed. Saʿd b. Muḥammad al-Saʿd; al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/421–422, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. ↩

  136. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/420–421, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī; Mālik, al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, 2/934, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī; ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, 1/435. ↩

  137. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/868–871, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419). ↩

  138. al-Qāsimī, Maḥāsin al-Taʾwīl, 3/31: أقول: الكل محتمل. إذ لا نص من الأصلين على واحد منها. ولا يخفى الورع. "I say: all are possible, since there is no explicit text in the two foundations for any one of them. The course of scrupulous restraint is not obscure." ↩

  139. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/426: أكل مال اليتيم عند الضرورة والحاجة إليه على وجه الاستقراض منه "Eating from the orphan's property in a case of necessity and need for it, by way of borrowing from it." ↩

  140. al-Ṣābūnī, Rawāʾiʿ al-Bayān, 1/443, quoting al-Ṭabarī: وأولى الأقوال في ذلك بالصواب قول من قال ﴿فَلْيَأْكُلْ بالمعروف﴾ المراد أكل مال التيم عند الضرورة والحاجة إليه، على وجه الاستقراض منه "The most fitting of the views in this, and the correct one, is the view of him who said that in 'let him take in the fair way' what is meant is taking from the orphan's property at the point of necessity and need for it, by way of borrowing from it"; then in his own voice: أقول: ولعلَّ هذا القول أرجح، لأنه جمع بين النصوص "I say: perhaps this view is the stronger, because it brings the texts together." ↩

  141. Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491. ↩

  142. Ibn al-Mundhir, Tafsīr, 2/576, no. 1400, ed. Saʿd b. Muḥammad al-Saʿd (Dār al-Maʾāthir, first printing, 1423/2002), from ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ through Mūsā, Yaḥyā, Abū Khālid and Ḥajjāj. Al-Suyūṭī quotes the athar in al-Durr al-Manthūr, 2/437: خمس في كتاب الله رخصة وليست بعزيمة, “Five provisions in the Book of Allah are concessions, not obligatory commands.” For this allowance: إن شاء أكل، وإن شاء لم يأكل, “If he wishes, he eats; if he wishes, he does not.” ↩

  143. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/44: وَالِاحْتِرَازُ عَنْهُ أَفْضَلُ, “Avoiding it is better.” ↩

  144. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42, reports from Mujāhid that the guardian may take neither a loan nor anything else, and that 4:29 abrogates the permission. Al-Qurṭubī then gives the reason: وهذا ليس بتجارة, “This is not trade.” ↩

  145. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42–43, through Bishr b. al-Walīd from Abū Yūsuf: لا أدري، لعل هذه الآية منسوخة, “I do not know; perhaps this verse is abrogated.” The verse he invokes is 4:29. ↩

  146. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/522 (Dār al-Fikr printing), attributes repeal by 4:10 to Mujāhid and uncertainty about repeal by 2:188 to Abū Yūsuf: وقال أبو يوسف: لعلها منسوخة بقوله: ولا تأكلوا أموالكم بينكم بالباطل, “Abū Yūsuf said: perhaps it is abrogated by His words, ‘Do not consume your property among yourselves unjustly.’” ↩

  147. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, reports the claim that 4:29 abrogates the permission, then says: وهذا مروي عن ابن عباس ولا يصح, “This is reported from Ibn ʿAbbās, and it is not sound.” ↩

  148. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/42, from Zayd b. Aslam: إن الرخصة في هذه الآية منسوخة بقوله تعالى: إن الذين يأكلون أموال اليتامى ظلمًا, “The concession in this verse is abrogated by His words, ‘Indeed, those who consume the property of orphans wrongfully’” (4:10). ↩

  149. Ibn Juzayy, al-Tashīl li-ʿUlūm al-Tanzīl, 1/179 (al-Arqam printing): وقيل: نسختها إن الذين يأكلون أموال اليتامى ظلمًا, “It is also said that ‘Indeed, those who consume the property of orphans wrongfully’ abrogated it.” ↩

  150. Al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr, 2/437–438, attributes to Abū Dāwūd and al-Naḥḥās in their works on abrogation, and to Ibn al-Mundhir, a report through ʿAṭāʾ from Ibn ʿAbbās that 4:10 abrogates the permission. He attributes a similar account from al-Ḍaḥḥāk to Abū Dāwūd’s work on abrogation. ↩

  151. Ibn al-Mundhir, Tafsīr, 2/572, no. 1386, ed. Saʿd b. Muḥammad al-Saʿd (Dār al-Maʾāthir, first printing, 1423/2002), through ʿAlī, Abū ʿUbayd, Ḥajjāj, Ibn Jurayj and ʿUthmān b. ʿAṭāʾ, from ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī from Ibn ʿAbbās: فنسخ الله جل وعز من ذلك الظلم والاعتداء, “Allah, mighty and majestic, abrogated the wrongdoing and transgression in that.” The report identifies 4:10 as the verse concerned. Ibn Ḥajar states that ʿAṭāʾ al-Khurāsānī did not hear from Ibn ʿAbbās (Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, 4/131–132, Dār al-Maʿrifa printing). ↩

  152. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, lists the continuing and abrogated positions, then describes the repeal claim reported from Ibn ʿAbbās as ولا يصح, “not sound.” ↩

  153. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, attributes the continuing ruling to ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Ḥasan, al-Shaʿbī, Abū al-ʿĀliya, Mujāhid, Ibn Jubayr, al-Nakhaʿī and Qatāda, among others. He explains that a needy guardian whose work prevents him from earning enough may take a reasonable allowance without excess, and records disagreement about repayment. ↩

  154. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/14: وظلمًا معناه: ما جاوز المعروف مع فقر الوصي "And 'wrongfully' means: what goes beyond what is fair, together with the trustee's poverty." ↩

  155. Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubab fi Ulum al-Kitab, 6/191. ↩

  156. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, records the continuing ruling from Ibn ʿAbbās and other early authorities; he rejects the contrary repeal account from Ibn ʿAbbās with ولا يصح, “not sound.” ↩

  157. Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/572; al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/344. ↩

  158. Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubab fi Ulum al-Kitab, 6/192: فقال مالك والشافعي: لا يصدق. وقال أبو حنيفة: يصدق "Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī said: he is not believed. And Abū Ḥanīfa said: he is believed.". وهذا أمر رشاد، وليس بواجب، أمر الولي بالإشهاد على دفع المال إلى اليتيم بعد البلوغ ليزول عنه التهمة وتنقطع الخصومة "This is a command of right guidance, and it is not obligatory. The guardian was ordered to take witnesses over handing the property to the orphan after he comes of age, so that suspicion is removed from him and dispute is cut off." Cf. al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/199: أي احتياطاً لأن الأحوال تتبدل، والرشد يتفاوت، فالإشهاد أقطع للشر "That is, out of caution, because circumstances change and sound judgment varies, so taking witnesses cuts off harm more decisively." ↩

  159. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/40: وإذا دفع الوصي دين الميت بغير إشهاد ضمن "And if the trustee pays the deceased's debt without taking witnesses, he is liable." ↩

  160. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/523 (Dār al-Fikr printing): وظاهر الأمر أنه واجب. وقال قوم: هو ندب, “The apparent sense of the command is obligation. Some hold that it is recommended.” ↩

  161. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/429, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, from Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما through Muḥammad b. Saʿd, his father, his uncle, his uncle’s father and that father’s father: إذا دفع إلى اليتيم ماله، فليدفعه إليه بالشهود كما أمره الله تعالى, “When he hands the orphan his property, let him hand it over with witnesses, as Allah commanded him.” Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/871, no. 4838, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419), records Muḥammad b. Saʿd al-ʿAwfī’s written transmission and names his uncle al-Ḥusayn. Al-Suyūṭī calls al-ʿAwfī weak, but not extremely weak, and notes that al-Tirmidhī sometimes graded his reports ḥasan (al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, 4/239). ↩

  162. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/44: وهو ظاهر الآية "And that is the apparent sense of the verse." ↩

  163. Ibn Juzayy, al-Tashīl li-ʿUlūm al-Tanzīl, 1/179: فهو ندب، وقيل فرض, “It is recommended; it is also said to be obligatory.” ↩

  164. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/90: هذا أدب من الله تعالى … وليس بفريضة, “This is instruction from Allah … and it is not an obligation”; al-Baghawī, Maʿālim al-Tanzīl, 1/571: هذا أمر وإرشاد، وليس بواجب, “This is a command and guidance, and it is not obligatory”; al-Khāzin, Lubāb al-Taʾwīl, 1/343, adds that witnesses remove the need for the guardian's oath when receipt is denied; Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb fī ʿUlūm al-Kitāb, 6/192, says the command removes suspicion and cuts off dispute; al-Wāḥidī, al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/336, treats the guardian as a trustee appointed by the Law and the command as nonbinding; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, quotes Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā: هذا على طريق الاحتياط لليتيم، والولي، وليس بواجب, “This is by way of caution for the orphan and the guardian, and it is not obligatory.” Al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/198–199, explains the precaution: لأن الأحوال تتبدل، والرشد يتفاوت، فالإشهاد أقطع للشر, “because circumstances change and sound judgement varies, calling witnesses cuts off harm more decisively”; he also says, والأمر بالإشهاد أزجر للولي عن الخيانة, “The command to take witnesses is a stronger restraint on the guardian against betrayal.” ↩

  165. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/146: وإن لم يكن ذلك واجبًا عند أصحابنا، فإن الوصي مصدق في الدفع مع اليمين، خلافًا لمالك والشافعي "Even if that is not obligatory according to our companions, the executor is believed regarding the handing over, together with an oath, contrary to Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī." Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/523, instead places Mālik with Abū Ḥanīfa in accepting the guardian’s statement on oath. Al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, 2/61, agrees with Abū al-Suʿūd’s attribution to Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī. ↩

  166. al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, collected by al-Bayhaqī, 341, from al-Umm, 8/186: دلالة لا حتمًا an indication, not a binding requirement, والآية محتملة المعنيين معًا "The verse bears both meanings together." ↩

  167. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/44: وهذا الإشهاد مستحب عند طائفة من العلماء, “A group of scholars considers this witnessing recommended”; وقالت طائفة: هو فرض، وهو ظاهر الآية, “Another group holds it obligatory, which is the apparent sense of the verse.” ↩

  168. al-Zuḥaylī, al-Tafsir al-Munir, 4/253, citing al-Ālūsī. وقوله تعالى ﴿وكفى بالله حسيبًا﴾ يشهد لهم في عدم لزوم البينة "His saying, exalted is He, 'And Allah is sufficient as a reckoner', testifies in their favour that proof by witnesses is not required." ↩

  169. Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm, 3/871, no. 4841, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, third printing, 1419), from Saʿīd b. Jubayr through Abū Zurʿa, Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukayr, Ibn Lahīʿa and ʿAṭāʾ b. Dīnār: يعني: شهيدًا، يعني: لا شاهدَ أفضلُ من اللهِ فيما بينكم وبينهم, “He means: a witness; there is no witness better than Allah between you and them.” Aḥmad b. Ṣāliḥ calls ʿAṭāʾ trustworthy but says that his tafsīr from Saʿīd is a written collection with no evidence that he heard it from him. Abū Ḥātim calls him ṣāliḥ al-ḥadīth and explains that he obtained Saʿīd’s tafsīr from the government register and transmitted it mursal (Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ wa-l-Taʿdīl, 6/332). ↩

  170. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, in Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/320–321: أَنَّ الْإِشْهَادَ - وَإِنْ حَصَلَ، وَكَانَ يُسْقِطُ الدَّعْوَى عِنْدَ الْقَاضِي بِالْمَالِ - لَا يُسْقِطُ الْحَقَّ عِنْدَ اللهِ إِذَا كَانَ الْوَلِيُّ خَائِنًا ‘Even when witnessing has occurred and would defeat the claim to the property before the judge, it does not extinguish the right before Allah if the guardian was treacherous.’ ↩

  171. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, recorded by Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/320–321: وَلَا شَكَّ عِنْدِي أَنَّ الْإِشْهَادَ حَتْمٌ، وَأَنَّ تَرْكَهُ يُؤَدِّي إِلَى النِّزَاعِ، وَالتَّخَاصُمِ، وَالتَّقَاضِي كَمَا هُوَ مُشَاهَدٌ، فَإِذَا فَرَضْنَا أَنَّ النَّاسَ كَانُوا فِي زَمَنٍ مَا مُسْتَمْسِكِينَ بِعُرْوَةِ الدِّينِ اسْتِمْسَاكًا عَامًّا، وَكَانَ الْيَتَامَى يُحْسِنُونَ الظَّنَّ فِي الْأَوْلِيَاءِ فَلَا يَتَّهِمُونَهُمْ، وَأَنَّ الْإِشْهَادَ لَمْ يَكُنْ مُحَتَّمًا عَلَيْهِمْ لِأَجْلِ هَذَا. أَفَلَيْسَ هَذَا الزَّمَنُ الْمَعْلُومُ مُخَالِفًا لِذَلِكَ الزَّمَنِ الْمَجْهُولِ مُخَالَفَةً تَقْتَضِي أَنْ يُجْعَلَ الْإِشْهَادُ ضَرْبَةَ لَازِبٍ لِقَطْعِ عِرْقِ الْخِصَامِ "I have no doubt that taking witnesses is obligatory, and that leaving it leads to dispute, contention and litigation, as can be seen. Suppose that, in some age, people generally held fast to religion, that orphans thought well of their guardians and did not suspect them, and that taking witnesses was not made binding on them for this reason. Is this known age not different from that unknown age in a way that requires taking witnesses to be made a fixed necessity, to cut off contention at its root?" ↩

  172. Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/320: وهذا الإشهاد واجب كما هو ظاهر الأمر، وعليه الشافعية، والمالكية. وقال الحنفية: إنه غير واجب بل مندوب "This taking of witnesses is obligatory, as is the apparent sense of the command, and this is the position of the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs. The Ḥanafīs said: it is not obligatory but recommended." ↩

  173. Al-Zajjāj, quoted in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1/312: وَكَفى بِاللَّهِ حَسِيباً يكون بمعنى مُحاسِباً، ويكون بمعنى كافِياً, “‘Allah suffices as a ḥasīb’ may mean one who calls to account, or one who suffices.” ↩

  174. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/429, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, transmits al-Suddī’s explanation through Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn, Aḥmad b. al-Mufaḍḍal and Asbāṭ: وَكَفَى بِاللَّهِ حَسِيبًا، يَقُولُ: شَهِيدًا, “‘And Allah suffices as a reckoner’: he says, ‘as a witness.’” Ḥikmat Bashīr Yāsīn, al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Masbūr, 2/10, grades this chain ḥasan. Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, 1/373, also reports “a witness” from Ibn ʿAbbās. ↩

  175. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/429, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. ↩

  176. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/12: والأظهر حسيبًا معناه: حاسبًا أعمالكم ومجازيًا بها، ففي هذا وعيد لكل جاحد حق "The more apparent view is that ḥasīb means: reckoning your deeds and requiting you for them. So in this is a threat to everyone who denies a right." Al-Wāḥidī reports Ibn ʿAbbās’s explanation as one who requites good and evil in al-Tafsīr al-Basīṭ, 6/336, and al-Tafsīr al-Wasīṭ, 2/14. ↩

  177. al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/491: والمراد بالرشد: نوعه، وهو المتعلق بحسن التصرف في أمواله، وعدم التبذير بها "What is meant by rushd is one type of it, namely the type connected with handling his wealth well and not squandering it.". الخطاب في هذه الآية لأولياء الأيتام القائمين بما يصلحهم، كالأب والجد ووصيهما "The address in this verse is to the guardians of orphans who see to what is good for them, such as the father, the grandfather, and the executor of either of them.". وَهَذَا الْقَوْلُ فِي غَايَةِ السُّقُوطِ "This statement is utterly worthless.". وهذا بالنظم القرآني ألصق، فإن إباحة الأكل للفقير مشعرة بجواز ذلك له من غير قرض "This fits the Qurʾānic wording more closely, for permitting the poor man to eat indicates that this is allowed to him without a loan.". حَاسِبًا لِأَعْمَالِكُمْ، شَاهِدًا عَلَيْكُمْ فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ تَعْمَلُونَهُ... وَفِيهِ وَعِيدٌ عَظِيمٌ، وَالْبَاءُ زَائِدَةٌ "Reckoning your deeds, witnessing over you in everything you do… In it is a great threat, and the bāʾ is extra." ↩

  178. Al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/199. ↩

  179. Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb, 6/193: وهذا وعيد سواء فسَّرنا الحسيب بالمحاسب، أو بالكافي "And this is a threat, whether we explain al-ḥasīb as the one who calls to account or as the one who suffices." ↩

  180. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/523 (Dār al-Fikr printing). ↩

  181. al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/44: وهو ظاهر الآية "And that is the apparent sense of the verse." ↩

  182. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, recorded by Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/320–321: وَلَا شَكَّ عِنْدِي أَنَّ الْإِشْهَادَ حَتْمٌ، وَأَنَّ تَرْكَهُ يُؤَدِّي إِلَى النِّزَاعِ، وَالتَّخَاصُمِ، وَالتَّقَاضِي كَمَا هُوَ مُشَاهَدٌ، فَإِذَا فَرَضْنَا أَنَّ النَّاسَ كَانُوا فِي زَمَنٍ مَا مُسْتَمْسِكِينَ بِعُرْوَةِ الدِّينِ اسْتِمْسَاكًا عَامًّا، وَكَانَ الْيَتَامَى يُحْسِنُونَ الظَّنَّ فِي الْأَوْلِيَاءِ فَلَا يَتَّهِمُونَهُمْ، وَأَنَّ الْإِشْهَادَ لَمْ يَكُنْ مُحَتَّمًا عَلَيْهِمْ لِأَجْلِ هَذَا. أَفَلَيْسَ هَذَا الزَّمَنُ الْمَعْلُومُ مُخَالِفًا لِذَلِكَ الزَّمَنِ الْمَجْهُولِ مُخَالَفَةً تَقْتَضِي أَنْ يُجْعَلَ الْإِشْهَادُ ضَرْبَةَ لَازِبٍ لِقَطْعِ عِرْقِ الْخِصَامِ "I have no doubt that taking witnesses is obligatory, and that leaving it leads to dispute, contention and litigation, as can be seen. Suppose that, in some age, people generally held fast to religion, that orphans thought well of their guardians and did not suspect them, and that taking witnesses was not made binding on them for this reason. Is this known age not different from that unknown age in a way that requires taking witnesses to be made a fixed necessity, to cut off contention at its root?" Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/320: وهذا الإشهاد واجب كما هو ظاهر الأمر، وعليه الشافعية، والمالكية. وقال الحنفية: إنه غير واجب بل مندوب "This taking of witnesses is obligatory, as is the apparent sense of the command, and this is the position of the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs. The Ḥanafīs said: it is not obligatory but recommended." ↩

  183. al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, collected by al-Bayhaqī, 341, from al-Umm, 8/186: دلالة لا حتمًا an indication, not a binding requirement, والآية محتملة المعنيين معًا "The verse bears both meanings together." ↩

  184. al-Māwardī, al-Nukat wa-l-Uyun, 1/455; al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, 2/61; Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/332. ↩

Iʿrāb: Grammatical Structure

  1. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah ed., 1/364–365. It parses the verse word by word: ﴿حَتّى﴾: حرف ابتداء وغاية "'Until': a particle of inception and of limit"; ﴿إِذا﴾: ظرف للزمن المستقبل تضمن معنى الشرط "'When': an adverb of future time holding the sense of a condition"; وجملة: (لا تأكلوها): معطوفة على جملة: (ابتلوا) "and the clause 'do not consume it' is joined to the clause 'test them'"; والمصدر المؤول (أن يكبروا): في محل نصب مفعول به للمصدر (بدارا)، والمعنى: بدارا كبرهم "and the verbal-noun phrase 'that they will grow up' is in the accusative as the object of the verbal noun 'in haste'; the sense is: racing their coming of age"; و (الباء): حرف جر، يفيد الأمر، والمعنى: اكتف بالله "and the bāʾ is a preposition giving the force of a command; the sense is: content yourself with Allah"; ﴿حَسِيباً﴾: تمييز منصوب "'As Accountant': a specifying complement in the accusative." ↩

  2. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/440–441. He identifies هُمْ after مِنْ as the object of the preposition, هُمْ in أَمْوَالَهُمْ as a possessive pronoun, and هَا in تَأْكُلُوهَا as the direct object; he also gives the positions of the attached subject pronouns. ↩

  3. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah printing, 1/364–365. ↩

  4. al-ʿUkbarī, al-Tibyān fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/331: حَتَّى هَاهُنَا غَيْرُ عَامِلَةٍ، وَإِنَّمَا دَخَلَتْ عَلَى الْكَلَامِ لِمَعْنَى الْغَايَةِ، كَمَا تَدْخُلُ عَلَى الْمُبْتَدَأِ؛ وَجَوَابُ ﴿إِذَا﴾ ﴿فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ﴾، وَجَوَابُ ﴿إِنْ﴾ ﴿فَادْفَعُوا﴾ "Ḥattā here does not govern. It has only entered upon the sentence to give the sense of a limit, just as it enters upon the subject of a nominal sentence. The response to 'when' is 'then if you perceive', and the response to 'if' is 'then hand over'." ↩

  5. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519 (Dār al-Fikr printing): وحتى إذا دخلت على الشرط لا تكون عاملة, “When ḥattā introduces a conditional sentence, it does not govern.” ↩

  6. al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/331; Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145: فما زالت القتلى تمُجُّ دماءَها بدِجلةَ حتى ماءُ دِجلةَ أشكلُ "The slain kept spewing their blood into the Tigris until the water of the Tigris ran murky red." ↩

  7. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah printing, 1/364–365. ↩

  8. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/440–441. He calls حَتَّى a particle of inception and gives إِنْ آنَسْتُمْ as the response to إِذَا, with ادْفَعُوا as the response to إِنْ. ↩

  9. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, al-Durr al-Maṣūn, 3/583: في «حتى» هذه وما أشبهها أعني الداخلةَ على «إذا» قولان، أشهرُهما: أنها حرف غاية دَخَلَتْ على الجملةِ الشرطية وجوابِها... والثاني: وهو قول جماعة منهم الزجاج وابن دُرُسْتويه أنَّها حرف جر، وما بعَدها مجرور بها، وعلى هذا ف «إذا» تتمحَّض للظرفيةِ، ولا يكون فيها معنى الشرط "Concerning this ḥattā and what resembles it, I mean the one that enters upon idhā, there are two views. The better known is that it is a particle of limit that has entered upon the conditional sentence and its response… The second, which is the view of a group including al-Zajjāj and Ibn Durustawayh, is that it is a preposition, and what comes after it is in the genitive because of it. On this view idhā is purely adverbial, and there is no conditional sense in it"; and 3/584: والفاءُ في قوله: ﴿فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ﴾ جوابُ «إذا»، وفي قولِه «فادْفَعُوا» جوابُ «إنْ» "The fāʾ in His saying 'then if you perceive' is the response to idhā, and in his saying 'then hand over' it is the response to in." ↩

  10. al-Zajjāj, Maʿānī al-Qurʾān wa-Iʿrābuh, 2/14. ↩

  11. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519 (Dār al-Fikr printing), attributes the genitive analysis to al-Zajjāj and Ibn Durustuwayh and the nongoverning analysis to the majority. ↩

  12. Muḥyī al-Dīn Darwīsh, Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān wa-Bayānuh, 2/160: وحتى حرف غاية وجر … وقيل حتى ابتدائية, “Ḥattā is a particle of limit and genitive government … and it is said that ḥattā is inceptive.” ↩

  13. Ibn ʿUthaymīn, al-Nisāʾ, 1/42: ﴿حتى﴾ هنا ابتدائية "'Ḥattā' here is inceptive"; شرطًا في ضمن شرط آخر a condition within another condition. ↩

  14. ʿAbduh, in Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/317: وَحَتَّى ابْتِدَائِيَّةٌ، أَيِ ابْتَلُوا الْيَتَامَى إِلَى ابْتِدَاءِ الْبُلُوغِ... وَإِلَّا فَاسْتَمِرُّوا عَلَى الِابْتِلَاءِ إِلَى أَنْ تَأْنَسُوا مِنْهُمُ الرُّشْدَ "Ḥattā is inceptive, that is: test the orphans up to the onset of puberty… and if not, then continue testing until you perceive sound judgment in them." ↩

  15. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah printing, 1/364–365. ↩

  16. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/441, note 3. His main analysis joins لَا تَأْكُلُوهَا to ابْتَلُوا. In the note he quotes Abū Ḥayyān’s independent-clause analysis and objection to joining it to فَادْفَعُوا: لأن الشرط مترتب على بلوغ النكاح وهو معارض لقوله وبدارا أن يكبروا, “because the condition depends on reaching marriageable age, whereas this conflicts with ‘in haste before they grow up.’” ↩

  17. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/520. وَهَذِهِ الْجُمْلَةُ مُسْتَقِلَّةٌ... وَلَيْسَتْ مَعْطُوفَةً عَلَى جَوَابِ الشَّرْطِ، لِأَنَّهُ وَشَرْطَهُ مُتَرَتِّبَانِ عَلَى بُلُوغِ النِّكَاحِ. وَهُوَ مُعَارِضٌ لِقَوْلِهِ: وَبِدَارًا أَنْ يَكْبَرُوا... وَبِهَذَا الَّذِي قَرَّرْنَاهُ يَتَّضِحُ خَطَأُ مَنْ جَعَلَ وَلَا تَأْكُلُوهَا عَطْفًا عَلَى فَادْفَعُوا "This sentence stands on its own… It is not joined to the response of the condition, because it and its condition both follow upon reaching the age of marriage. And that conflicts with His saying: 'and in haste, before they grow up'… By this that we have established, the error of whoever made 'and do not consume it' joined to 'then hand over' becomes clear." ↩

  18. Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb, 6/190: أصحهما: أنها استئنافية، وليست معطوفةً على ما قبلها... وهذا فاسدٌ؛ لأن الشّرط وجوابه مترتِّبان على بلوغ النِّكاح وهو معارضٌ لقوله: ﴿وَبِدَاراً أَن يَكْبَرُواْ﴾ فَيَلزَمُ منه سَبْقُه على ما ترتَّب عَلَيْهِ، وذلك ممتنع "The sounder of the two is that it begins a new sentence and is not joined to what comes before it… This is unsound, because the condition and its response both follow upon reaching the age of marriage, and it conflicts with His saying 'and in haste, before they grow up', so it would follow that it precedes what it follows upon, and that is impossible." ↩

  19. Muḥyī al-Dīn Darwīsh, Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān wa-Bayānuh, 2/160. He makes the wāw in وَلَا تَأْكُلُوهَا begin an independent sentence, because making it depend on the later handover condition would reverse the order of the events. ↩

  20. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145: والجملة تأكيد للأمر بالدفع وتقرير لها وتمهيد لما بعدها, “The sentence reinforces and confirms the command to hand over, and prepares for what follows.” ↩

  21. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah printing, 1/364–365. ↩

  22. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/410, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī: وموضع أن في قوله أن يكبروا نصب بالمبادرة لأن معنى الكلام لا تأكلوها مبادرة كبرهم, “The position of an in ‘that they grow up’ is accusative, governed by ‘racing,’ because the meaning is: do not consume it while racing their growing up.” ↩

  23. Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib, Mushkil Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/190: قوله ﴿إسرافا﴾ مفعول من أجله وقيل هو مصدر في موضع الحال وبدارا مثله "His saying 'wastefully' is an object of purpose. It has been said that it is a verbal noun in the position of a circumstantial qualifier, and 'in haste' is like it"; قوله ﴿أن يكبروا﴾ أن في موضع نصب ببدار "His saying 'that they will grow up': an is in the accusative position, governed by bidāran." ↩

  24. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/440. He takes أَنْ يَكْبَرُوا as مفعول به عامله المصدر بدار, “an object governed by the verbal noun bidār.” Note 4 also allows an object of purpose with an omitted noun: مخافة أن يكبروا, “for fear that they grow up.” ↩

  25. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Kharrāṭ, al-Mujtabā min Mushkil Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/164: والمصدر أن يكبروا مفعول لأجله أي مخافة أن يكبروا, “The verbal-noun construction ‘that they grow up’ is an object of purpose: for fear that they grow up.” ↩

  26. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/440, note 4. ↩

  27. Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, Dār al-Ṣaḥābah printing, 1/364–365. ↩

  28. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/523–3/524: وَفِي كَفَى خِلَافٌ: أَهِيَ اسْمُ فِعْلٍ، أَمْ فِعْلٌ؟ وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهَا فِعْلٌ، وَفَاعِلُهُ اسْمُ اللَّهِ، وَالْبَاءُ زَائِدَةٌ "Concerning kafā there is disagreement: is it a noun standing for a verb, or a verb? The sound view is that it is a verb, its subject is lafẓ al-jalālah, the Name of Majesty, and the bāʾ is extra"; تمييز لِصَلَاحِيَّةِ دُخُولِ من عليه a specifying complement, because min may validly enter upon it. ↩

  29. Maḥmūd Ṣāfī, al-Jadwal fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 2/441: كفى فعل ماض … الباء حرف جر زائد … الله لفظ الجلالة مجرور لفظا مرفوع محلا فاعل كفى, “Kafā is a past-tense verb … the bāʾ is an added preposition … lafẓ al-jalālah is genitive in form but nominative in grammatical position, as the subject of kafā.” ↩

  30. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Kharrāṭ, al-Mujtabā min Mushkil Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/164: كفى فعل ماض … والباء زائدة وحسيبا تمييز, “Kafā is a past-tense verb … the bāʾ is added, and ḥasīban is a specifying complement.” He makes lafẓ al-jalālah the subject. ↩

  31. Al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/199: والباء في مثل هذا تأكيد لأن ما قرنت به هو الفاعل حقيقة لا مجازًا, “The bāʾ in this construction gives emphasis, because what it accompanies is the subject in reality, not figuratively.” ↩

  32. Ibn ʿĀdil, al-Lubāb fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb, 6/192–6/193: وهذا كلامٌ غيرُ صحيح؛ لأنه من حيث المعنى الذي قدَّره يكون الفاعل هم المخاطبين، و«بالله» متعلّق به، ومن حيث كون «الباء» دخلت في الفاعل يكون الفاعل هو اللهُ تعالى، فيتناقض. وفي كلام ابن عطية نحو من قوله أيضًا... وفي هذا ما رُدَّ به على الزَّجَّاجِ، وزيادة جَعْلِ الحرف زائدًا وغير زائدٍ "This is not a sound statement, because, from the standpoint of the meaning he assumed, the subject would be the people addressed, and 'bi-Llāh' would be attached to it; while from the standpoint of the bāʾ having entered upon the subject, the subject would be lafẓ al-jalālah, the Name of Majesty, so it is self-contradictory. In the words of Ibn ʿAṭiyya there is something like his statement as well… In this is the refutation that was made against al-Zajjāj, with the added point of making the particle both extra and not extra"; أصحهما: أنه تمييز "The sounder of the two is that it is a specifying complement." ↩

  33. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/247: والباء زائدة للتوكيد, “The bāʾ is added for emphasis.” ↩

Ṣarf: Roots and Word Formation

  1. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/231–232: يقال: بلوته أي اختبرته "One says balawtuhu, that is, I tested him"; ويقال: ابتليته كبلوته "And one says ibtalaytuhu, in the sense of balawtuhu", with وابتلوا اليتامى "And test the orphans" [4:6] as his citation; and وابتلى وبلى يتضمن أمرين: أحدهما تعرف حاله وما يجهل من أمره. والثاني ظهور جودته ورداءته "And ibtalā and balā take in two things: one of them is coming to know his state and what is unknown of his affair, and the second is the showing up of his soundness or his badness." ↩

  2. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 1/292: الباء واللام والواو والياء، أصلان: أحدهما إخلاق الشئ، والثانى نوعٌ من الاختبار "Bāʾ, lām, wāw and yāʾ are two roots: one of them is a thing's wearing out, and the second is a kind of testing"; and 1/293: ويكونُ البَلَاءُ فى الخير والشرّ "And balāʾ occurs in good and in evil." ↩

  3. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/231–232: يقال: بلوته أي اختبرته "One says balawtuhu, that is, I tested him"; ويقال: ابتليته كبلوته "And one says ibtalaytuhu, in the sense of balawtuhu", with وابتلوا اليتامى "And test the orphans" [4:6] as his citation; and وابتلى وبلى يتضمن أمرين: أحدهما تعرف حاله وما يجهل من أمره. والثاني ظهور جودته ورداءته "And ibtalā and balā take in two things: one of them is coming to know his state and what is unknown of his affair, and the second is the showing up of his soundness or his badness." ↩

  4. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 1/301: الباء واللام والغين أصلٌ واحد وهو الوُصول إلى الشئ "Bāʾ, lām and ghayn are a single root, and it is arrival at a thing"; وقد تُسَمَّى المُشَارَفَةُ بُلوغاً بحقِّ المقارَبة "And coming close is sometimes called bulūgh, by right of nearness." ↩

  5. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/228: وقيل: البلاغ هو الانتهاء إلى أقصى الأمر "And it is said: al-balāgh is arrival at the furthest point of a matter"; وقد يعبر به عن المشارفة عليه وإن لم ينته إليه "And it is sometimes used of coming within sight of it, even if one has not arrived at it"; and 1/229: يقال: بلغ الصبي يبلغ بلوغًا فهو بالغ "One says: the boy balagha, yablughu, bulūghan, so he is bāligh." ↩

  6. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 2/288: الدال والفاء والعين أصلٌ واحد مشهور، يدلُّ على تنحيَة الشئ "Dāl, fāʾ and ʿayn are a single well-known root indicating the moving aside of a thing." ↩

  7. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 2/18: الدفع إن عدي بإلى فمعناه الإنالة "Dafʿ, if made transitive by ilā, means putting a thing within reach", his citation being فادفعوا إليهم أموالهم "then release their property to them" [4:6]; وإن عدي بعن فمعناه الحماية "and if it is made transitive by ʿan, its sense is protection." ↩

  8. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 4/126: المال: ما ملك من متاع الدنيا وصح الانتفاع به، وغلب في النقود والعروض المعدة للتجارة "Al-māl is what is owned of the goods of this world and can rightly be put to use, and it has come to be used chiefly of coin and of goods set aside for trade"; the derivation from leaning, given to al-Aṣmaʿī, وتبعه الراغب: سمي المال مالًا لأنه يميل من هذا إلى ذاك "and al-Rāghib followed him: property was called māl because it leans from this one to that one"; and al-Samīn's answer, فإن المال من الواو بدليل مويل وأموال، وتمول فلانٌ "for māl is from the wāw, on the evidence of muwayl, amwāl, and tamawwala fulān." ↩

  9. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 4/126: المال: ما ملك من متاع الدنيا وصح الانتفاع به، وغلب في النقود والعروض المعدة للتجارة "Al-māl is what is owned of the goods of this world and can rightly be put to use, and it has come to be used chiefly of coin and of goods set aside for trade"; the derivation from leaning, given to al-Aṣmaʿī, وتبعه الراغب: سمي المال مالًا لأنه يميل من هذا إلى ذاك "and al-Rāghib followed him: property was called māl because it leans from this one to that one"; and al-Samīn's answer, فإن المال من الواو بدليل مويل وأموال، وتمول فلانٌ "for māl is from the wāw, on the evidence of muwayl, amwāl, and tamawwala fulān." ↩

  10. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 5/285: الميم والواو واللام كلمة واحدة، هي تَمَوَّلَ الرّجُل: اتخذَ مالاً "Mīm, wāw and lām are a single word: the man tamawwala, that is, he took property to himself." ↩

  11. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 1/122: الهمزة والكاف واللام بابٌ تكثر فُروعه، والأصل كلمة واحدة، ومعناها التنقُّص "Hamza, kāf and lām are a chapter whose branches are many, and the root is a single word whose meaning is diminution." ↩

  12. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/98–99: الأكلُ بالفتح: المصدرُ، وبالضم الشيءُ المأكولُ "Al-akl with fatḥa is the verbal noun, and with ḍamma it is the thing eaten"; and on ولا تَأكُلوا أموالَهم إلى أموالِكُم "and do not consume their property along with your own" [4:2]: ذكرَ الأكلَ بعدَ سائِر وجوهِ التصرُّفِ؛ فإنه أغلبُ التصرُّفاتُ أو جعلَ كنايةً عن إنفاقِ أموالهم "He named eating in place of all the other ways of dealing with property, for it is the commonest of them; or it was made an indirect expression for spending their property away." ↩

  13. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 5/153: الكاف والباء والراء أصلٌ صحيح يدلُّ على خِلاف الصِّغَر "Kāf, bāʾ and rāʾ are a sound root indicating the opposite of smallness." ↩

  14. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/365–366: ثم إن الكبر والصغر اسمان متضايفان باعتبار بعضها ببعضٍ "Bigness and smallness are two correlative nouns, each taken in relation to the other"; ويستعمل ذلك اعتبارًا بتقدم الزمان. ومنه: فلان كبير أي مسن "And it is used with regard to priority in time; from this, so-and-so is kabīr, that is, aged"; وقد يقال باعتبار المنزلة والرفعة "And it is sometimes said with regard to rank and elevation." ↩

  15. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 5/148: الكاف والواو والنون أصلٌ يدلُّ على الإخبار عن حدوثِ شيء، إمَّا في زمانٍ ماضٍ أو زمان راهن "Kāf, wāw and nūn are a root indicating the report that a thing has come about, whether in past time or in present time." ↩

  16. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/439: وجوابه أن كان تدل على زمنٍ ماضٍ طويلًا كان أو قصيرًا "The answer to it is that kāna indicates a past time, whether long or short." ↩

  17. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 4/397: الغين والنون والحرف المعتل أصلانِ صحيحان، أحدُهما يدلُّ على الكِفاية، والآخر صوت "Ghayn, nūn and the weak letter are two sound roots: one of them indicates sufficiency, and the other is a sound." ↩

  18. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/176–177: ثم الغني يكون على أضربٍ: أحدها ارتفاع الحاجات وامتناعها على ذلك المُستغني، وليس ذلك إلا لله تعالى دون خلقه. والثاني قلة الحاجات "Then ghinā is of several kinds: the first is the absence of wants and their impossibility for the one who is without want, and that belongs to Allah alone and not to His creation; the second is fewness of wants", with والثالث كثرة القنيات وزيادة الأعراض الدنيوية "and the third is abundance of possessions and increase of worldly goods"; and on this verse: ﴿ومن كان غنيًا فليستعفف﴾ أي ومن كان عنده مال يكتفي به عن أكل مال اليتيم فليطلب العفة والقنع من نفسه عن مال اليتيم "⟨And whoever is well off, let him refrain⟩, that is: whoever has property by which he can do without consuming the orphan's property, let him seek restraint and contentment of himself away from the orphan's property." ↩

  19. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/176–177: ثم الغني يكون على أضربٍ: أحدها ارتفاع الحاجات وامتناعها على ذلك المُستغني، وليس ذلك إلا لله تعالى دون خلقه. والثاني قلة الحاجات "Then ghinā is of several kinds: the first is the absence of wants and their impossibility for the one who is without want, and that belongs to Allah alone and not to His creation; the second is fewness of wants", with والثالث كثرة القنيات وزيادة الأعراض الدنيوية "and the third is abundance of possessions and increase of worldly goods"; and on this verse: ﴿ومن كان غنيًا فليستعفف﴾ أي ومن كان عنده مال يكتفي به عن أكل مال اليتيم فليطلب العفة والقنع من نفسه عن مال اليتيم "⟨And whoever is well off, let him refrain⟩, that is: whoever has property by which he can do without consuming the orphan's property, let him seek restraint and contentment of himself away from the orphan's property." ↩

  20. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/242: والفقر: الخلة والحاجة الضرورية "Al-faqr is want and pressing need"; وهو مأخوذ من فقار الظهر كأنه لاحتياجه انكسر فقارة فهو لا ينهض "And it is taken from the vertebrae of the back, as though, for his need, his vertebra were broken so that he cannot rise"; وقيل: هو فعيل بمعنى مفعول، فالفقير هو المكسور الفقار على التشبيه "And it is said: it is faʿīl in the sense of mafʿūl, so the faqīr is the one whose vertebrae are broken, by way of likeness." Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 4/443: الفاء والقاف والراء أصلٌ صحيح يدلُّ على انفراجٍ فى شئ "Fāʾ, qāf and rāʾ are a sound root indicating a parting in a thing"; والفقير: المكسور فَقَارِ الظَّهر "And al-faqīr is the one whose back vertebrae are broken." ↩

  21. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/61: والمعروف: اسم لكل فعلٍ يعرف بالعقل والشرع حسنه "Al-maʿrūf is a name for every act whose goodness is recognised by reason and by the Law"; ومن ثم قيل للاقتصاد في الجود معروف لما كان مستحسنًا شرعًا وعقلاً "And hence moderation in giving was called maʿrūf, since it is held good in Law and in reason"; and on وللمطلقات متاع بالمعروف "and for divorced women a provision in the fair way" [2:241]: أي بالاقتصاد من غير إسرافٍ فيضر بالزوج، ولا تقتير فيضر بالمرأة "That is, moderately, without excess that would harm the husband and without stinting that would harm the woman." ↩

  22. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/61: والمعروف: اسم لكل فعلٍ يعرف بالعقل والشرع حسنه "Al-maʿrūf is a name for every act whose goodness is recognised by reason and by the Law"; ومن ثم قيل للاقتصاد في الجود معروف لما كان مستحسنًا شرعًا وعقلاً "And hence moderation in giving was called maʿrūf, since it is held good in Law and in reason"; and on وللمطلقات متاع بالمعروف "and for divorced women a provision in the fair way" [2:241]: أي بالاقتصاد من غير إسرافٍ فيضر بالزوج، ولا تقتير فيضر بالمرأة "That is, moderately, without excess that would harm the husband and without stinting that would harm the woman." ↩

  23. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 3/221: الشين والهاء والدال أصلٌ يدلُّ على حضور وعلم، وإعلام، لا يخرُج شئٌ من فروعه عن الذى ذكرناه "Shīn, hāʾ and dāl are a root indicating presence, knowledge and making known; nothing of its branches falls outside what we have mentioned." ↩

  24. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 2/295: الشهادة والشهود: حضور مع مشاهدةٍ "Shahāda and shuhūd are attendance together with witnessing"; والشهادة: قول صادر عن علمٍ حصل بمشاهدة بصرٍ أو بصيرةٍ "And testimony is a statement issuing from knowledge got by the witnessing of the eye or of the understanding." ↩

  25. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 5/188: الكَاف والفاء والحرف المعتل أصلٌ صحيح يدلُّ على الحَسْب الذى لا مُستَزَادَ فيه "Kāf, fāʾ and the weak letter are a sound root indicating an amount admitting of no increase." ↩

  26. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/414: الكفاية: سد الخلة وبلوغ المراد من الأمر "Sufficiency is the stopping of a want and the reaching of what is wanted of a matter"; and on كفى بالله شهيدًا "Allah suffices as a witness": وقيل: الباء مزيدةٌ في الفاعل، والأصل: كفى الله شهيدًا، وهذا هو الصحيح "And it is said: the bāʾ is added to the subject, the underlying wording being kafā Allāhu shahīdan, and this is the sound view." ↩

  27. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 3/414: الكفاية: سد الخلة وبلوغ المراد من الأمر "Sufficiency is the stopping of a want and the reaching of what is wanted of a matter"; and on كفى بالله شهيدًا "Allah suffices as a witness": وقيل: الباء مزيدةٌ في الفاعل، والأصل: كفى الله شهيدًا، وهذا هو الصحيح "And it is said: the bāʾ is added to the subject, the underlying wording being kafā Allāhu shahīdan, and this is the sound view." ↩

  28. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 4/217–218: النكاح لغة: المداخلة والاشتباك "Nikāḥ in the language is interpenetration and interlocking"; ومنه: تناكحت الأشجار، أي تداخلت أغصان بعضها في بعضٍ "And from it: the trees tanākaḥat, that is, the branches of some ran into others"; قالوا: وكل نكاحٍ ورد في الكتاب العزيز فالمراد به العقد، إلا موضعًا واحدًا وهو قوله: ﴿حتى تنكح زوجًا غيره﴾ "They said: every nikāḥ occurring in the Mighty Book means the contract, except one place, His words ⟨until she marries a husband other than him⟩"; and وقيل: أصل النكاح لغةً الملازمة. ومنه نكح المطر الأرض أي لزمها "And it is said: the root of nikāḥ in the language is clinging; from it, the rain nakaḥa the earth, that is, it clung to it." ↩

  29. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 5/475: النون والكاف والحاء أصلٌ واحد، وهو البِضاع "Nūn, kāf and ḥāʾ are a single root, and it is coupling"; النِّكاح يكون العَقدَ دونَ الوطء "Al-nikāḥ may be the contract without the act." ↩

  30. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 4/217–218: النكاح لغة: المداخلة والاشتباك "Nikāḥ in the language is interpenetration and interlocking"; ومنه: تناكحت الأشجار، أي تداخلت أغصان بعضها في بعضٍ "And from it: the trees tanākaḥat, that is, the branches of some ran into others"; قالوا: وكل نكاحٍ ورد في الكتاب العزيز فالمراد به العقد، إلا موضعًا واحدًا وهو قوله: ﴿حتى تنكح زوجًا غيره﴾ "They said: every nikāḥ occurring in the Mighty Book means the contract, except one place, His words ⟨until she marries a husband other than him⟩"; and وقيل: أصل النكاح لغةً الملازمة. ومنه نكح المطر الأرض أي لزمها "And it is said: the root of nikāḥ in the language is clinging; from it, the rain nakaḥa the earth, that is, it clung to it." ↩

  31. al-Zarkashī, al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, 1/109, in النوع الرابع: في جمع الوجوه والنظائر "the fourth kind: on gathering the senses and the parallels": النِّكَاحُ فِي الْقُرْآنِ التَّزَوُّجُ إِلَّا قَوْلَهُ جَلَّ ثَنَاؤُهُ: ﴿حَتَّى إِذَا بَلَغُوا النكاح﴾ فإنه يعني الحلم "Nikāḥ in the Qurʾān is marrying, except His words, exalted be His praise, ⟨until they reach al-nikāḥ⟩, for it means puberty." ↩

  32. al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, 2/159, in النوع التاسع والثلاثون: في معرفة الوجوه والنظائر "the thirty-ninth kind: on knowing the senses and the parallels": وَكُلُّ " نِكَاحٍ " فِيهِ تَزَوُّجٌ إِلَّا: ﴿حَتَّى إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ﴾ فَهُوَ الْحُلُمُ "And every nikāḥ in it is marrying, except ⟨until they reach al-nikāḥ⟩, where it is puberty." ↩

  33. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 1/145: الهمزة والنون والسين أصلٌ واحد، وهو ظهورُ الشئ، وكلُّ شئٍ خالَفَ طريقة التوحُّش. قالوا: الإنْس خلاف الجِنّ، وسُمُّوا لظهورهم. يقال آنَسْتُ الشئ إذا رأيتَه. قال الله تعالى: ﴿فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ مِنْهُمْ رُشْداً﴾ "Hamza, nūn and sīn are a single root, which is the appearing of a thing, and everything that is contrary to the way of wildness. They said: al-ins is the opposite of the jinn, and they were named so because they are visible. One says ānastu al-shayʾ when you have seen it. Allah, exalted is He, said: 'And if you perceive in them sound judgment'." ↩

  34. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/129: سموا بذلك لأنهم كانوا يؤنسون أي يبصرون بخلاف الجن... وقوله تعالى ﴿فإن آنستم منهم رشدًا﴾ أي علمتم. وأصله أبصرتم، لأنه طريق العلم "They were named that because they used to be seen, that is, perceived by sight, unlike the jinn… And His saying, exalted is He, 'And if you perceive in them sound judgment' means: you come to know. Its original sense is 'you see', because that is the path to knowledge." ↩

  35. al-Zamakhsharī, Asās al-Balāgha, 1/35–1/36: وأَنِستُ به واستأنستُ به وأَنِستُ إليه واستأنستُ إليه "I grew familiar with him (bihi), and I sought familiarity with him (bihi), and I grew familiar with him (ilayhi), and I sought familiarity with him (ilayhi)"; وآنستُ نارًا، وآنستُ فَزَعًا، وآنستُ منه رُشْدًا... والبازي يتأنَّس إذا جلَّى ونظر رافعًا رأسَه طامحًا بطرفه "I sighted a fire; I sensed fear; I perceived sound judgment in him… And the falcon peers when it looks out and gazes, raising its head with its eye ranging far." ↩

  36. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qurʾān, 94: وقوله: فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ مِنْهُمْ رُشْداً أي: أبصرتم أنسا بهم "And His saying, 'And if you perceive in them sound judgment', that is: you have seen a familiarity with them." ↩

  37. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 6/15: ابن الأعرابي: أَنِسْتُ بفلانٍ أي فرحتُ به، وآنَسْتُ فَزَعاً... إذا أَحْسَسْتَه ووجدتَه في نفسك "Ibn al-Aʿrābī: anistu bi-fulān, that is, I was gladdened by him. And ānastu fazaʿan… when you have sensed it and found it within yourself"; يقال: آنَسْتُ منه رُشْداً أي عَلِمْتُه "One says: ānastu minhu rushdan, that is, I came to know it"; والاستئناسُ في كلام العرب النظرُ. يقال: اذهبْ فاسْتَأْنِسْ هل ترى أحداً؟ "Al-istiʾnās in the speech of the Arabs is looking. One says: Go and look, do you see anyone?". ↩

  38. al-Akhfash al-Awsaṭ, Maʿānī al-Qurʾān, 1/246: وقال ﴿آنَسْتُمْ﴾ ممدودة. تقول: «آنَسْتُ منه رُشدًا وخيرًا» و﴿آنَسْتُ نارًا﴾ مثلها ممدودة. وتقول: «أنِسْتُ بالرجل» «أُنْسًا» "He said ⟨ānastum⟩ is with the lengthened alif. You say: ‘I perceived (ānastu) in him right judgement and good.’ And ⟨I perceived a fire⟩ is like it, lengthened. And you say: ‘I became familiar with the man (anistu bi-l-rajul),’ ‘familiarity (unsan).’". ↩

  39. Al-Farrāʾ, quoted in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 6/15: والاستئناس في كلام العرب النظر يقال اذهب فاستأنس هل ترى أحدا فيكون معناه انظر من ترى في الدار, “Istiʾnās in Arab speech means looking. One says, ‘Go and look: do you see anyone?’ Its meaning is: look to see whom you find in the house.” ↩

  40. Al-Azharī, quoted in al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/129–130: اذهب فاستأنس هل ترى أحدًا معناه تبصر, “‘Go and look: do you see anyone?’ means: look carefully.” ↩

  41. al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/490: قوله: فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ أي: أبصرتم ورأيتم... قال الأزهريُّ: تقول العرب: اذهب فاستأنِسْ هل ترى أحدًا، معناه: تَبَصَّرْ "His words ‘And if you perceive’ mean: you have discerned and seen… al-Azharī said: The Arabs say, ‘Go and look about (fa-staʾnis): do you see anyone?’ Its meaning is: look closely.". al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/490; al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37. ↩

  42. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 2/398: الراء والشين والدال أصلٌ واحدٌ يدلُّ على استقامةِ الطريق. فالمَراشِد: مقاصد الطُّرُقِ. والرُّشْد والرَّشد: خِلافُ الغَىّ "Rāʾ, shīn and dāl are a single root indicating the straightness of a road. So al-marāshid are the destinations of roads. And al-rushd and al-rashad are the opposite of al-ghayy (error)." ↩

  43. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 3/175–3/176: الرُّشْد والرَّشَد والرَّشاد: نَقِيضُ الْغَيِّ... وهو نقيض الضلال، إذا أصاب وجه الأمر والطريق "Al-rushd, al-rashad and al-rashād are the opposite of al-ghayy… and it is the opposite of straying, when one hits upon the right aspect of a matter and the right road"; أبو منصور: ومنهم من جعل رَشَدَ يرشُد ورَشِدَ يرشَد بمعنًى واحد "Abū Manṣūr: Some of them treat rashada yarshudu and rashida yarshadu as having one and the same meaning." ↩

  44. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 354: الرَّشَدُ والرُّشْدُ: خلاف الغيّ... وبين الرّشدين، أعني: الرّشد المؤنس من اليتيم، والرّشد الذي أوتي إبراهيم، بون بعيد... وقال بعضهم: الرَّشَدُ أخصّ من الرُّشْدِ "Al-rashad and al-rushd are the opposite of al-ghayy… And between the two rushds, I mean the rushd perceived in the orphan and the rushd that was given to Ibrāhīm, there is a wide gap… Some of them said: al-rashad is more specific than al-rushd." ↩

  45. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 2/398: الراء والشين والدال أصلٌ واحدٌ يدلُّ على استقامةِ الطريق. فالمَراشِد: مقاصد الطُّرُقِ. والرُّشْد والرَّشد: خِلافُ الغَىّ "Rāʾ, shīn and dāl are a single root indicating the straightness of a road. So al-marāshid are the destinations of roads. And al-rushd and al-rashad are the opposite of al-ghayy (error)." ↩

  46. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 3/175–3/176: الرُّشْد والرَّشَد والرَّشاد: نَقِيضُ الْغَيِّ... وهو نقيض الضلال، إذا أصاب وجه الأمر والطريق "Al-rushd, al-rashad and al-rashād are the opposite of al-ghayy… and it is the opposite of straying, when one hits upon the right aspect of a matter and the right road"; أبو منصور: ومنهم من جعل رَشَدَ يرشُد ورَشِدَ يرشَد بمعنًى واحد "Abū Manṣūr: Some of them treat rashada yarshudu and rashida yarshadu as having one and the same meaning." ↩

  47. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 2/93: فقال أبو عمرو: بالضم الصلاح، وبالفتح الدين. ومن ثم أجمعوا على ضم ﴿فإن آنستم منهم رشدًا﴾ وفتحوا ﴿فأولئك تحروا رشدًا﴾ "Abū ʿAmr said: with ḍamma it is soundness, and with fatḥa it is religion. That is why they agreed on the ḍamma in ⟨And if you perceive rushd in them⟩ and used the fatḥa in ⟨Those have sought out rashad⟩"; وبين الرشدين... بون بعيد في المعنى، وإن اتفقا لفظًا "And between the two rushds… there is a wide gap in meaning, even though they agree in wording." ↩

  48. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 354: الرَّشَدُ والرُّشْدُ: خلاف الغيّ... وبين الرّشدين، أعني: الرّشد المؤنس من اليتيم، والرّشد الذي أوتي إبراهيم، بون بعيد... وقال بعضهم: الرَّشَدُ أخصّ من الرُّشْدِ "Al-rashad and al-rushd are the opposite of al-ghayy… And between the two rushds, I mean the rushd perceived in the orphan and the rushd that was given to Ibrāhīm, there is a wide gap… Some of them said: al-rashad is more specific than al-rushd." ↩

  49. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 354: الرَّشَدُ والرُّشْدُ: خلاف الغيّ... وبين الرّشدين، أعني: الرّشد المؤنس من اليتيم، والرّشد الذي أوتي إبراهيم، بون بعيد... وقال بعضهم: الرَّشَدُ أخصّ من الرُّشْدِ "Al-rashad and al-rushd are the opposite of al-ghayy… And between the two rushds, I mean the rushd perceived in the orphan and the rushd that was given to Ibrāhīm, there is a wide gap… Some of them said: al-rashad is more specific than al-rushd." ↩

  50. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 2/93: فقال أبو عمرو: بالضم الصلاح، وبالفتح الدين. ومن ثم أجمعوا على ضم ﴿فإن آنستم منهم رشدًا﴾ وفتحوا ﴿فأولئك تحروا رشدًا﴾ "Abū ʿAmr said: with ḍamma it is soundness, and with fatḥa it is religion. That is why they agreed on the ḍamma in ⟨And if you perceive rushd in them⟩ and used the fatḥa in ⟨Those have sought out rashad⟩"; وبين الرشدين... بون بعيد في المعنى، وإن اتفقا لفظًا "And between the two rushds… there is a wide gap in meaning, even though they agree in wording." ↩

  51. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 3/153: السين والراء والفاء أصلٌ واحدٌ يدلُّ على تعدِّى الحدّ والإغفالِ أيضاً للشئ... وأمّا الإغفال فقول القائل: «مررتُ بكم فَسرِفتكم»، أى أغفلتكم... وهذا يرجع إلى بعض ما تقدَّم. والقياس واحد "Sīn, rāʾ and fāʾ are a single root indicating going beyond the limit, and also overlooking a thing… As for overlooking, it is the speaker’s saying, ‘I passed by you fa-sariftukum,’ that is, I overlooked you… And this goes back to part of what came before. The analogy is one." ↩

  52. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/149: وأَسْرَفَ في الكلام وفي القتل: أَفْرَط, “Asrafa in speech and killing: he went to excess”; وسَرِفَ الشيءَ، بالكسر، سَرَفاً: أَغْفَلَه وأَخطأَه وجَهِلَه, “Sarifa something, with kasra: he overlooked it, missed it, or was ignorant of it.” ↩

  53. al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/80: أَعْطَوْا هُنَيْدَةَ يَحْدُوهَا ثَمَانِيَةٌ ... مَا فِي عَطَايَاهُمْ مَنٌّ وَلَا سَرَفُ. He explains سَرَف as خَطَأ, error, because they put gifts in their proper places. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/11, cites the second hemistich as مَا فِي عَطَائِهِمُ مَنٌّ وَلَا سَرَفُ and explains أَيْ لَا يُخْطِئُونَ مَوَاضِعَ الْعَطَاءِ, ‘that is, they do not miss the proper places for giving.’ ↩

  54. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/149. The entry explains سَرِفَ الشيءَ as overlooking, missing or being ignorant of it. Shimr explains سَرَفُ الماء as ما ذهَب منه في غير سَقْي ولا نَفْع, “water that goes away without irrigating or benefiting anything.” ↩

  55. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 3/153: السين والراء والفاء أصلٌ واحدٌ يدلُّ على تعدِّى الحدّ والإغفالِ أيضاً للشئ... وأمّا الإغفال فقول القائل: «مررتُ بكم فَسرِفتكم»، أى أغفلتكم... وهذا يرجع إلى بعض ما تقدَّم. والقياس واحد "Sīn, rāʾ and fāʾ are a single root indicating going beyond the limit, and also overlooking a thing… As for overlooking, it is the speaker’s saying, ‘I passed by you fa-sariftukum,’ that is, I overlooked you… And this goes back to part of what came before. The analogy is one." ↩

  56. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 408: وقولهم: مررت بكم فَسَرِفْتُكُمْ، أي: جهلتكم، من هذا، وذاك أنه تجاوز ما لم يكن حقّه أن يتجاوز فجهل "And their saying, ‘I passed by you fa-sariftukum,’ that is, I was ignorant of you, is from this; and that is because he went beyond what it was not his right to go beyond, and so he was ignorant." ↩

  57. Shimr, quoted in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/149: وكيف يكون ذلك تفسيرًا له وهو ضدُّه؟, “How can that explain it when it is its opposite?” ↩

  58. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/149, records an unnamed explanation: إسرافاً أي لا تَأَثَّلُوا منها وكلوا القوتَ على قدر نفعكم إياهم, “‘Wastefully’: that is, do not accumulate wealth from it; consume sustenance in proportion to the benefit you bring them.” ↩

  59. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 2/193: وقال إياس بن معاوية: «الإسراف: ما قصر به عن حق الله تعالى» وهو ضد القصد "Iyās b. Muʿāwiya said: ‘Isrāf is that by which one falls short of the right of Allah, exalted is He.’ And it is the opposite of moderation." ↩

  60. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 1/208–1/209: الباء والدال والراء، أصلان: أحدهما كمال الشئ وامتلاؤه، والآخر الإسراع إلى الشَّئ... ويقولون غُلامٌ بدرٌ، إذا امتلَأَ شباباً... والأصل الآخر: قولُهم بَدَرت إلى الشئ وبادَرْت "Bāʾ, dāl and rāʾ are two roots: one of them is a thing’s completeness and fullness, and the other is hastening to a thing… And they say ‘a badr of a boy’ when he is full of youth… The other root is their saying badartu ilā al-shayʾ and bādartu (I hastened to the thing)." Cf. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/165: المبادرة: المسارعة إلى الشيء "Al-mubādara is hurrying to a thing." ↩

  61. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 2/59–2/61: الحاء والسين والباء أصول أربعة: فالأول: العدّ... والأصل الثانى: الكِفاية. تقول شئ حِسَابٌ، أى كافٍ... وقد يتّفق فى أصول الأبواب هذا التفاوتُ الذى تراه فى هذه الأصول الأربعة "Ḥāʾ, sīn and bāʾ are four roots. The first is counting… The second root is sufficiency. You say, ‘a thing that is ḥisāb,’ that is, sufficient… In the roots of the chapters there may occur this divergence that you see in these four roots." ↩

  62. Al-Zajjāj, quoted in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1/312. ↩

  63. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1/312: أَحْسَبَني ما أَعْطاني أي كَفَاني, “What he gave me aḥsabanī: that is, it sufficed me.” ↩

  64. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 2/59–2/61: الحاء والسين والباء أصول أربعة: فالأول: العدّ... والأصل الثانى: الكِفاية. تقول شئ حِسَابٌ، أى كافٍ... وقد يتّفق فى أصول الأبواب هذا التفاوتُ الذى تراه فى هذه الأصول الأربعة "Ḥāʾ, sīn and bāʾ are four roots. The first is counting… The second root is sufficiency. You say, ‘a thing that is ḥisāb,’ that is, sufficient… In the roots of the chapters there may occur this divergence that you see in these four roots." ↩

  65. al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 234: وَكَفى بِاللَّهِ حَسِيباً، أي: رقيبا يحاسبهم عليه "‘And Allah suffices as a ḥasīb,’ that is: a watcher who calls them to account for it." ↩

  66. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿUmdat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 1/403: ﴿وكفى بالله حسيبا﴾ أي محاسبا لهم لأنه لا يخفى عليه من أعمالهم شيء "⟨And Allah suffices as a ḥasīb⟩, that is, One who calls them to account, because nothing of their deeds is hidden from Him." ↩

  67. Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 4/3: العين والفاء أصلان صحيحان: أحدُهما الكفُّ عن القبيح، والآخر دالٌّ على قلّة شئ. فالأول: العِفّة: الكفُّ عمّا لا ينبغى... والأصل الثانى: العُفَّة: بقيّة اللّبن فى الضَّرع "ʿAyn and fāʾ are two sound roots: one of them is restraint from what is base, and the other indicates the smallness of a thing. The first: al-ʿiffa is restraint from what is not fitting… The second root: al-ʿuffa is the remnant of milk in the udder." ↩

  68. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/253: الاسْتِعْفاف: طلَبُ العَفَافِ وهو الكَفُّ عن الحرام والسؤالِ من الناس "Al-istiʿfāf is seeking al-ʿafāf, which is restraint from what is forbidden and from asking of people"; أَعِفَّة الفَقْرِ أي إذا افْتَقَرُوا لم يغْشَوُا المسأَلة القبيحةَ "‘Restrained in poverty’, that is, when they become poor they do not resort to base begging"; واسْتَعَفَّ أي عَفَّ. وفي التنزيل: وَمَنْ كانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ؛ وكذلك تَعَفَّفَ أي تكلَّف العِفَّة "And istaʿaffa means ʿaffa (he restrained himself). In the Revelation: ‘And whoever is rich, let him refrain.’ Likewise taʿaffafa, that is, he took upon himself ʿiffa." ↩

  69. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 9/253: الاسْتِعْفاف: طلَبُ العَفَافِ وهو الكَفُّ عن الحرام والسؤالِ من الناس "Al-istiʿfāf is seeking al-ʿafāf, which is restraint from what is forbidden and from asking of people"; أَعِفَّة الفَقْرِ أي إذا افْتَقَرُوا لم يغْشَوُا المسأَلة القبيحةَ "‘Restrained in poverty’, that is, when they become poor they do not resort to base begging"; واسْتَعَفَّ أي عَفَّ. وفي التنزيل: وَمَنْ كانَ غَنِيًّا فَلْيَسْتَعْفِفْ؛ وكذلك تَعَفَّفَ أي تكلَّف العِفَّة "And istaʿaffa means ʿaffa (he restrained himself). In the Revelation: ‘And whoever is rich, let him refrain.’ Likewise taʿaffafa, that is, he took upon himself ʿiffa." ↩

  70. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/522 (Dār al-Fikr printing): ولفظة فليستعفف أبلغ من فليعف، لأن فيه طلب زيادة العفة, “The wording ‘let him seek restraint’ is stronger than ‘let him refrain,’ because it calls for greater restraint.” Al-Nasafī, Madārik al-Tanzīl, 1/332; Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/146. ↩

  71. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 12/645: وسُمُّوا يتامى بعد أن أُونس منهم الرشد بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسه منهم "They were called orphans, after sound judgment had been perceived in them, by the first name that was theirs before it was perceived in them.". اليُتْمُ: الانفرادُ؛ عن يعقوب. واليَتِيم: الفَرْدُ "Al-yutm is being alone, from Yaʿqūb. And al-yatīm is the solitary one"; وهو يَتِيمٌ حتى يبلغَ الحُلُم "And he is an orphan until he reaches puberty"; أي أعطوهم أموالَهُم إذا آنَسْتم منهم رُشْداً، وسُمُّوا يَتَامَى بعد أن أُونِسَ منهم الرُّشْدُ بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسِه منهم "That is, give them their property when you perceive right judgement in them. And they were called orphans, after right judgement had been perceived in them, by the earlier name that was theirs before it was perceived in them"; قال المفضل: أصل اليُتْم الغفْلةُ، وسمي اليَتِيمُ يَتِيماً لأنه يُتَغافَلُ عن بَرِّه. وقال أبو عمرو: اليُتْم الإِبطاء "Al-Mufaḍḍal said: the root meaning of al-yutm is heedlessness, and the orphan was called yatīm because kindness to him is neglected. And Abū ʿAmr said: al-yutm is slowness." ↩

  72. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 12/646: وأصلُ اليُتْم، بالضم والفتح، الانفرادُ، وقيل: الغفْلةُ "And the root meaning of al-yutm, with ḍamma and with fatḥa, is being alone; and it is said: heedlessness"; وإذا بَلَغا زَالَ عنهما اسمُ اليُتْم حقيقةً، وقد يطلق عليهما مجازاً بعد البلوغ "And when the two reach maturity, the name of orphanhood leaves them in reality, though it may be applied to them figuratively after maturity"; الأصمعي: اليَتِيمُ الرَّمْلةُ المُنْفردة، وكلُّ منفردٍ ومنفردةٍ عند العرب يَتِيمٌ ويَتِيمةٌ "Al-Aṣmaʿī: al-yatīm is the solitary sand dune, and every solitary thing, masculine or feminine, is with the Arabs yatīm and yatīma." See also Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 6/154: ويقولون لكلِّ منفردٍ يتيم "And they call every solitary thing yatīm." ↩

  73. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 12/645: وسُمُّوا يتامى بعد أن أُونس منهم الرشد بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسه منهم "They were called orphans, after sound judgment had been perceived in them, by the first name that was theirs before it was perceived in them.". اليُتْمُ: الانفرادُ؛ عن يعقوب. واليَتِيم: الفَرْدُ "Al-yutm is being alone, from Yaʿqūb. And al-yatīm is the solitary one"; وهو يَتِيمٌ حتى يبلغَ الحُلُم "And he is an orphan until he reaches puberty"; أي أعطوهم أموالَهُم إذا آنَسْتم منهم رُشْداً، وسُمُّوا يَتَامَى بعد أن أُونِسَ منهم الرُّشْدُ بالاسم الأول الذي كان لهم قبل إيناسِه منهم "That is, give them their property when you perceive right judgement in them. And they were called orphans, after right judgement had been perceived in them, by the earlier name that was theirs before it was perceived in them"; قال المفضل: أصل اليُتْم الغفْلةُ، وسمي اليَتِيمُ يَتِيماً لأنه يُتَغافَلُ عن بَرِّه. وقال أبو عمرو: اليُتْم الإِبطاء "Al-Mufaḍḍal said: the root meaning of al-yutm is heedlessness, and the orphan was called yatīm because kindness to him is neglected. And Abū ʿAmr said: al-yutm is slowness." ↩

  74. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 12/646: وأصلُ اليُتْم، بالضم والفتح، الانفرادُ، وقيل: الغفْلةُ "And the root meaning of al-yutm, with ḍamma and with fatḥa, is being alone; and it is said: heedlessness"; وإذا بَلَغا زَالَ عنهما اسمُ اليُتْم حقيقةً، وقد يطلق عليهما مجازاً بعد البلوغ "And when the two reach maturity, the name of orphanhood leaves them in reality, though it may be applied to them figuratively after maturity"; الأصمعي: اليَتِيمُ الرَّمْلةُ المُنْفردة، وكلُّ منفردٍ ومنفردةٍ عند العرب يَتِيمٌ ويَتِيمةٌ "Al-Aṣmaʿī: al-yatīm is the solitary sand dune, and every solitary thing, masculine or feminine, is with the Arabs yatīm and yatīma." See also Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lugha, 6/154: ويقولون لكلِّ منفردٍ يتيم "And they call every solitary thing yatīm." ↩

Balāghah: Rhetorical Analysis

  1. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/238: وهو كناية عن الخروج من حالة الصبا للذكر والأنثى "And it is an indirect expression (kināya) for leaving the state of childhood, for the male and the female." ↩

  2. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/239: تختلف باختلاف البلاد في الحرارة والبرودة، وباختلاف أمزجة أهل البلد الواحد في القوة والضعف "It differs with the difference of lands in heat and cold, and with the difference of the constitutions of the people of a single land in strength and weakness." ↩

  3. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/242, on why آنستم stands in place of علمتم, and on handing the property over دون تراخٍ ولا مطل without delay or postponement. ↩

  4. al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 1/473: والإيناس: الاستيضاح فاستعير للتبيين "And al-īnās is seeking to see clearly, so it was borrowed metaphorically for making clear." ↩

  5. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/242, on why آنستم stands in place of علمتم, and on handing the property over دون تراخٍ ولا مطل without delay or postponement. ↩

  6. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Tafsīr al-Qayyim, p. 680: والإنس والإنسان: مشتق من الإيناس، وهو الرؤية والإحساس "And al-ins and al-insān: derived from al-īnās, which is seeing and perceiving", citing Q 4:6 together with Q 28:29. ↩

  7. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145: للاهتمام بالمقدَّم والتشويق إلى المؤخر, “To give importance to what comes first and create anticipation of what follows.” He applies this to مِنْهُمْ before رُشْدًا and إِلَيْهِمْ before أَمْوَالَهُمْ. ↩

  8. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/243, naming the indefinite تنكير النوعية indefiniteness of kind (tankīr al-nawʿiyya). ↩

  9. al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/437, quoting al-Kashshāf: الفائدة في تنكير الرشد التنبيه على أن المعتبر هو الرشد في التصرف والتجارة، أو على أن المعتبر هو حصول طرفٍ من الرشد، وظهور أثر من آثاره حتى لا ينتظر به تمام الرشد "The point of leaving rushd indefinite is to draw attention to the fact that what counts is sound judgement in handling property and trade, or that what counts is attaining some part of sound judgement and seeing one of its effects, so that complete sound judgement is not awaited." ↩

  10. Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/410, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, from ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. Aslam through Yūnus and Ibn Wahb. ↩

  11. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/521 (Dār al-Fikr printing), reports from Ibn ʿAbbās and others: أبادر كبره لئلا يرشد ويأخذ ماله, “I hurry ahead of his growing up, lest he acquire sound judgement and take his property.” He gives no isnād for this wording. ↩

  12. al-ʿUkbarī, al-Tibyān fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/332: فكأنهما يستبقان "So it is as though the two of them were racing each other." ↩

  13. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/521 (Dār al-Fikr printing): لأن اليتيم مبادر إلى الكبر، والولي مبادر إلى أخذ ماله، فكأنهما مستبقان, “The orphan is hurrying toward adulthood, and the guardian toward taking his property: they are like two people racing.” ↩

  14. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/244: المفاعلة هنا قصد منها تمثيل هيئة الأولياء, “The reciprocal form here portrays the guardians’ conduct.” ↩

  15. Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 4/316: يحولون بينهم وبين أسباب الرشد "They come between them and the means of sound judgment." ↩

  16. al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 6/429: فأشهدوا على الأيتام باستيفائهم ذلك منكم، ودفعكموه إليهم "So call witnesses against the orphans that they have received that from you in full, and that you have handed it over to them.". فليدفعه إليه بالشهود كما أمره الله "So let him hand it over to him with witnesses, as Allah commanded him.". وكفى بالله كافيًا من الشهود الذين يشهدهم والي اليتيم "And Allah is sufficient in place of the witnesses whom the orphan’s guardian calls to witness." ↩

  17. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/244: فليس القصد تقييد النهي عن الأكل بذلك بل المقصود تشويه حالة الأكل, “The purpose is not to restrict the prohibition of consuming the property to this, but to expose the ugliness of that conduct.” ↩

  18. Al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/238, identifies الطِّبَاق between غَنِيًّا and فَقِيرًا: antithesis between rich and poor. ↩

  19. Al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/238, calls the parallel conditions and their responses المقابلة اللطيفة, “the subtle paired contrast.” ↩

  20. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/146: واستعفَّ أبلغُ من عفّ كأنه يطلب زيادةَ العفة "And istaʿaffa is stronger than ʿaffa, as though he were seeking an increase in restraint." ↩

  21. Al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/238. ↩

  22. Al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/238, identifies الجناس المغاير between فَادْفَعُوا and دَفَعْتُمْ: related-root wordplay in different forms. ↩

  23. Al-Ṣābūnī, Ṣafwat al-Tafāsīr, 1/238, identifies الإطناب in repeating the handover phrase. ↩

  24. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145, on فادفعوا "then hand over" here against وآتوا and give at 4:2: إيذانٌ بتفاوتهما بحسب المعنى "an indication that the two of them differ in respect of meaning." ↩

  25. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/247. ↩

  26. Ibn ʿĀshūr, al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, 4/247. ↩

  27. al-ʿUkbarī, al-Tibyān fī Iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, 1/332, on the added bāʾ: دخلت لتدل على معنى الأمر، إذ التقدير: اكتف بالله "It was brought in to indicate the sense of the imperative, since the implied wording is: take Allah as sufficient." ↩

  28. al-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, al-Durr al-Maṣūn, 3/587: أصحُّهما: أنه تمييزٌ يَدُلُّ على ذلك صلاحيةُ دخولِ «مِنْ» عليه، وهي علامةُ التمييز. والثاني: أنه حال "The sounder of the two: that it is a tamyīz (specifying complement). What shows that is the admissibility of placing ‘min’ before it, and that is the mark of the tamyīz. The second: that it is a ḥāl (circumstantial qualifier)." ↩

  29. al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm al-Durar, 5/196–5/197: ولما نهى عن ذلك البذل للسفهاء أيتاماً كانا أو غيرهم، بين أنه ليس دائماً بل ما دام السفه قائماً... ولما كان السفه أمراً باطناً لا يعرف إلا بالتصرف ولا سيما في المال؛ بدأ سبحانه بتعليم ما يتوصلون به إلى معرفته "When He forbade that handing over of property to the foolish, whether they be orphans or others, He made clear that it is not permanent, but only so long as the foolishness stands… And since foolishness is an inward matter that is known only through conduct, especially in money, He, glorified is He, began by teaching what they may reach knowledge of it by." ↩

  30. Abū al-Suʿūd, Irshād al-ʿAql al-Salīm, 2/145: شروع في تعيين وقت تسليم أموال اليتامى إليهم وبيان شرطه بعد الأمر بإيتائها على الإطلاق والنهي عنه عند كون أصحابها سفهاء, “It begins specifying when the orphans’ property is to be handed over and its condition, after the general command to give it and the prohibition of doing so when its owners lack sound judgement.” ↩

Qirāʾāt: The Readings

  1. Ibn al-Jazarī, al-Nashr fī al-Qirāʾāt al-ʿAshr, 2/247–250, records no difference at 4:6 between the entries for 4:5 and 4:9. At 2/312 he cites 4:6 as a case of أُجْمِعَ, agreement on one vocalization. The printed line there reads فَتْحِهِ, while al-Qasṭallānī's quotation of the same sentence from al-Nashr, Laṭāʾif al-Ishārāt, 6/32, reads ضَمِّه, which matches the canonical form. The editorial note in al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/69, states: وَالْمُتَوَاتِرَةُ هِيَ الْأُولَى بِضَمِّ الرَّاءِ وَسُكُونِ الشِّينِ فَقَطْ ‘The mutawātir form is only the first, with ḍamma on the rāʾ and sukūn on the shīn.’ ↩

  2. al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 1/490, names Ibn Masʿūd, al-Sulamī and ʿĪsā al-Thaqafī for رَشَدًا. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519, and Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10, add Abū al-Simāl. Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/69, names only al-Sulamī and ʿĪsā. Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37, prints وَقَرَأَ السُّلَمِيُّ وَعِيسَى وَالثَّقَفِيُّ وَابْنُ مَسْعُودٍ; its coordinated wording is retained without deciding whether ʿĪsā and al-Thaqafī designate one person or two. The form is absent from al-Nashr at 4:6 and from Ibn Jinnī's al-Muḥtasab, 1/179–182. Al-Thaʿlabī's editorial note identifies only رُشْدًا with ḍamma on the rāʾ and sukūn on the shīn as mutawātir and cites Iʿrāb al-Qirāʾāt al-Shawādhdh for the form with two fatḥas. ↩

  3. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519: وَقَرَأَ ابْنُ مَسْعُودٍ: فَإِنْ أَحَسْتُمْ، يُرِيدُ أَحْسَسْتُمْ ‘Ibn Masʿūd read: fa-in aḥastum, intending aḥsastum.’ He calls the deletion شُذُوذٌ occurring in a few words, then reports that other grammarians regarded it as a regular feature of the dialect of Sulaym. Al-Samīn, al-Durr al-Maṣūn, 3/584, preserves the same two accounts. The form is not among the ten readings in al-Nashr and is not entered in al-Muḥtasab for this verse. ↩

  4. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10: وَقَرَأَ ابْنُ مَسْعُودٍ: حَسْتُم، بِالْحَاءِ وَسُكُونِ السِّينِ عَلَى مِثَالِ فَعَلْتُمْ ‘Ibn Masʿūd read ḥastum, with ḥāʾ and a still sīn, on the pattern faʿaltum.’ This is an outlier form in the inspected sources; Ibn ʿAṭiyya reports it, while Ibn Masʿūd is the attributed carrier. ↩

  5. Abū Ḥayyān, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 3/519: وَقُرِئَ شَاذًّا: رُشُدًا بِضَمَّتَيْنِ ‘And it was read noncanonically, rushudan, with two ḍammas.’ No carrier is named for 4:6. The same form is a canonical reading at al-Kahf 18:66 for Ibn ʿĀmir; Ibn Khālawayh, Iʿrāb al-Qirāʾāt al-Sabʿ, p. 231. That is a different verse. ↩

  6. Ibn ʿAṭiyya, al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz, 2/10: وَالْمَعْنَى وَاحِدٌ ‘the meaning is one.’ Al-Thaʿlabī, al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān, 10/69, and al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5/37: وَهُمَا لُغَتَانِ ‘they are two dialectal forms.’ Al-Qurṭubī also says آنَسْتُ وَأَحْسَسْتُ وَوَجَدْتُ بِمَعْنًى وَاحِدٍ ‘ānastu, aḥsastu and wajadtu have one meaning.’ Ibn al-Jazarī records Abū ʿAmr's narrower lexical distinction in al-Nashr, 2/312, while citing 4:6 as the agreed canonical case rather than a locus of competing readings. ↩

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